The Social Contract

Vol. XIV, No. 2 Winter 2003-4

Highlights

Gerda Bikales is Guest Editor for an examination of France as it copes with a mushrooming Muslim population. To her own essays and an interview she adds articles by:

Jean-Paul Gourévitch
Theodore Dalrymple
Sophie Masson
Michele Tribalat

Linda Thom reviews statistics relating to economic prospects for Hispanic immigrants and their offspring.

Disturbing aspects of H1-B and L-1 visas embedded in the free trade agreements are explained by Rob Sanchez.

John Cairns, Jr. expands Garrett Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons' to its global ramifications.

Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) discusses the impact of projected amnesties on American Culture.

Selected books are reviewed by Katherine Betts, Gerda Bikales, John Attarian, and Carl Bajema.

France: Once a Nation...



John Culbertson's essay on the pitfalls of free trade with Mexico is as arresting today as it was twelve years ago. See page 122.

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About THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

The English philosopher John Locke, whose thinking helped inspire the American revolution, said that society should be governed by an understood set of values he termed "the social contract." Under the social contract, governments have obligations to their citizens, and citizens have responsibilities to society.

Most public issues are basically moral and ethical ones. What is the right thing to do? How do we decide what we think is right? When "rights" collide, which ones take precedence? The concept of the social contract helps us sort out the difficult issues confronting American society today and helps us find balance.

Each quarter THE SOCIAL CONTRACT journal examines trends, events, and ideas that have an impact on America's delicate social fabric. Key topics addressed by this journal:

- *Human population issues, including absolute size, rate of growth, and distribution. Do cherished American ideals prosper or suffer through further population growth?*
- *Immigration issues. In order to best facilitate meeting the highest goals of the American people, (1) how many immigrants should we admit? (2) who should be admitted? and (3) how can we humanely enforce the rules?*
- *Language, assimilation, culture, and national unity considerations. What shared values are necessary to the maintenance of our social contract?*
- *The balance of individual rights and civic responsibilities. Since the previous issues are so often framed in terms of rights, what are the balancing obligations?*
- *Other nations' efforts at creating and guarding their own social contracts. What practical insight can be gained from observing the failures and successes in nation-building by other societies?*

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT explores these complex and interrelated issues with articles, essays and book reviews that vary greatly in outlook and philosophy. We encourage a wide spectrum of opinion as we publish contributions from many vantage points. The opinions expressed by the writers are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

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A Note from the Editor

'Free Trade' Costs Lives and Jobs

As we go to press, President Bush and other leaders of 34 American nations agreed to create a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas. Bush is pushing to have this functioning by next year.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is now in its eleventh year. At the time it was signed by Mexico, the United States, and Canada, Mexican President Carlos Salinas swore that all three countries would benefit. NAFTA was supposed to open up a large market in Mexico for U.S. products, Mexican wages were supposed to rise, thus keeping Mexicans working in their own country, with the tide of illegal immigrants coming to a virtual halt.

It hasn't worked out that way. Real wages in Mexico are lower than before NAFTA. While American manufacturing jobs have been going south to Mexico and across the Pacific to China and other Asian countries, Mexico, in turn has been losing jobs to China and other countries. Employment at Mexican-American border *maquiladoras* is down more than 20% from four years ago. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, manufacturing wages in Mexico now exceed those of the Dominican Republic by 67% and are about 92% higher than in Honduras. With trade liberalization and World Trade Organization diktats, Mexico is experiencing some of the same negative consequences of "Free Trade" that Americans have over the past decade. Textile, apparel, shoe and toy production jobs that went from the United States to Mexico are now going to even lower-wage countries in the Caribbean, Central America, and Asia.

Illegal aliens and drugs continue to flow across the Mexican border. Twenty-nine states report more than 100% increases in their Mexican born populations.

Americans are told that we are in the midst of an economic "recovery." But it is a recovery without new good jobs. We now have 2,944,000 fewer private sector jobs than the U.S. had in January 2001. During the past 25 months, the U.S. economy shed another 1,321,000 manufacturing jobs, and over 2.7 manufacturing jobs have been lost since Bush became president. Rep. Bernie Sanders (Independent-Vermont) made the following points in the October 14, 2003 issue of *The Hill*:

> *Our economy has been decimated by 'free' trade, and someone has to point out that, like the proverbial naked emperor, our policies have no clothes—or more appropriately in this context, no jobs making clothes, or electronics, or a host of products we use every day....*
>
> *The demise of well-paid manufacturing jobs is best illustrated by the following: 20 years ago, the largest private*

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employer in the United States was General Motors, where workers earned – and still earn – a good income. Today, our largest employer is Wal-Mart, where workers earn below-poverty wages.

Corporate America and its supporters in the White House and Congress are destroying the American middle class by making jobs America's No. 1 export. If we continue to force American workers to 'compete' against desperate people throughout the world, American workers will continue to lose.

'Free Trade' is not just costing Americans their jobs; it is literally killing some of us. In October, 38-year old auto mechanic Jeff Cook became the first person to die in what federal officials reported as the worst outbreak of hepatitis A in the United States. Cook contracted the liver-destroying disease from green onions consumed at a Chi-Chi's Mexican restaurant outside Pittsburgh, PA. At least three other people died and over 600 were sickened from infected Mexican produce sold in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Georgia. According to the federal Centers for Disease Control, "hepatitis A is spread from person to person by putting something in the mouth that has been contaminated with the stool of a person with Hepatitis A. The virus is more easily spread in areas where there are poor sanitary conditions or where good personal hygiene is not observed." The U.S. Department of Agriculture reports that 23% of the fresh fruits and vegetables consumed in the U.S. are imported, with Mexico being the top source of winter produce. Fruits and vegetables are not subject to the same inspections that imported meat is. Hepatitis A can linger for weeks in raw produce. Polluted water, children in diapers roaming the Mexican fields, and poor hygiene among agricultural workers all contribute to the spread of the disease.

In this issue, we reprint an article by John M. Culbertson, Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, "US 'Free Trade' With Mexico: Progress Or Self-Destruction?" First published in *The Social Contract*, Fall 1991, it is well worth reading again.

* * * *

We express our thanks to Gerda Bikales for guest-editing our feature section. France, the Netherlands, Germany, England, indeed all the European countries, are grappling with the rise of Muslim populations. What expectation can there be that such militantly un-Western people can ever genuinely be "assimilated"? This leads to the real issue at stake: do the men and women of the West have the will to survive in their own homelands?

WAYNE LUTTON, PH.D.

Letters to the Editor

EDITOR:

Those of us who admired the late Garrett Hardin could not be more disappointed in Gregg Easterbrook's op ed of 10/21/03 in the *Wall Street Journal* entitled "The Tragedy of Garrett Hardin" which raised the most profound question of all time: Can humanity overwhelm the earth? Unfortunately, Mr. Easterbrook gets the answer wrong and slurs Hardin in the process.

Easterbrook starts his piece by dubbing Hardin as "brilliant, wise and gentle" but "often desperately wrong." His piece then cites Hardin's well-known positions on resource limitations, perhaps best exemplified by his famous essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," which Easterbrook properly notes is regarded by most as "an argument against selfishness." He then notes, completely incorrectly, that Hardin "was arguing for government-imposed population control," something Hardin *never* advocated.

Getting the name of Hardin's wife, Jane, wrong, joins other errors – his most blatant being confusing Hardin's statements about wished-for human behavior as a call for government enforced action against procreation. Hardin was a valuntarist through and through, although he felt that as the resources of the planet are more and more denigrated, the choices for continuing life on Earth may force draconian measures, preventable in totally voluntary and benign

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ways if we would but perceive what Easterbrook (and far too many others like the late Julian Simon) miss: Humans can, like denizens of Easter Island, use up enough resources to sink us all into disastrous conflict. That remote island's Rapanuam tribes were once 20,000 reduced by the Four Horsemen to 110. But then, this is the main argument of our times. And Hardin had it right.

DON COLLINS
Washington, D.C.

[Mr. Collins served on many voluntary family planning boards with Dr. Hardin including Planned Parenthood.]

EDITOR:

Many thanks to *The Social Contract* for the review of the *Environmental Congressional Scorecard Booklet from CUSP - Comprehensive (approach to a) U.S. Sustainable Population*, <uscongress-enviroscore.org> (*The Social Contract*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Fall 2003, page 75). Our scorecard is truly environmental unlike the environmental standard, the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) Scorecard.

The CUSP scorecard was launched in Y2000 with two initial goals: to persuade LCV to adopt comprehensive environmental scoring by including votes that affect future U.S. population numbers, and second, to persuade Project Vote Smart to rate Congressmembers on the environment using CUSP scores, which, happily, it now does.

Ignoring population numbers as the root cause of environmental impacts in the U.S. is staggering intellectual dishonesty yet the entire American environmental Establishment is guilty of doing it. And LCV, "the political arm of the American environmental movement," does the Establishment's bidding.

This can't continue much longer. The limits that Nature imposes on U.S. population growth are more and more apparent. At home, water shortages are showing up across the country, and energy shortages loom closer every day. Abroad, our nearly 25% responsibility for global warming and climate change leaves us vulnerable to international censure.

In his review, Prof. Wolpin (a CUSP Endorser) demonstrates why the Big Enviros avoid the subject of U.S. population growth, even though it is the highest by far among industrialized nations. His remarks on racial preference in immigration and on denial of women's choice are the sort of discussion they don't want to engage in.

CUSP was created to provide a non-confrontational, non-polarizing way for the large environmental organizations to join the fight against U.S. overpopulation and for immigration reform.

Our appeals to LCV and its member-organizations are shown on the CUSP website Archive page. Readers of *The Social Contract*, especially those who contribute to those organizations, are encouraged to add their appeals to ours.

Re: Professor Wolpin's comment, "Dr. Kuper probably deserves... a medal from the Sierra Club for his effort..." I already have two of the Club's national awards.

ALAN KUPER, President
CUSP

EDITOR:

I have received a copy of the summer edition of *The Social Contract*. I have read it and not only enjoyed it but learned a lot. The information contained only makes me more aware and better armed to try to do what I can to save our nation.

D. A. KING
Marietta, Georgia

EDITOR:

Congratulations on your Fall issue on diseases brought to America by the unscreened immigrant hordes. The articles on TB reminded me of my illness in 1948 (World War II Prisoner of War camp related). Streptomycin had just become available so for a month they injected my posterior cheeks daily, in alternate sequence. After six months of bed rest I went home and started a year of pneumothorax, which is the injection of air into the lungs for temporary collapse and rest for the infected area. No problem since then. A fellow patient at the sanitorium, a coal miner, died of his blackened lungs. They called it "anthrovolcano-siliconeosis."

The Social Contract should be required study at every college and university, as well as by every politician.

ANDY KERR
Laguna Woods, California

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About This Issue

Some thoughts from the guest editor

by Gerda Bikales

Writings about a foreign country, a non-English speaking one at that, demand an effort from everyone – translators, editors and readers too. We thank our readers in advance for putting up with all those words in italics and parentheses, with unfamiliar names and institutions, with all those explanatory footnotes.

We think that the subject is worth that effort. We are talking about France here, the country that, for its own reasons, stood with us at the dawn of our Revolution, and was fired up by events on our side of the Atlantic to start a Revolution of its own. Together, these two nations pulled off the chains of tyranny that had so long oppressed the peoples of Europe and its American colonies, allowing new societies to flourish in freedom.

Most revolutionary, of course, were the ideas that had preceded action. That ordinary people, guided by reason, had the power and even the duty to rule themselves, that every human being had inherent rights to liberty and dignity simply by virtue of *being*, was new thinking that electrified the world. Many of these theories were generated by the French philosophers we know so well – Montesquieu and Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau – collectively known in their country as *les lumières*, "the lights" that lit the way. The theories were implemented by the American Founding Fathers, who were the first to make them work in the real world.

And so the ties between France and the United States have been deep and indeed special. America was fortunate, for its Revolution was clean and decisive. The French Revolution of 1789 was not. It was followed by the bloody Terror and repeated slides into autocratic rule – monarchs, emperors, and the fascist Vichy government. But the relationship endured, as the American World War I and World War II military cemeteries in France attest.

It was never unambiguous. The Founders who spent much time in France reacted very differently to that experience. Thomas Jefferson was a great admirer of everything French, while John Adams detested it. Benjamin Franklin had a fine time in France but was mistrustful. The French, for their part, were not much given to gratitude. In the post-World War II years, as French influence waned, they showed themselves increasingly resentful of America's political and cultural preeminence. As the playwright Eugène Labiche observed in one of his comedies, people don't much care for those who save them, but tend to be very fond of those they save. He might have been thinking of the France-U.S. relationship.

> ***"The post-communist world has not been kind to France. With America the world's unrivaled superpower, anti-American resentment boiled over, most memorably in its aggressive power plays in the weeks leading up to the Iraq war."***

Other than a common history as pioneering promoters of human freedom, there were other characteristics about France that Americans found *sympathique*. Its population was the most diverse on

***Gerda Bikales** is a member of the advisory board of* The Social Contract. *Formerly the first executive director of U.S.English she is currently a member of the board of directors of English Language Advocates (ELA). A frequent visitor to France, Mrs. Bikales writes from her home in North Bethesda, Maryland..*

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the European continent – as the country had united dispersed dukedoms and shaped them into one nation, it took in Celts, Germans, Basques, and various Mediterranean peoples. In the nineteenth century, France too became a country of immigration, adding Italians, Spaniards, Arabs, Poles, Russians, Armenians and others to the mix. It demanded a high level of franco-conformity from these newcomers, far more than the mild anglo-conformity we expected from our own immigrants. In both countries, the schools of the era were up to the task of training the next generation of citizens. And in both countries, the past forty years have seen large-scale immigration from the non-Western world and new challenges to their assimilative capacities.

The "sixties" are another revolution that we shared with France. Again, theirs started after ours, in 1968, but it made up for the delay by its intensity. The revolt of the young and privileged against the middle-class standards of their parents combined high-minded concern for the world's disadvantaged with exalted sexual freedom. As in America, respected institutions – the family, the church, the schools – quickly lost their authority. French universities overturned the merit standard and opened their doors wide, building many new ones in the process. Many veterans of those heady times, the "*soixante-huitards,*" the sixty-eighters," are now in positions of leadership in the country. Like their American analogs, they preach impassioned political correctness to people who have come to know better.

The post-communist world has not been kind to France. With America the world's unrivaled superpower, anti-American resentment boiled over, most memorably in its aggressive power plays in the weeks leading up to the Iraq war. The Atlantic alliance that had united Western Europe and North America against the communist threat had lost its relevance and France searched for alternatives. It has pinned its hopes for renewed international influence and prestige on a federated European Union, within which it could rightfully play a starring role. Looking about for a new friend, it thinks it found one in today's bigger, bolder, reunited Germany. Of course, Germany is a country that can not ever claim to have saved France and so, if Labiche's views on friendship are sound, it may be a good match for a time.

We have assembled in this issue a number of articles aiming to shed some light on what has become of our old partner, beyond what we casually gather from the press. We asked Jean-Paul Gourévitch, an expert on African immigration to France, to share his thoughts on Raspail's prophecy of a Third World invasion of France, thirty years after the publication of *Camp of the Saints*. We probed this further in a more wide-ranging interview, which left us with mixed impressions. Theodore Dalrymple sadly watches the lights go out in the "City of Lights." This writer takes a stab at explaining the Corsican conundrum that has exposed the French government's paralysis and double-dealings when faced with a bunch of terrorist racketeers. We have a report on the ultimate politically correct trial – that of the novelist Michel Houellebeck. The demographer Michele Tribalat clues us in on the significance of the Islamic veil controversy, and helps us to get a handle on the number of Muslims living in France, a subject that comes up repeatedly in this issue. Finally, in the book review section, we feature a recent collection of essays on the state of the schools.

Read on!

GERDA BIKALES

Further Collection of Papers by John Cairns, Jr., Ph.D.

ESEP (Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics) makes professional papers and insights available world-wide, free of charge and at one's fingertips. Currently posted is Book 2 by Dr. Cairns, "Eco-Ethics and Sustainability Ethics." It contains such chapters as: "Ethical Issues in Ecological Restoration," "Environmental Refugees," "Repairing the Country's Ecological Infrastructure:The Cumulative Impact of Small Decisions," seventeen in all.

Downloads are free of charge at
http://www.int-res.com/
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Parable Or Reality?

A Third World invasion of France – 30 years after The Camp of the Saints

by Jean-Paul Gourévitch

In 1973 Jean Raspail published *The Camp of the Saints*, according to the author a "prophetic" book, about a peaceful invasion of France by a million immigrants from the Ganges. Today, should we consider this much translated and reprinted book as an epic novel, as a warning to a Western society in the throes of social disintegration, or as a sociological essay anticipating an inevitable process of change?



Raspail the novelist did not give a date for the announced apocalypse, but the essayist guiding his pen did not want his warning to be in vain. In *Figaro Magazine* of 26 October 1985, a feature article written by Jean Raspail and Gérard–François Dumont, President of the Institute of Political Demography, was published below a photograph of a veiled Muslim woman and the startling headline: "Will we still be French in 30 years?" The subtitle was explicit: "Here, revealed for the first time, you will find the hidden numbers which will endanger national identities and shape the destiny of our civilization in the thirty years ahead."

One discovers right away that the picture on the cover changes the source of the invasion – it is no longer Indian but North African. Jean Raspail explained it in the preface to the third edition, allowing for "an element of personal caution and, especially ... my refusal to enter the current booby-trapped debate in France on racism and anti-racism – as well as my revulsion at highlighting social tensions which were already perceptible but not yet discussed, and thus risk making them more poisonous."

Let us be clear. It was politically incorrect and legally dangerous to allude to North African and Moslem immigration at a time when militant anti-racism held the high ground. I have recently met with Jean Raspail and he confided that if he were to rewrite the book today he would not change anything, but this work would not find a publisher because of the taboos weighing down heavily on French publishing and intellectual debate. A conspiracy of silence muzzles the data on immigration. Government authorities close their eyes and refuse to make them public.

From the Novel to Statistics

It is therefore all the more interesting to look at the migration statistics used in *Figaro Magazine*. The method chosen differentiates between the French population that includes "French citizens of non-European origin," who had become French through naturalization, and "foreigners of non-European origin" (F.N.E.),[1] a population that "hails mostly from the Mediterranean Basin and Africa and is 90 percent Islamic by religion or culture." The total fertility rate used 1.25 for the "French" population and 4.69 for the F.N.E. population. Annual net migration was set at 59,000. Jean Raspail and Gérard François drew some inescapable conclusions from this data. Growth of the foreign population leads to a gradual inversion of the statistical curve.

"By 2015 the population of French nationals will have lost 5,200,000 persons, while the F.N.E., will have gained that many, representing 17 percent of the resident population of France." The annual number of

---

Jean-Paul Gourévitch *is an international expert on French-speaking Africa. Among other works, he is the author of* African France [La France africaine] *and* The Informal Economy, [l'Economie informelle] *published by le Pré aux Clercs, [Paris].*

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F.N.E. births (218,000) is more than half of all French births (373,000). This means that in every school there is on average one foreign student for every two French students. If we take into account the concentration of this population in certain regions (Paris, the Midi region, the Northern region, the Rhône-Alps) there will be thousands of schools with close to 100 percent F.N.E. Furthermore, Gérard-François Dumont points out that the official statistics are wrong, as they underestimate the number of F.N.E.s by about 15 to 20 percent. Consequently, in 2015 France will no longer be a nation, but merely a geographical space; the Muslim religion will be the primary one in France and, "in a multi-racial France that will have become multi-racist" freedom will amount to nothing more than the sum of its conflicts. With more than 309 million inhabitants living in a bloc formed by North Africa-Egypt-Turkey and Syria, and the France-Spain-Italy bloc weighing in with no more than 153 million people, it will be impossible to resist the pressure of Mediterranean countries which "already have their advance team in France."

"He [Raspail] ponders that Islamic extremism and poverty remain two threats to the West which feed on one another."

Besieged, Europe will have to learn "the resigned courage of being poor amidst other poor peoples" or find once again "the unflinching courage to be rich." This means that Europe will need to pass on to the countries of the Third World those cultural and technical values that will allow them to develop at home, instead of us accepting their population here.

This scenario is not limited to France. The same article talks about overpopulated Caribbean islands incapable of building a viable future for themselves. Also mentioned is the Mexican demographic powder keg that besieges an American giant, in need of repatriating its troops from Europe in order to block the "army of poor people obviously responding to propaganda"[2] from crossing the Rio Grande del Norte.

Any long-term prediction is naturally prone to error. The French demographer, Hervé Le Bras, estimated that the discrepancy between forecasts and real outcomes is about 0.7 annually. Starting out in 1990 with an estimated African population of 647 million in a world population of 5.29 billion, we can project a population of 1.39 to 1.79 billion Africans in 2025, in a world population ranging between 7.59 and 9.42 billion. Today Jean Raspail subtly redraws his catastrophic scenario by suggesting that the clash will take place closer to 2040 than to 2015. He ponders that Islamic extremism and poverty remain two threats to the West which feed on one another. He adds that, in a world of human rights, the weak (the victims) are always in the right when pitted against the strong (the oppressors). We are probably moving towards a French type of communalism, a system that caters to the differences between many distinct communities. In effect, it is a form of apartheid in which each community develops according to its own traditions, values, and religion, in enclaves that escape the application of the laws of the State, thereby striking a decisive blow to the civic values of integration.

How Does *The Camp of the Saints* Measure Up Today?

So, what is France's situation in 2003? The net migration figures are fuzzy estimates, due to internal migration within the European community. These days the number is closer to 100,000 than to 59,000. Adding the massive influx of illegal immigrants into French territory, which at first glance appears to be around 100,000 per annum (some of whom go on to other countries, however) reinforces the notion that France is becoming more and more North African "*beur*"[3] and "black."[4] Conversely, the total fertility rate attributed to this F.N.E. population is vastly overestimated. Though the population of African origin still has a very high fertility rate, the gap in fertility rates between the population of North African origin and the average for the total French population is gradually closing. The fact that the rate for all of France has gone back up to 1.9 is not only due to the impact of immigration, but also because "French-by-ancestry" women are having more children.

But the increase in France's Muslim population is real: it was 550,000 in 1962, 1.4 million in 1973,

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nearly 3 million in 1982, and it is more than 6 million today. There is, however, no indication that this increase will continue at the same rate. In fact, the rate has been slowing down. In any case, although it is likely that the Muslim religion will become the primary one in France over the course of the twenty-first century, this certainly won't happen by 2015 and possibly not even by 2040, despite immigration, fertility differentials, and an increase in conversions to Islam.

Jean Raspail states emphatically that these populations will not assimilate. Although it is true that in France today the traditional motors of integration – the army, the church, school, work, civic obligations, urbanization – are obsolete or dysfunctional, other shared interests are coming to the fore to unite French men and women, regardless of their origins, around common values. Sport, music, celebrations, entertainment, communication, and the informal economy[5] are examples. But the *Figaro-Magazine* hypothesis relies heavily on the nationality differences between "French" and "foreigners." As the authors note, "according to current lax policies granting automatic citizenship through birth on our soil, these F.N.E. children born in France are nearly all French," which means that the problem is not between French and foreigners, but between those "French by origin" and those descended from immigrants.

"...a parable that shows the cowardice of Western politicians, their lame pronouncements and compromises in the name of humanitarian ideals."

We should therefore be turning our attention to the immigrant population or to their children rather than to the foreign population. The former group, of foreign origin but choosing to live in France with their children, cannot be considered as a monolithic bloc. One cannot put in the same box young women of North African descent – "*beurettes*"[6] – who are trying at all costs to get access to higher education, and the "big brothers – *les grands frères*"[7] – who find it more lucrative and of greater immediate relevance to devote themselves to selling drugs. Islam in France is itself very diverse. There is the Islam of the mosques and the Islam of the cellars, North African Islam and Black African Islam, and moderate Islam and radical Islam. To refer to an Islamic threat is to look at Islam only on the surface; Islam's diversity was apparent recently when the Minister for the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, attempted to constitute a council that would be representative of Muslims in France. What a variety of conceptions of Islam did he come up against!

To presume that the *beurs* will be the "leading [political] party in France" and that they will refuse to choose between traditional French conservatism and socialism, voting instead very differently and "for extreme [parties], almost certainly manipulated by religious or political powers from outside France", bespeaks a certain contempt for their freedom of choice and does not correspond to any tangible reality today. Although it is true that there are neighborhoods in Paris (the 13th and the 18th) and towns (Roubaix, Vénissieux) and even a *département*[8] (Seine Saint-Denis) with populations that are predominantly of foreign origin, no significant development in electoral behavior has been noted in years past. What's more, the Muslim Party in France has difficulty assembling more than 1000 people at any of its demonstrations.

From Epic Novel to Parable

So we have to accept *The Camp of the Saints* for what it is; a riotous torrent of a novel which relates the epic of a fleet of a million castaways gathered around their monster-child, burning their excrements to cook their rice and rolling around in lewd abandon. It's a parable that shows the cowardice of Western politicians, their lame pronouncements and compromises in the name of humanitarian ideals.

"I wrote more for myself than to be read," Jean Raspail admits in the last pages of his book, "for the official version of the story is now the law, and I don't expect to be published ever again. The best I can expect is that my grandchildren will read my words without feeling too much shame ... Will the word 'racism' retain any significance for them? In my time it had already taken on so many different meanings

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it had already taken on so many different meanings that what was for me a mere acknowledgment of the incompatibility of races when they share the same living space became simultaneously, for most of my contemporaries, a rallying cry to hatred and a crime against human dignity."

Taken literally, some of Jean Raspail's statements can be shocking. Here we have the book's final perspective on a confrontation between the West and the Third World:

> *They were all there. The suburban blacks' guru, leader of the rat people and their white advisers, from the trashman-priest to the activist; the one-eyed Muslim magistrate and his staff officer; the smiling Mamadou;*[9] *and all the frizzy heads, the dark-skinned, the despised, the ghosts, the ants in the service of the white man's happiness, the cleaners, the cave dwellers, the stinking and the degraded, the consumptives, the womanless, the replaceable, the sacrificed, the dispensable, the innumerable. They didn't say much. They were the strong ones and, from now on, they knew it ... If they don't agree they just grumble and we realize that it is this grumbling that henceforth directs the debate. For the sound of five million people grumbling carries. All the while ... seven hundred million whites close their eyes and stick their fingers in their ears.*

But, as Raspail told me himself, "Sometimes the novel got away from me." This is the risky part in a novel that argues a point. Plausible as long as it is couched in parables, losing credibility when it imagines it is bringing facts to life. This is both the strength and the weakness of *The Camp of the Saints*. It is a warning cry to an endangered West which, the author fears, is threatened with the loss of its soul. But this is also an attempt to demonstrate a remorseless and mechanical process leading to a catastrophic scenario. Today the problem of immigration has become one of the major issues of the twenty-first century. Africa is the future of Europe and the poverty of the Third World is a permanent challenge for the West which accepts immigrants most unwillingly. It was salutary that voices were raised to say that "we cannot take in all the misery of the world" (as did Michel Rocard, a former socialist Prime Minister in the Mitterand government who was known for his candid remarks) even if "you cannot hold back the tide with your two hands" (according to Abdou Diouf, former President of Senegal). But that is neither a reason nor an excuse to confuse prophecy and projections. The worst, as the writer Paul Claudel said, is not always inevitable.[10] ■

NOTES

1. In France, immigrants are only classified demographically and statistically as such for as long as they hold foreign nationality. Those who naturalize are reclassified as French and are no longer counted as immigrants.

2. In Raspail's view, they had been falsely promised a better life but were destined to be exploited.

3. A popular term to designate Muslim youths of North African ancestry.

4. "Black" in this context includes not only people from Black Africa but also those coming from Haiti, Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guinea, New Caledonia, the Comores, Reunion, etc. Many of these are French citizens and can enter metropolitan France at will. They will not appear as "foreigners."

5. The informal economy is a subject on which the author has written widely. It does not refer to the cash economy or to the black market, but rather to a parallel economy described as "a way of life and a state of mind that include a series of diverse transactions around alternative work, the exchange of possessions or of partners, systems of mutual aid, barter, recovery, recycling, mutual support and cohesion; also styles of fraud, corruption, and piracy. In short, everything – from convivial weekend fairs to the traffic in human organs, while not forgetting the e-commerce sector." From *La France Africaine*, Le Pre aux Clercs, 2000.

6. Feminine of "*beur*."

7. "Big Brothers" refers to older boys, mainly of North African origin, brought up in France and French-speaking, who look after younger boys in a protective capacity, dealing with school authorities and other officials. They are often involved in the informal economy and in Islamic radical agitation. The term once had a positive connotation but has become pejorative.

8. France is divided into more than 90 administrative regions known as *départements*.

9. Caricature of a cheerful naive African of France's colonial empire.

10. A 20th century playwright, author of *The Satin Shoe*, subtitled *The Worst Is Not Always Inevitable*.

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African Migration and the Transformation of France

Interview with Jean-Paul Gourévitch

by Gerda Bikales

Gerda Bikales interviewed Jean-Paul Gourévitch on the changing conditions of French life due to massive immigration. Gourévitch was born in Paris, to a Russian father and Belgian mother who were naturalized French citizens. His studies were in literature and information sciences; he teaches political communication at Paris XII University. He and his wife Annie, a book dealer, have one son. He is the author of 46 books and numerous articles, on such diverse subjects as African immigration, children's literature, and political imagery. His avocations are tennis, scrabble and collecting cocktail recipes, a hobby that may soon lead to another book.



Jean-Paul Gourévich

GERDA BIKALES: *Judging by your list of publications, you are a prolific writer, on many different subjects – French poetry, children's literature, publicity and propaganda, education, and now immigration. What brought you to the subject of African immigrants in France?*

JEAN-PAUL GOURÉVITCH: It is quite true that seen from a distance, a writer who proclaims himself a specialist on political image-making, children's literature, African immigration and who, furthermore, writes interactive novels that invite reader participation, would appear to be in disarray. In our country, we are used to putting labels on every product, so as to be able to name it, to classify it and to recognize it. A Jack-of-all-trades is easily mistaken for a good-for-nothing.

On that point, I would say that it is salutary in life to work along several tracks at once. I find that it stimulates the mind, allows fresh air to enter and offers a different way of looking at things. As one example: when studying the First World War one can approach it simultaneously through political imagery (it was the first massive use of posters); through children's literature (the heroes of children's books and favorite cartoon characters were enlisted to exalt the fatherland and ridicule the enemy); and through African immigration, as young men recruited in the French colonies were first brought to France at that time, to fight as front-line soldiers. The sharpshooters from Senegal have remained legendary. All of these approaches enrich and modify one's views.

I took a long route to get to African immigration. For about twenty years, and continuing to this day, I have worked as an international consultant on issues relating to the Maghreb[1] and to Sub-Saharan Africa, the very countries from which our largest immigration flows originate. This has allowed me to understand why they leave their country. I have also cultivated friendships and connections with citizens from those countries now living in France, thus gaining insights on what they came for and what reality they encountered here.

***Gerda Bikales** is guest editor of this issue of* The Social Contract. *Jean-Paul Gourévitch may be contacted at: jpgour@club-internet.fr.*

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At bottom, I believe that the problem of African immigration is one of numbers, and of the transformations large numbers induce in French society, making it the key *problematique* of the twenty-first century. That is why, after keeping silent on this subject for a long time, I decided in 1997 to publish in this field.

GB: *You have written a trilogy of books on the subject of African immigration into metropolitan France, of which the last volume,* La France africaine [African France], *has been especially controversial. Can you give us a conceptual overview of the three books?*

"Maghrebi immigration evolved in the fifties in response to industrial development. It was initially Algerian, but Moroccans and Tunisians also settled permanently on French soil..."

JPG: You may as well say I have written a tetralogy on the subject. The first book, *Afrique, le fric, la France [Africa, Money, France]* appeared in 1997 and was reprinted in 2001. It attempted to measure what France has done or failed to do for Africa since these countries became independent, what the costs have been and what results they yielded.

The second volume, *Immigration, la fracture legale [Immigration, the Legal Fracture]* came out in 1998. It laid out the history of immigration into France, the statistical data on influx and settlements, the different positions and opinions on the subject, and its treatment in the media. It proposed the concept of a "legal fracture," in contrast to a "social fracture," a term used by Jacques Chirac during his first presidential campaign in 1995. The social fracture posits a France of have-nots at the bottom facing a France of privilege at the top, with a malfunctioning social elevator running between them, while the legal fracture differentiates between a France that is hard-working and deserving and a France of lawbreakers and pleasure-seekers in want of immediate satisfaction. There is no automatic correlation between immigration and legal fracture. Not all immigrants are lawbreakers and not all who operate in this noxious sphere are immigrants. Nevertheless, when immigration and legal fracture intersect, an explosion is pretty much inevitable. This is shown in the data on urban violence and in studies on various illegal traffics.

The third volume, *La France africaine [African France]*, was published in 2000 and has been reissued twice. It looks at African immigration into France, both from the Maghreb and the Sub-Sahara, explaining its causes, its development and the transformations it produces in the host society, which so often receives it with closed arms. One of these transformations is the exponential growth of the *Economie Informelle [The Informal Economy]* which is the title and subject of a fourth volume, out in 2001.

GB: La France africaine *has two parts, the first one perhaps best described as "The Africans in France." Can you tell us a little about their history? Where they are from? What attracts them to France?*

JPG: Immigration from Africa is very diverse. The first important influx dates back to the first World War, to those who came as soldiers to "defend the motherland" or as a substitute work force. Not all of them returned to their country. While the number of Sub-Saharan immigrants increased but little, immigration from the Maghreb – often clandestine – has swelled the migrant stream ever since that time and now makes up more than six percent of the country's population. Starting in the thirties, various measures were tried to limit or regulate this influx.

Maghrebi immigration evolved in the fifties in response to industrial development. It was initially Algerian, but Moroccans and Tunisians also settled permanently on French soil, even as the war over Algerian independence exacerbated tensions between France and Algeria and within the migrant communities. Beginning in the sixties, one can also observe a growing concentration of Black Africans in the suburbs of the French capital (Montreuil became known as Bamako[2]-on-the-Seine) and in some Paris neighborhoods, and to a lesser extent, in Provence and

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the Lyon region.

But two new variables increased and transformed the migratory flows. The first was the policy of family reunion, introduced by Jacques Chirac when he was Prime Minister in 1975-1976, after guest-worker programs were officially ended. Under certain conditions, workers could bring their families to France. A second factor was amnesty, granted to 131,000 illegal immigrants in 1981-1982. It became a magnet, attracting a million immigrants in the next five years. To those who later became known as *les sans-papiers* (the undocumented) it signaled the possibility that they too may eventually benefit from social programs already conceded to those established legally in metropolitan France.

Today, work-based immigration is limited to certain targeted professions (artists, computer specialists) but clandestine work, more or less tolerated, goes on in the building trades, the garment industry, restaurants, and security operations. Others come to France to join family, to get quality health care at little cost through universal health insurance, to continue their studies, especially at the graduate level, and to avail themselves of social welfare legislation that is the most generous in Europe and was, until the past few months, one of the most permissive and least likely to lead to deportation. Finally, let us not forget the asylum seekers.

GB: *I have tried to understand the statistical data available from official French sources, namely the National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) and the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). From these, I am unable to get a clear idea of the size of the immigrant population and of the direction in which it is evolving over time, up or down.*

JPG: French statistics are false for they mix-up foreigners, temporary residents, and immigrants. Furthermore, the census counts only those who want to be included in it. It is very easy to escape the census count without any penalty – I have personally had this experience.

Everyone knows that the numbers are wrong but no one dares to say it for fear of frightening the French-by-origin population or otherwise encourage xenophobic behavior. The 1999 census form removed all questions about the respondent's parentage, so it is impossible to get direct information on the ethnicity of the French population.

The African population of France, including illegal residents, is increasing very rapidly due to official and clandestine immigration and to differential fertility rates. While the fertility of women from North Africa is slowly getting closer to the national average (2.3 - 2.9, compared to 1.9) that of women from Sub-Saharan countries remains very high (between 4.9 and 6.8). Looking beyond some fantastical extrapolations which yield somewhere between 1 million and 15 million Africans living on French soil, we can reasonably estimate that there are between 2.3 and 3 million Black Africans (including children) in France today, nearly as many as there are North Africans, who number a little more than 3 million.

"A second factor was amnesty, granted to 131,000 illegal immigrants in 1981-1982. It became a magnet, attracting a million immigrants in the next five years."

GB: *The second part of the book you have subtitled "The Africanization of French Society." This is obviously a difficult subject to discuss candidly. Its publication has stirred controversy in France. Tell us about the reaction to your book.*

JPG: Controversy arises because some people believe they see the specter of an invasion that will inevitably transform France into a country of Bantu tribes and a dumping ground for the Third World, and induce it to retreat from its own values. But actually what we experience is a gradual mixing within French society. Africans, through their culture (music, jive, sports, handicrafts, superstars), their style of expression (chitchat, rumors, boasting, conviviality, humor, folk medicine, magic), and their economic and social choices (barter, illicit traffics, ethnic solidarity with

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newcomers and their countrymen, the informal economy) play an important role in this.

GB: *We think of France as a pillar of Western Civilization. How has French society changed after several decades of heavy immigration from North and Sub-Saharan Africa? Would a Frenchman born before World War II feel comfortable and at home in a country transformed by immigration?*

"...the connections between immigration and juvenile delinquency, the importation of an aggressive form of Islam, and the display of anti-white racism in some neighborhoods generate hostile and sometimes violent reactions in a part of the French population."

JPG: The reaction of French society is riddled with contradictions. On the one hand, there is a movement of sympathy for immigrants whose forefathers have fought for France, who have personally known misery, who come from a wretched continent, and who, at least in part, arrived in France only because we went to fetch them.

On the other hand, the visibility of this population, which makes up more than half the inhabitants in some cities, the connections between immigration and juvenile delinquency, the importation of an aggressive form of Islam, and the display of anti-white racism in some neighborhoods generate hostile and sometimes violent reactions in a part of the French population.

A succession of sometimes contradictory studies by the National Advisory Commission on Human Rights seems to indicate that a saturation threshold has been reached but that legal immigrants who are well integrated are appreciated. The highest expression of disapproval is reserved for youths from immigrant backgrounds.

GB: *You describe the alienation of the young generation, especially the young men. What form does this alienation take?*

JPG: The alienated behavior takes two forms. One, which these young people perceive as a natural reaction to negative conditions, is based on economic status. It starts with misery, grows into rage and ends up as hatred, partly because the youngsters want to enjoy all the material goods displayed before their eyes but see no immediate satisfaction forthcoming. The other form of alienation, which they also perceive as positive, is the socio-cultural evolution toward an alternative or delinquent culture (graffiti, *verlan*,[3] rap, drugs). Both forms of alienation must be understood in the etymological sense of the word – an estrangement from France's Gallic and middle-class power-nexus.

GB: *The teaching of civics is often proposed in our country as a way to build a set of common values in all students, and a sense of unity in the nation. Has this been tried in France?*

JPG: Civic education has been rehabilitated, most notably by Jean-Pierre Chevènement.[4] It is taught in the schools, but its effectiveness is limited. How much credibility can such education have in the eyes of a youngster who is subjected in the classroom to teachings on morality, citizenship and human rights, but who then sees his older brothers and role models getting away with not paying bus or subway fares, stealing from small children, and showing-off by wearing fancy clothes and driving expensive cars equipped with hi-fi gadgetry that an average working family could never afford?

GB: *In America, assimilation today does not work as reliably as it did in earlier times. We see this most clearly in the area of language. Spanish, especially, is competing with English for acceptance as a national language. France has traditionally been very proud and protective of the French language, so the question comes to mind whether French is also being displaced by immigrant languages? Is the French language changing in response to challenges from African languages?*

JPG: Throughout history, the French language has

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always been enriched by foreign contributions. It continues to do so through an ongoing process of borrowing words from Arabic, Berber, and Woloff.[5] However, this linear progression is now facing some major problems. We are seeing the infiltration of vernaculars that mock the standard language, notably *verlan* and *ouaiche* (based on honomatopeic sounds). They contaminate the speech of young people and have become fashionably snobbish among adults. We also have a sizeable population that doesn't know French or chooses to speak Arabic.

GB: *Isn't the deepest divide really religion, rather than language? This must be perceived as dangerous, in a nation still conscious of its history of decades of fratricidal religious wars.*

JPG: In France, there are currently 6 to 7 million Muslims, that is to say somewhat more than mentioned in official statements. When one compares the growth curves of Islam and Christianity, it is clear that if the ongoing evolution were to continue at the same pace and under the same conditions, the Muslim religion would be the dominant one before the end of the twenty-first century. Can this happen without a religious war? Nothing is less certain. But prognosticators have often been wrong on such matters. Furthermore, Islam is not monolithic, as we see in the debates going on today within the Muslim community in France.

Finally, we must keep in mind that religious observance among Muslims is changing in two opposite directions: a gradual secularization marked by the abandonment of rituals and the consumption of alcohol and tobacco and, to the contrary, a radicalization which demands and flaunts the distinctive symbols of the faith such as the Muslim cemetery square, the veil for women, and the celebration of religious holidays.

GB: *Just recently, after many years of dispute and indecision, the French government established a Muslim Representative Council, to be the official interlocutor in dealing with the government, on an equal footing with the country's other established religions – Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism. In what way will this Council make a difference? Is it expected to become an instrument for integration and improved intergroup relations, rather than the opposite?*

JPG: The decision taken by Nicolas Sarkozy[6] builds on earlier attempts by Jean-Pierre Chevènement to use such a council as interlocutor in discussing the problems of the Muslim community, from financing the construction of mosques to television programming. In theory, then, it is a vector of integration, even though the council today is dominated by radicals, following an election that is not in legal dispute. Sarkozy has been blamed for having "put his hand in a hornets' nest," for giving a platform to the enemies of the nation, for financing the education of imams, and for quietly preparing the growth of a forest of minarets under the French sky. However, it is part of the country's democratic tradition to recognize and even subsidize parties and associations radically opposed to its politics.

GB: *We have heard a great deal about Jean-Marie LePen, whose political platform calls for an end to immigration. He seems to oscillate between surprising popularity and political irrelevance. After his defeat of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in the first round of the presidential election in 2002, we now hear little about him.*

JPG: Jean-Marie Le Pen is alive, as demonstrated by the recent *Front National* convention in Nice. His daughter can be counted on to succeed him. Immigration remains his fundamental business. He has gradually enlarged it into a trilogy of "I" words: Immigration-Islam-Insecurity. The Minister of the Interior attempts to deprive him of voters and diffuse the debate through subtle games of politics, which balance firm measures (i.e., charter planes for deportations to Africa) with humanitarian ones, such as quiet amnesties on a case-by-case basis, and a review of the policy of "double indemnity," which first jails lawbreakers and afterwards deports them.

GB: *What are the foreign policy considerations that arise from such large scale immigration?*

JPG: French foreign policy must strive to act in concert with nearby receiving countries that face the same migration flows. It must also intervene in ways favorable to the sending countries. The goal is to stop the brain-drain, to end the demand for economic asylum by stimulating investments, and advance basic

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large-scale structural reforms.

The migratory flows go from countries in the South and East toward those in the North, not all of which have the same laws on asylum rights, work-permits, and social services for new arrivals. This obliges the countries in the North, and particularly those in Europe, to define an immigration policy and publicize its decisions, especially as they impact other neighboring countries. For a long time, the policy of France, which has been more generous than that of its neighbors – even as it made a show of wanting to regulate the flows and to fight illegal immigration – has been shaped by a desire to do more and better for "those who choose France." This has been interpreted by candidates for emigration as encouragement and has fueled hopes of regularization down the road. Today the policy is more restrictive, as a portion of those who come by plane are escorted back to their country before they set foot in France. At the same time, France tries to plug differences with its neighbors on such issues as "double indemnity," health insurance co-payments, creation of a database of entrants, while working to speed-up the implementation of a common European immigration policy.

France intervenes to absorb a part of the bilateral debts of the countries of origin and to reduce multilateral debts. It also offers assistance to the Third World, in matters such as health and humanitarian relief. But in its concern for stabilizing regimes and help them move toward democracy, it sometimes ends up offering political, economic and military assistance to governments that have little to commend them. On a broader scale, its search for agreements with African and Arab states attempts to show that the era of colonial and post-colonial politics is definitely over and that controlled immigration today is a way for the West to reap benefits and escape the problems of an aging society.

GB: *How do you see the future evolving? Will globalization continue to send large numbers of migrants from the South to the North, or will technology and innovation change this pattern? What will life be like in a multiethnic and multicultural France, in the year 2050?*

JPG: I have no passion for futurology. It consider it very doubtful that the migratory flows will dry up or reverse themselves in the short run, given the unequal economies of the North and the South. I simply try to inform about technological innovations, made possible by computers and the internet, that could bring about a "virtual immigration," providing jobs for people without having them leave home. This would check the brain-drain, introduce Africa to the twenty-first century, and create true currents of exchange between the multitude of data banks of the well-functioning countries of the North and those of the South that are still in their infancy.

GB: *Some critics have pointed out that your book is strong on analysis, but fails to project a point of view. You remain in the distance, aloof, disengaged. How do you answer them?*

JPG: They are right. The objective of my work is not to teach lessons or declare what should be done in these areas, which are difficult and often taboo. Rather, it is to provide information and intellectual tools that will help decision-makers and public opinion leaders to make informed choices. This is not disengagement, for to be able to scrutinize these issues one must always fight disinformation. Fortunately, I am not the only one to venture off on such expeditions and I am pleased to be invited by very diverse educational institutions, associations and entities that recognize the need for expertise divorced from partisanship and from any personal gain.

GB: *You know, as I go over your answers, many of them seem to split off in two incongruous directions.*

JPG: Yes, we live in a very complex world. Nothing is simple or straight forward. ■

NOTES

1. Collective term designating North Africa, specifically the countries of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

2. The capital of Mali.

3. A coded form of slang, marked by the systematic reversal of syllables in the word structure. According to Gourévitch, *verlan* goes beyond mere word play to evoke a symbolic reversal of the social order.

4. Former Minister of Education, later served as Minister of the Interior which is in charge of internal security.

5. Some examples: *bled*, for small town or village; *sidi*, the Arabic word for Arab; *mabool*, for crazy; *kif*, for drugs.

6. An energetic young newcomer of the political right, Mayor of Neuilly, currently Minister of the Interior.

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The Barbarians at the Gates of Paris

Surrounding the 'City of Light' are threatening 'Cities of Darkness'

by Theodore Dalrymple

Everyone knows *la douce France*: the France of wonderful food and wine, beautiful landscapes, splendid *châteaux* and cathedrals. More tourists (60 million a year) visit France than any country in the world by far. Indeed, the Germans have a saying, not altogether reassuring for the French: "to live as God in France." Half a million Britons have bought second homes there; many of them bore their friends back home with how they order these things better in France.

But there is another growing, and much less reassuring, side to France. I go to Paris about four times a year and thus have a sense of the evolving preoccupations of the French middle classes. A few years ago it was schools: the much vaunted French educational system was falling apart; illiteracy was rising; children were leaving school as ignorant as they entered, and much worse-behaved. For the last couple of years, though, it has been crime: *l'insécurité, les violences urbaines, les incivilités*. Everyone has a tale to tell, and no dinner party is complete without a horrifying story. Every crime, one senses, means a vote for Le Pen or whoever replaces him.

I first saw *l'insécurité* for myself about eight months ago. It was just off the Boulevard Saint-Germain, in a neighborhood where a tolerably spacious apartment would cost $1 million. Three youths – Rumanians – were attempting quite openly to break into a parking meter with large screwdrivers to steal the coins. It was four o'clock in the afternoon; the sidewalks were crowded, and the nearby cafés were full. The youths behaved as if they were simply pursuing a normal and legitimate activity, with nothing to fear.

Eventually, two women in their sixties told them to stop. The youths, laughing until then, turned murderously angry, insulted the women, and brandished their screwdrivers. The women retreated, and the youths resumed their "work."

A man of about 70 then told them to stop. They berated him still more threateningly, one of them holding a screwdriver as if to stab him in the stomach. I moved forward to help the man, but the youths, still shouting abuse and genuinely outraged at being interrupted in the pursuit of their livelihood, decided to run off. But it all could have ended very differently.

Several things struck me about the incident: the youths' sense of invulnerability in broad daylight; the indifference to their behavior of large numbers of people who would never dream of behaving in the same way; that only the elderly tried to do anything about the situation, though physically least suited to do so. Could it be that only they had a view of right and wrong clear enough to wish to intervene? That everyone younger than they thought something like: "Refugees ... hard life very poor ... too young to know right from wrong and anyway never taught

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***Theodore Dalrymple** is probably best known for his weekly columns in* The Spectator *and his essays in the American quarterly* City Journal. *Born in London in 1949, he is a psychiatric doctor working in an inner city area in Britain where he is attached to a large hospital and a prison. This article is from* City Journal, *Autumn 2002, Vol. 12, No. 4, and is reprinted by permission.*

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... no choice for them ... punishment cruel and useless"? The real criminals, indeed, were the drivers whose coins filled the parking meters: were they not polluting the world with their cars?

Another motive for inaction was that, had the youths been arrested, nothing would have happened to them. They would have been back on the streets within the hour. Who would risk a screwdriver in the liver to safeguard the parking meters of Paris for an hour?

The *laxisme* of the French criminal justice system is now notorious. Judges often make remarks indicating their sympathy for the criminals they are trying (based upon the usual generalizations about how society, not the criminal, is to blame); and the day before I witnessed the scene on the Boulevard Saint-Germain, 8,000 police had marched to protest the release from prison on bail of an infamous career armed robber and suspected murderer before his trial for yet another armed robbery, in the course of which he shot someone in the head. Out on bail before this trial, he then burgled a house. Surprised by the police, he and his accomplices shot two of them dead and seriously wounded a third. He was also under strong suspicion of having committed a quadruple murder a few days previously, in which a couple who owned a restaurant, and two of their employees, were shot dead in front of the owners' nine-year-old daughter.

The left-leaning *Libération*, one of the two daily newspapers the French intelligentsia reads, dismissed the marchers, referring with disdainful sarcasm to *la fièvre flicardiaire* – cop fever. The paper would no doubt have regarded the murder of a single journalist – that is to say, of a *full* human being – differently, let alone the murder of two journalists or six; and of course no one in the newspaper acknowledged that an effective police force is as vital a guarantee of personal freedom as a free press, and that the thin blue line that separates man from brutality is exactly that: thin. This is not a decent thing for an intellectual to say, however true it might be.

It is the private complaint of everyone, however, that the police have become impotent to suppress and detect crime. Horror stories abound. A Parisian acquaintance told me how one recent evening he had seen two criminals attack a car in which a woman was waiting for her husband. They smashed her side window and tried to grab her purse, but she resisted. My acquaintance went to her aid and managed to pin down one of the assailants, the other running off. Fortunately, some police passed by, but to my acquaintance's dismay let the assailant go, giving him only a warning.

My acquaintance said to the police that he would make a complaint. The senior among them advised him against wasting his time. At that time of night, there would be no one to complain to in the local commissariat. He would have to go the following day and would have to wait on line for three hours. He would have to return several times, with a long wait each time. And in the end, nothing would be done.

As for the police, he added, they did not want to make an arrest in a case like this. There would be too much paperwork. And even if the case came to court, the judge would give no proper punishment. Moreover, such an arrest would retard their careers. The local police chiefs were paid by results – by the crime rates in their areas of jurisdiction. The last thing they wanted was for policemen to go around finding and recording crime.

Not long afterward, I heard of another case in which the police simply refused to record the *occurrence* of a burglary, much less try to catch the culprits.

Now crime and general disorder are making inroads into places where, not long ago, they were unheard of. At a peaceful and prosperous village near Fontainebleau that I visited – the home of retired high officials and of a former cabinet minister – criminality had made its first appearance only two weeks before. There had been a burglary and a "rodeo" – an impromptu race of youths in stolen cars around the village green, whose fence the car thieves had knocked over to gain access.

A villager called the police, who said they could not come at the moment, but who politely called back half an hour later to

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find out how things were going. Two hours later still, they finally appeared, but the rodeo had moved on, leaving behind only the remains of a burned-out car. The blackened patch on the road was still visible when I visited.

The official figures for this upsurge, doctored as they no doubt are, are sufficiently alarming. Reported crime in France has risen from 600,000 annually in 1959 to 4 million today, while the population has grown by less than 20 percent (and many think today's crime number is an underestimate by at least a half). In 2000, one crime was reported for every sixth inhabitant of Paris, and the rate has increased by at least 10 percent a year for the last five years. Reported cases of arson in France have increased 2,500 percent in seven years, from 1,168 in 1993 to 29,192 in 2000; robbery with violence rose by 15.8 percent between 1999 and 2000, and 44.5 percent since 1996 (itself no golden age).

Where does the increase in crime come from? The geographical answer: from the public housing projects that encircle and increasingly besiege every French city or town of any size, Paris especially. In these housing projects lives an immigrant population numbering several million, from North and West Africa mostly, along with their French-born descendants and a smattering of the least successful members of the French working class. From these projects, the excellence of the French public transport system ensures that the most fashionable *arrondissements* are within easy reach of the most inveterate thief and vandal.

"Where does the increase in crime come from? The geographical answer: from the public housing projects that encircle and increasingly besiege every French city or town of any size, Paris especially."

Architecturally, the housing projects sprang from the ideas of Le Corbusier, the Swiss totalitarian architect –and still the untouchable hero of architectural education in France – who believed that a house was a machine for living in, that areas of cities should be entirely separated from one another by their function, and that the straight line and the right angle held the key to wisdom, virtue, beauty, and efficiency. The mulish opposition that met his scheme to pull down the whole of the center of Paris and rebuild it according to his "rational" and "advanced" ideas baffled and frustrated him.

The inhuman, unadorned, hard-edged geometry of these vast housing projects in their unearthly plazas brings to mind Le Corbusier's chilling and tyrannical words: "The despot is not a man. It is the ... *correct, realistic, exact plan* ... that will provide your solution once the problem has been posed clearly. ...*This plan has been drawn up well away from ... the cries of the electorate or the laments of society's victims.* It has been drawn up by serene and lucid minds."

But what is the problem to which these housing projects, known as *cités*, are the solution, conceived by serene and lucid minds like Le Corbusier's? It is the problem of providing an Habitation de Loyer Modéré – a House at Moderate Rent, shortened to HLM – for the workers, largely immigrant, whom the factories needed during France's great industrial expansion from the 1950s to the 1970s, when the unemployment rate was 2 percent and cheap labor was much in demand. By the late eighties, however, the demand had evaporated, but the people whose labor had satisfied it had not; and together with their descendants and a constant influx of new hopefuls, they made the provision of cheap housing more necessary than ever.

An apartment in this publicly owned housing is also known as a *logement*, a lodging, which aptly conveys the social status and degree of political influence of those expected to rent them. The *cités* are thus social marginalization made concrete:

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bureaucratically planned from their windows to their roofs, with no history of their own or organic connection to anything that previously existed on their sites, they convey the impression that, in the event of serious trouble, they could be cut off from the rest of the world by switching off the trains and by blockading with a tank or two the highways that pass through them, (usually with a concrete wall on either side), from the rest of France to the better parts of Paris. I recalled the words of an Afrikaner in South Africa, who explained to me the principle according to which only a single road connected black townships to the white cities: once it was sealed off by an armored car, "the blacks can foul only their own nest."

The average visitor gives not a moment's thought to these *Cités* of Darkness as he speeds from the airport to the City of Light. But they are huge and important – and what the visitor would find there, if he bothered to go, would terrify him.

A kind of anti-society has grown up in them – a population that derives the meaning of its life from the hatred it bears for the other, "official," society in France. This alienation, this gulf of mistrust – greater than any I have encountered anywhere else in the world, including in the black townships of South Africa during the apartheid years – is written on the faces of the young men, most of them permanently unemployed, who hang out in the pocked and potholed open spaces between their *logements*. When you approach to speak to them, their immobile faces betray not a flicker of recognition of your shared humanity; they make no gesture to smooth social intercourse. If you are not one of them, you are against them.

Their hatred of official France manifests itself in many ways that scar everything around them. Young men risk life and limb to adorn the most inaccessible surfaces of concrete with graffiti – BAISE LA POLICE, fuck the police, being the favorite theme. The iconography of the *cités* is that of uncompromising hatred and aggression: a burned-out and destroyed community-meeting place in the Les Tarterets project, for example, has a picture of a science-fiction humanoid, his fist clenched as if to spring at the person who looks at him, while to his right is an admiring portrait of a huge slavering pit bull, a dog by temperament and training capable of tearing out a man's throat – the only breed of dog I saw in the *cités*, paraded with menacing swagger by their owners.

There are burned-out and eviscerated carcasses of cars everywhere. Fire is now fashionable in the *cités*: in Les Tarterets, residents had torched and looted every store – with the exceptions of one government-subsidized supermarket and a pharmacy. The underground parking lot, charred and blackened by smoke like a vault in an urban hell, is permanently closed.

When agents of official France come to the *cités*, the residents attack them. The police are hated: one young Malian, who comfortingly believed that he was unemployable in France because of the color of his skin, described how the police invariably arrived like a raiding party, with batons swinging – ready to beat whoever came within reach, irrespective of who he was or of his innocence of any crime, before retreating to safety to their commissariat. The conduct of the police, he said, explained why residents threw Molotov cocktails at them from their windows. Who could tolerate such treatment at the hands of *une police fasciste*?

Molotov cocktails also greeted the president of the republic, Jacques Chirac, and his interior minister when they recently campaigned at two *cités*, Les Tarterets and Les Musiciens. The two dignitaries had to beat a swift and ignominious retreat, like foreign overlords visiting a barely held and hostile suzerainty: they came, they saw, they scuttled off.

Antagonism toward the police might appear understandable, but the conduct of the young inhabitants of the *cités* toward the firemen who come to rescue them from the fires that they have themselves started gives a dismaying glimpse into the depth of their hatred for mainstream society. They greet the admirable firemen (whose motto is *Sauver ou périr*, save or perish) with Molotov cocktails and hails of stones when they arrive on their mission of mercy, so that armored vehicles frequently have to protect the fire engines.

Benevolence inflames the anger of the young men of the

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cités as much as repression, because their rage is inseparable from their being. Ambulance men who take away a young man injured in an incident routinely find themselves surrounded by the man's "friends," and jostled, jeered at, and threatened: behavior that, according to one doctor I met, continues right into the hospital, even as the friends demand that their associate should be treated at once, before others.

Of course, they also expect him to be treated as well as anyone else, and in this expectation they reveal the bad faith, or at least ambivalence, of their stance toward the society around them. They are certainly not poor, at least by the standards of all previously existing societies: they are not hungry; they have cell phones, cars, and many other appurtenances of modernity; they are dressed fashionably – according to their own fashion – with a uniform disdain of bourgeois propriety and with gold chains round their necks. They believe they have rights, and they know they will receive medical treatment, however they behave. They enjoy a far higher standard of living (or consumption) than they would in the countries of their parents' or grandparents' origin, even if they labored there 14 hours a day to the maximum of their capacity.

But this is not a cause of gratitude – on the contrary: they feel it as an insult or a wound, even as they take it for granted as their due. But like all human beings, they want the respect and approval of others, even – or rather especially – of the people who carelessly toss them the crumbs of Western prosperity. Emasculating dependence is never a happy state, and no dependence is more absolute, more total, than that of most of the inhabitants of the *cités*. They therefore come to believe in the malevolence of those who maintain them in their limbo: and they want to keep alive the belief in this perfect malevolence, for it gives meaning – the only possible meaning – to their stunted lives. It is better to be opposed by an enemy than to be adrift in meaninglessness, for the simulacrum of an enemy lends purpose to actions whose nihilism would otherwise be self-evident.

"But like all human beings, they [the immigrants] want the respect and approval of others, even – or rather especially – of the people who carelessly toss them the crumbs of Western prosperity."

That is one of the reasons that, when I approached groups of young men in Les Musiciens, many of them were not just suspicious (though it was soon clear to them that I was no member of the enemy), but hostile. When a young man of African origin agreed to speak to me, his fellows kept interrupting menacingly. "Don't talk to him," they commanded, and they told me, with fear in their eyes, to go away. The young man was nervous, too: he said he was afraid of being punished as a traitor. His associates feared that "normal" contact with a person who was clearly not of the enemy, and yet not one of them either, would contaminate their minds and eventually break down the them-and-us worldview that stood between them and complete mental chaos. They needed to see themselves as warriors in a civil war, not mere ne'er-do-wells and criminals.

The ambivalence of the *cité* dwellers matches "official" France's attitude toward them: over-control and interference, alternating with utter abandonment. Bureaucrats have planned every item in the physical environment, for example, and no matter how many times the inhabitants foul the nest (to use the Afrikaner's expression), the state pays for renovation, hoping thereby to demonstrate its compassion and concern. To assure the immigrants that they and their offspring are potentially or already truly French, the streets are named for French cultural heroes: for painters in Les Tarterets (rue Gustave Courbet, for example) and for composers in Les Musiciens (rue Gabriel

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Fauré). Indeed, the only time I smiled in one of the *cités* was when I walked past two concrete bunkers with metal windows, the École maternelle Charles Baudelaire and the École maternelle Arthur Rimbaud. Fine as these two poets are, theirs are not names one would associate with kindergartens, let alone with concrete bunkers.

But the heroic French names point to a deeper official ambivalence. The French state is torn between two approaches: Courbet, Fauré, *nos ancêtres, les gaullois*, on the one hand, and the shibboleths of multiculturalism on the other. By compulsion of the ministry of education, the historiography that the schools purvey is that of the triumph of the unifying, rational, and benevolent French state through the ages, from Colbert onward, and Muslim girls are not allowed to wear headscarves in schools. After graduation, people who dress in "ethnic" fashion will not find jobs with major employers. But at the same time, official France also pays a cowering lip service to multiculturalism – for example, to the "culture" of the *cités*. Thus, French rap music is the subject of admiring articles in *Libération* and *Le Monde*, as well as of pusillanimous expressions of approval from the last two ministers of culture.

One rap group, the *Ministère amer* (Bitter Ministry), won special official praise. Its best-known lyric: "Another woman takes her beating./ This time she's called Brigitte./ She's the wife of a cop./ The novices of vice piss on the police./ It's not just a firework, scratch the clitoris./ Brigitte the cop's wife likes niggers./ She's hot, hot in her pants." This vile rubbish receives accolades for its supposed authenticity: for in the multiculturalist's mental world, in which the savages are forever noble, there is no criterion by which to distinguish high art from low trash. And if intellectuals, highly trained in the Western tradition, are prepared to praise such degraded and brutal pornography, it is hardly surprising that those who are not so trained come to the conclusion that there cannot be anything of value in that tradition. Cowardly multiculturalism thus makes itself the handmaiden of anti-Western extremism.

Whether or not rap lyrics are the authentic voice of the *cités*, they are certainly its authentic ear: you can observe many young men in the *cités* sitting around in their cars aimlessly, listening to it for hours on end, so loud that the pavement vibrates to it 100 yards away. The imprimatur of the intellectuals and of the French cultural bureaucracy no doubt encourages them to believe that they are doing something worthwhile. But when life begins to imitate art, and terrible gang-rapes occur with increasing frequency, the same official France becomes puzzled and alarmed. What should it make of the 18 young men and two young women currently being tried in Pontoise for allegedly abducting a girl of 15 and for four months raping her repeatedly in basements, stairwells, and squats? Many of the group seem not merely unrepentant or unashamed but proud.

Though most people in France have never visited a *cité*, they dimly know that long-term unemployment among the young is so rife there that it is the normal state of being. Indeed, French youth unemployment is among the highest in Europe – and higher the further you descend the social scale, largely because high minimum wages, payroll taxes, and labor protection laws make employers loath to hire those whom they cannot easily fire, and whom they must pay beyond what their skills are worth.

Everyone acknowledges that unemployment, particularly of the permanent kind, is deeply destructive, and that the devil really does find work for idle hands: but the higher up the social scale you ascend, the more firmly fixed is the idea that the labor-market rigidities that encourage unemployment are essential both to distinguish France from the supposed savagery of the Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal model (one soon learns from reading the French newspapers what *anglo-saxon* connotes in this context), and to protect the downtrodden from exploitation. But the labor-market rigidities protect those who least need protection, while condemning the most vulnerable to utter hopelessness: and if sexual hypocrisy is the vice of the Anglo-Saxons, economic hypocrisy is the vice of the French.

It requires little imagination to

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see how, in the circumstances, the burden of unemployment should fall disproportionately on immigrants and their children: and why, already culturally distinct from the bulk of the population, they should feel themselves vilely discriminated against. Having been enclosed in a physical ghetto, they respond by building a cultural and psychological ghetto for themselves. They are of France, but not French.

The state, while concerning itself with the details of their housing, their education, their medical care, and the payment of subsidies for them to do nothing, abrogates its responsibility completely in the one area in which the state's responsibility is absolutely inalienable: law and order. In order to placate, or at least not to inflame, disaffected youth, the ministry of the interior has instructed the police to tread softly (that is to say, virtually not at all, except by occasional raiding parties when inaction is impossible) in the more than 800 *zones sensibles* – sensitive areas – that surround French cities and that are known collectively as *la Zone*.

But human society, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and so authority of a kind, with its own set of values, occupies the space where law and order should be – the authority and brutal values of psychopathic criminals and drug dealers. The absence of a real economy and of law means, in practice, an economy and an informal legal system based on theft and drug-trafficking. In Les Tarterets, for example, I observed two dealers openly distributing drugs and collecting money while driving around in their highly conspicuous BMW convertible, clearly the monarchs of all they surveyed. Both of northwest African descent, one wore a scarlet baseball cap backward, while the other had dyed blond hair, contrasting dramatically with his complexion. Their faces were as immobile as those of potentates receiving tribute from conquered tribes. They drove everywhere at maximum speed in low gear and high noise: they could hardly have drawn more attention to themselves if they tried. They didn't fear the law: rather, the law feared them.

I watched their proceedings in the company of old immigrants from Algeria and Morocco, who had come to France in the early 1960s. They too lived in Les Tarterets and had witnessed its descent into a state of low-level insurgency. They were so horrified by daily life that they were trying to leave, to escape their own children and grandchildren: but once having fallen into the clutches of the system of public housing, they were trapped. They wanted to transfer to a *cité*, if such existed, where the new generation did not rule: but they were without leverage – or *piston* – in the giant system of patronage that is the French state. And so they had to stay put, puzzled, alarmed, incredulous, and bitter at what their own offspring had become, so very different from what they had hoped and expected. They were better Frenchmen than either their children or grandchildren: they would never have whistled and booed at the *Marseillaise*, as their descendants did before the soccer match between France and Algeria in 2001, alerting the rest of France to the terrible canker in its midst.

Whether France was wise to have permitted the mass immigration of people culturally very different from its own population to solve a temporary labor shortage and to assuage its own abstract liberal conscience is disputable: there are now an estimated 8 or 9 million people of North and West African origin in France, twice the number in 1975 – and at least 5 million of them are Muslims. Demographic projections (though projections are not predictions) suggest that their descendants will number 35 million before this century is out, more than a third of the likely total population of France.

Indisputably, however, France has handled the resultant situation in the worst possible way. Unless it assimilates these millions successfully, its future will be grim. But it has separated and isolated immigrants and their descendants geographically into dehumanizing ghettos; it has pursued economic policies to promote unemployment and create dependence among them, with all the inevitable psychological consequences; it has flattered the repellent and worthless culture that they have developed; and it has withdrawn the protection of the law from them, allowing them to create

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their own lawless order.

No one should underestimate the danger that this failure poses, not only for France but also for the world. The inhabitants of the *cités* are exceptionally well armed. When the professional robbers among them raid a bank or an armored car delivering cash, they do so with bazookas and rocket launchers, and dress in paramilitary uniforms. From time to time, the police discover whole arsenals of Kalashnikovs in the *cités*. There is a vigorous informal trade between France and post-communist Eastern Europe: workshops in underground garages in the *cités* change the serial numbers of stolen luxury cars prior to export to the East, in exchange for sophisticated weaponry.

A profoundly alienated population is thus armed with serious firepower: and in conditions of violent social upheaval, such as France is in the habit of experiencing every few decades, it could prove difficult to control. The French state is caught in a dilemma between honoring its commitments to the more privileged section of the population, many of whom earn their livelihoods from administering the *dirigiste* economy, and freeing the labor market sufficiently to give the hope of a normal life to the inhabitants of the *cités*. Most likely, the state will solve the dilemma by attempts to buy off the disaffected with more benefits and rights, at the cost of higher taxes that will further stifle the job creation that would most help the *cité* dwellers. If that fails, as in the long run it will, harsh repression will follow.

But among the third of the population of the *cités* that is of North African Muslim descent, there is an option that the French, and not only the French, fear. For imagine yourself a youth in Les Tarterets or Les Musiciens, intellectually alert but not well educated, believing yourself to be despised because of your origins by the larger society that you were born into, permanently condemned to unemployment by the system that contemptuously feeds and clothes you, and surrounded by a contemptible nihilistic culture of despair, violence, and crime. Is it not possible that you would seek a doctrine that would simultaneously explain your predicament, justify your wrath, point the way toward your revenge, and guarantee your salvation, especially if you were imprisoned? Would you not seek a "worthwhile" direction for the energy, hatred, and violence seething within you, a direction that would enable you to do evil in the name of ultimate good? It would require only a relatively few of like mind to cause havoc. Islamist proselytism flourishes in the prisons of France (where 60 percent of the inmates are of immigrant origin), as it does in British prisons; and it takes only a handful of Zacharias Moussaouis to start a conflagration.

The French knew of this possibility well before September 11: in 1994, their special forces boarded a hijacked aircraft that landed in Marseilles and killed the hijackers – an unusual step for the French, who have traditionally preferred to negotiate with, or give in to, terrorists. But they had intelligence suggesting that, after refueling, the hijackers planned to fly the plane into the Eiffel Tower. In this case, no negotiation was possible.

A terrible chasm has opened up in French society, dramatically exemplified by a story that an acquaintance told me. He was driving along a six-lane highway with housing projects on both sides, when a man tried to dash across the road. My acquaintance hit him at high speed and killed him instantly.

According to French law, the participants in a fatal accident must stay as near as possible to the scene, until officials have elucidated all the circumstances. The police therefore took my informant to a kind of hotel nearby, where there was no staff, and the door could be opened only by inserting a credit card into an automatic billing terminal. Reaching his room, he discovered that all the furniture was of concrete, including the bed and washbasin, and attached either to the floor or walls.

The following morning, the police came to collect him, and he asked them what kind of place this was. Why was everything made of concrete?

"But don't you know where you are, *monsieur*?" they asked. "*C'est la Zone, c'est la Zone.*" ■

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Corsican Capers

Island separatists highlight French nation's malaise

by Gerda Bikales

For longer than the thirteen rebellious British colonies of North America have been a nation, Corsica has been an integral part of France. One might think that this is time enough to form a solid bond. Alas! It isn't so.

A Brief History

Before becoming French in 1768, Corsica had been ruled for five centuries by Genoa, the wealthy city-state and naval powerhouse on Italy's Mediterranean coast. Genoese control of the island had been heavy-handed and marked by repeated revolts. In one such uprising in 1736, a colorful adventurer known as Theodore de Neuhof brought much needed arms, money and promises of foreign help to the rebels, in return for the title of Theodore, King of Corsica. His reign was short – unable to deliver foreign troops, he fled the island as Genoa recaptured its dominant position. Another attempt at independence in 1755 was led by Pasquale Paoli, who envisioned a democratic constitutional government for his nation and convinced Jean-Jacques Rousseau to draft its constitution. After France bought the island from Genoa in 1768, Paoli continued his struggle, in vain. He was much admired in America, where a city in Pennsylvania still bears his name.

The name most widely associated with Corsica, however, is Napoleon Bonaparte. The future emperor was born in Ajaccio in 1769, a French citizen. He left the island at fourteen to attend military school in Paris, and soon distinguished himself as a bold general who went on to conquer much of Europe. The Napoleonic age gave post-Revolutionary France its period of greatest glory, and the dashing Corsican remains a much admired figure, even as his imperial exploits embarrass the politically correct.

Annexing Corsica, France acquired a most beautiful Mediterranean island, blessed with an unspoiled shoreline and fine natural harbors, a majestic mountainous interior divided by deep green valleys, and a sunny climate. Its closest neighbor is the larger Italian island of Sardinia, just six miles south.

With the land came the people. Of Greek and Italian stock, Catholic since the fifth century, they spoke several Genoese dialects that had no written form until the nineteenth century. Geography, topography, and history combined to forge a society marked by fierce allegiances to family, village, and clan, ruled by *omerta*, the honor code of silence when dealing with outsiders; and by deadly *vendettas*, carried on across generations, that lead to murder rates that are among the highest in the world. These mores often invite comparisons with Sicily, a more distant island.

Traditionally, Corsica's economy has been based on agriculture and the raising of cattle, sheep and goats. The meager income from these pursuits has long been supplemented with the rewards of banditry, piracy and contraband – activities still practiced in updated form.

A difficult economy and relentless *vendettas* kept the island's population low. In 1800 it had 160,000 inhabitants, a number that increased over the next century to 260,000. But as the twentieth century approached, Corsicans found new opportunities on the continent and in the Americas.[1] Ironically, a people known then as now for lawlessness, distinguished themselves in law enforcement in France and in its colonies. Corsicans played a major role in France's colonial administration, especially in North Africa. They were well represented in the French military, protecting colonial interests and quashing rebellions. In France, they became policemen and *gendarmes*.[2]

***Gerda Bikales** is guest editor of this issue of* The Social Contract.

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According to an unsigned article in *Figaro Magazine* (5 May 2000), Corsican emigrants moved in large numbers to Puerto Rico, where their descendants today number some 400,000. The article, full of factual errors, claims that Pierre Toussaint Vivoni of Cape Corsica became "Puerto Rico's first Mayor," and showed a keen interest in politics. Some of the best known politicians in France today are of Corsican origin, including the law-and-order former Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua.

Emigration caused a steep drop in population, especially in the interior villages. Today the islanders number 250,000, but they are a broader mix of people. Despite its explosive politics, Corsica's mild climate and wild beauty attract many retirees from the continent. And, as elsewhere in France, immigrants are a significant presence – around ten percent of the population. The newcomers settle mostly in the cities along the shore, leaving the interior depopulated.

The Rise of Nationalism

In the course of its long and close association with a culturally domineering nation, Corsica's own language has suffered. French is the usual language of Corsica, taught in its schools, and used by mainstream media. New settlers have shown no inclination to learn Corsican, a regional language at best, unsuited for the technological age, hardly spoken anywhere beyond the island. Thirty years ago, there were an estimated 70,000 Corsican-speakers, a number that has since plummeted to 25,000. Corsicans have watched their language wither and the culture it nourished fade. Fear of cultural identity loss drives a radical nationalist movement for independence.

Modern Corsican nationalism can be traced to Mussolini, who encouraged the island's ethnic attachment to Italy. The turbulent war years that followed dissipated that flirtation, and in the post-war period innocently mistaking a Corsican for an Italian was a major *faux pas*.

The year 1962 is crucial in the evolution of Corsican nationalism. That year, France negotiated peace with Algeria after eight years of bloody guerilla warfare. It repatriated over a million French citizens implanted in colonial Algeria for generations. Many exiled refugees, in search of sunshine, relocated to the south of France. Some 17,000 moved further, to Corsica. Among them were vintners who had lost their lands and received generous government subsidies to acquire newly irrigated acreage suitable for wine cultivation. Native wine-growers, who had expected to benefit from the improvements, were scandalized when the best vineyards went to the refugees instead.

Tensions escalated between the rival growers, centered around the wine trade. But something more

"Bombings and blasts directed at public buildings and at tourist facilities started in the sixties. In 1975, the violence took a more ominous turn when two gendarmes were killed in a battle with armed guerillas."

was afoot: the presence of these exiles in Corsica was proof of French vulnerability. Unlike other countries in France's crumbling colonial empire, Algeria's status had been like Corsica's – both had been tightly woven into a nation that proclaimed itself "one and indivisible." Yet, Algeria had successfully fought its way to independence. Liberation from French rule was no longer unthinkable.

Bombings and blasts directed at public buildings and at tourist facilities started in the sixties. In 1975, the violence took a more ominous turn when two *gendarmes* were killed in a battle with armed guerillas. After that, bombs went off nightly somewhere on the island. By 1980, the violence spilled over to continental France, when two agents guarding the Iranian Embassy in Paris were gunned down. A later explosion targeted the *École Nationale d'Administration*, the country's prestigious training school for government service, in Strasbourg. The City Hall in Bordeaux was badly damaged in a bombing – a clear message for Alain Jupé, then Prime Minister and Bordeaux's Mayor.

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Economic Downturn

The economic crisis precipitated by oil shortages in the 1970s hit Corsica hard, drying up the safety valve of continental jobs. Tourism, a potential growth industry for this beautiful island with no other resources, had been successfully promoted, but the terrorists would have none of it. Wrapping themselves in the mantle of environmental purism, they destroyed tourist facilities under development, scaring off investors and vacationers

The economy suffered, but the guerillas prospered. As bombs became a part of daily life, the rebels collected "protection" money from intimidated businesses and homeowners. Loose accounting had long been the rule in Corsica, allowing the nationalists to line their pockets with a portion of the subsidies that started flowing abundantly from Paris.



Members of the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica hold a press conference.

Deadly feuds soon erupted within the terrorist community – disputes over turf in the various rackets, as much as over ideology or strategy. The *crescendo* of assassinations targeting dissident gang members, anti-nationalists, law enforcement, and local elected officials rattled the island and panicked the mainland. The violent Front for the National Liberation of Corsica (FLNC), created in 1976, was outlawed and went underground. It split into three factions, which in turn spawned shadowy rival organizations. Their frequent changes of name and leadership are meant to confuse.

The nationalists' demands ranged from formal recognition of Corsica's uniqueness – and the right to "adjust" French laws accordingly – to autonomy, to full independence. All factions insisted on restoring the Corsican language and promoting its culture. Traditionally highly centralized, the French government had already taken steps toward regionalization, a process greatly accelerated by the ongoing meltdown in Corsica. Successive French governments responded to the insurrection with strong rhetoric about restoring law and order, bringing criminals to justice, and never negotiating with terrorists. As a practical matter, they aimed for a set of compromises around the less radical proposals. The cultural demands netted the creation in 1982 of the first university in Corsica, which immediately became a hotbed of nationalist agitation; other concessions included the promotion of Corsica's haunting folk music, subsidized television programing in Corsican, and optional courses in that language in the schools. An updated demand would make its study *mandatory* for all students.

The government hoped to placate the nationalists by establishing an island-wide elected Assembly, with major responsibilities for the political and fiscal management of the island and power to establish specialized agencies. The new institutions provided more opportunities for election fraud. Relative to its small population, Corsica has a profusion of elected and appointed politicians and a surfeit of functionaries, many allied with criminal interests and all enjoying salaries and perks from their positions. To grease the wheels, money has been thrown around liberally in the form of tax abatements, "tax-free zones," agricultural credits and numerous subsidies. More money yet has been coming in from the European Union, always ready to encourage regionalism at the expense of national governments.

Violence Escalates

Far from retreating, the separatists grew bolder. In a chilling display of unity in January 1996, several hundred masked and armed terrorists called a midnight press conference, jammed with journalists who had no trouble locating the outlaws, while the police remained clueless. Pictures of masked guerillas brandishing rifles, on television and in every newspaper, exposed the government's pathetic helplessness.

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The apex of violence was reached in February 1998, when Claude Erignac, the Prefect of Corsica, was gunned down on a street in the capital, Ajaccio, in front of numerous witnesses. To rub it in, a handgun stolen earlier from the police station in Pietrosella was left at the scene.

It is nearly impossible to convey to readers unfamiliar with France's prefectoral system the enormity of this attack or the shock-waves it produced. That famous Corsican, Napoleon Bonaparte, had introduced the system in 1800, to bring the State closer to the people. The country was divided into small *départements*, each headed by a Prefect who, in theory, would be accessible to any citizen. Over time, the Prefects acquired a great deal of authority, far beyond the merely administrative. Dressed in their elegant navy-blue uniforms with gold decorations, the Prefects embody the prestige and legitimacy of the French State. None had ever been assassinated before.[3]

"It is nearly impossible to convey to readers unfamiliar with France's prefectoral system the enormity of this [assassination] or the shock-waves it produced."

The French nation shuddered in revulsion. How could this have been allowed to happen? It was easy to point fingers. Despite all the tough rhetoric, gross financial irregularities had been tolerated, high profile crimes went unpunished, and negotiations with terrorists had gone on right in the Prime Minister's office. Corsica had become outlaw territory, beyond the reach of French law.

Succeeding the fallen Prefect was Bernard Bonnet, chosen for his tough-guy reputation. He had dealt with cultural separatists before, in the country's southwest. A few months later, Bonnet was arrested and jailed for overzealous law enforcement, involving arson of an unlicensed waterfront restaurant frequented by gangsters. This tragicomical episode once again showcased the government's indecisiveness and willingness to court the criminal bosses.

On the continent, support for separation from Corsica has zoomed – a referendum to grant independence to the island would pass handily. But Corsicans are adamantly opposed to secession, and given a chance to vote would defeat it overwhelmingly. Constitutional opinion and the Algerian precedent hold that separate referenda in both Corsica and France must agree on independence. Predictably, a referendum would resolve nothing.

After the defeat of the Socialists in 2002, a new conservative government tried another approach. For more than twenty years, the government had chosen to deal only through *les élus*, the island's elected politicians, some of them suspected of terrorism and racketeering, not to mention election fraud. Nicolas Sarkozy, the new Minister of the Interior, chose to bypass them. He asked Corsicans directly to approve a decentralization plan leading to fuller autonomy. The referendum was narrowly defeated last July, by voters confused by its legalistic phrasing and suspicious of its true intent. The dramatic arrest on the day before the vote of Prefect Erignac's presumed killer, more than five years after the murder, was too staged to produce the hoped-for outcome.

Arson, bombings, and attacks on the civil order have resumed. It's back to the *status quo*.

Deep-seated Double-Mindedness

The strands of this intolerable stalemate are woven into the fabric of Corsican life. As one expert puts it, "in every family there is a customs inspector, a *gendarme*, a gangster and nationalist..."[4] France has no partner in crafting an exit strategy.

Every way out leads through dangerous territory. Should some constitutional *legerdemain* leading to separation be found, it will quicken the demands of other regions within metropolitan France aspiring to extensive autonomy. In the words of a former Minister of the Interior: "Who would be naive enough to think that whatever has been granted to Corsica won't be demanded by the Basques, by Brittany, by Savoy, and Franche-Comté?"[5] He might have added Alsace, which is reclaiming its German roots.

But France, the prime mover of a European Union Constitution that will raise human rights to new

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heights, can hardly afford to apply the harsh, bloody measures necessary to restore the rule of law. Further, in the name of a Federated Europe, it is engaged in a process of self-imposed deconstruction, giving up the symbols of nationhood such as a currency and an immigration policy of its own, hoping to restore its lost power and influence as a province in the enlarged European Union rather than as an independent nation-state. The imposition of authority by strong-arm tactics is strictly *verboten*.

"The unhappy relations between France and Corsica hold a lesson for Americans ... the issue of statehood for Puerto Rico..."

The Corsican impasse will not end soon.

And Then There's Puerto Rico

The unhappy relations between France and Corsica hold a lesson for Americans. In recent years, the issue of statehood for Puerto Rico – a Spanish-speaking Caribbean island – has repeatedly come up in Congress, and is sure to resurface. Puerto Rico is a largely autonomous "Commonwealth" with ties to the United States that go back to 1898. Statehood sentiment is gaining momentum on the island, largely because of anticipated social welfare benefits and because its promoters assure voters that no change of language will be required.

In comparison, Puerto Rico has far less in common with the United States than Corsica has with France. Corsica's Mediterranean people, Catholic, entirely French-speaking and citizens of France for 235 years, had favored something close to unity, which arguably had been realized at some time. But the politicization of nostalgia for a waning cultural past has made Corsica ungovernable, and in the process has badly undermined the Western World's first and formerly one of the strongest of nation-states. Were Puerto Rico – with its more than three million Latin American people (and another three million living in the U.S.) – to enter the Union of States, we would soon face intransigent demands for "Puerto Rican exceptionalism" that no self-respecting nation-state can tolerate. The option of independence for an *Estado de Puerto Rico* would be forever gone. We fought a fratricidal Civil War to assert that principle.

The Corsica conflict teaches us that the statehood decision must not be Puerto Rico's alone. The American people, too, must be consulted before Congress takes this irrevocable step into a future of diminished unity and lost cohesiveness.

It has been said that Puerto Rico, with its intense Spanish-language loyalty, is our potential Quebec.

It is also our potential Corsica. ■

NOTES

1. According to an unsigned article in *le Figaro* magazine (5 May 2000), Corsican emigrants moved in large numbers to Puerto Rico where their descendants today number some 400,000. The article, full of factual errors, claims that Pierre Toussaint Vivoni of Cape Corsica became "Puerto Rico's first mayor."

2. A national corps of police officers functioning in the country's smaller cities and countryside, attached to the Ministry of Defense.

3. Jean Moulin, a former prefect who was head of the *Résistance* during the German occupation, was captured and killed by the Gestapo.

4. Jean-Marc Fombonne-Bresson, quoted in *le Figaro*, 10 February 1998, 10B.

5. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, quoted in *le Figaro*, 16 May 2001, 5.

"And then one day the grid went down and never came back up."

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The Strange Trial of Michel Houellebecq

by Sophie Masson

If ever a court case exemplified the clash between modern realities and modern pieties in France, it is that of the writer Michel Houellebecq, whose *succes de scandale* novels have earned him immense notoriety, immense sales, and immense ire. Recently, he found himself at the center of an extraordinary court battle, which pitted *soixante-huitard*[1] politico-cultural orthodoxies, in alliance with Islamic organizations, against secularism and free speech.

Houellebecq (pronounced "Wellbeck") has been no stranger to controversy since the publication of his second novel, *Les particules élementaires (Atomized)* in 1998. Published in twenty-five countries, this pessimistic, often sickening, but mordantly clever novel was a direct, savage attack on *soixante-huitard* values and what they did to France and to its culture. It is also a pitiless exposé of the ways in which normal human interactions have been robotized and trivialized since then, displaying a deep and scary unease in French society. The main characters, two 40ish half-brothers, live in a world of peep-shows and sex clubs – a rebellion against political pieties that is their only validation. It is a highly disturbing portrayal of a society rotten to the core, slowly committing suicide. A similar portrait had already been drawn by politicians such as Jean-Marie Le Pen – reason enough for the 1968 orthodoxy which dominates the French literary establishment to hate the book. But Houellebecq is no Le Pen, defending the old ways and fighting for a return to tradition; in person and in his work, he truly represents that atomized state in which France's post-68 generations find themselves. Despite his fracas with Islam, he is no Salman Rushdie, either. He has occasionally, with characteristic unblushing swagger, compared himself to Albert Camus. But that is hardly a good comparison, for Camus, though amoral and existentialist, is much more grounded in the old values. Houellebecq can perhaps be best compared with novelist Martin Amis: at heart a deeply bruised moralist, a savage observer of humanity's ugliest side, despairing of finding real love in a world increasingly brutalized and trivialized. Theirs is a dark, dark vision. Strange, in a way, for it can be seen as utterly self-indulgent. They grew up at a time of unprecedented prosperity, nuclear-umbrella peace and individual freedom in the West, to see their societies only as corrupt. The world of their books is a jungle, where jackals rather than tigers or lions rule. They reject every political "solution" or interpretation, from whatever source. Fearless in their dissection of the times, they are nevertheless vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy: for are they not living off the very outrage their books create?

Born in 1958, Houellebecq is of the in-between generation that came to adulthood in the late seventies and early eighties, too young to have been an actor in the sixties' but, nevertheless, heir to the world created by the revolution in values. Born Michel Thomas in the French Indian Ocean island of La Reunion, he was abandoned by his parents at age six, when his mother met a Muslim, converted, and left the family. The boy's father handed him over to the care of *his* mother – whose maiden name, Houellebecq, the writer eventually adopted. The grandmother was a Stalinist whose influence shows through in the hardline materialistic atheism of Houellebecq's public persona. He trained as an agricultural scientist, but never worked in this field. In his thirties, he had several nervous breakdowns, and was hospitalized for depression. Currently, he lives with his second wife on an island in Bantry Bay, in western Ireland.

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In 1994, his first novel, *Extension du Domaine de la Lutte* (published in English as *Whatever*) brought him some small success. But his life changed with the publication of *Atomized*, which launched him on the French literary scene and in the popular media as an outrageous denouncer of every *soixante-huitard* piety, who blames the "generation of 68" for the declining quality of food and conversation in France, along with the decline in morals! At every turn he challenges the received wisdom that has been part of the fragile postwar French consensus, even voicing contempt for the sacrosanct General Charles de Gaulle and sympathy for Marshal Philippe Pétain, head of the Vichy government.

It was an interview in *Lire*, a literary quarterly, which got Michel Houellebecq into the deepest hot water yet – and which confirmed his status as anarchist troublemaker to some and free-speech hero to others. Houellebecq got hauled into court to face the very modern French "human-rights" charge of "incitement to religious and racial hatred" for his inflammatory comments on Islam, characteristically delivered with a brutal, ill-mannered, and rather incoherent directness.

The context of the outburst was this: in September 2001, *Lire* magazine published an interview with Houellebecq which had been conducted some months before. The interview was to mark the imminent publication of his new novel, *Plateforme* (*Platform*).

Set in Thailand, it is focused around the sex trade and Westerners' frenzied search for sexual intimacy with supposedly more 'liberated' people (Houellebecq's perhaps deliberate misreading of Thai culture and Asian realities add more fuel to the fire, of course). Especially for an Australian reader, the book is eerily prescient in its final scene. The main female character, Valerie, dies in an Islamist terrorist attack on a bar in a Thai tourist resort – an attack which kills 117 people, the majority of them foreign tourists. Indeed, Islamist terrorism, and Islamic hypocrisy (there are frenzied sex-seeking Arab tourists in the book, too) are the *leitmotif* in the novel, along with Houellebecq's familiar themes of Western alienation and robotization, his atheism and his depiction of sex, especially commercial sex, as a lifesaver for stressed, spiritually empty Westerners.

The interviewer, Didier Senecal, asked: "*Platform*, then, is set partly overseas (in Thailand) and looks both at sexual tourism and Islam. You really look for controversial subjects?"

"I don't look for them," replied the author, "I happen across them...at the intersection of those two things is something that struck me greatly.. I saw lots of Arab tourists in Bangkok... when one thinks of Islam, one thinks of the fate of women..but there are lots of men too who are terribly pissed off, in Arab countries...many of them have no faith and live in complete hypocrisy... when they come to Thailand they are even more frantic than Westerners in their search for pleasure..."

"Houellebecq [faced] the very modern French 'human-rights' charge of 'incitement to religious and racial hatred' for his inflammatory comments on Islam."

Later in the interview, he elaborated on his feelings about Islam. "It is more than contempt I have for Islam, it is hatred," he said. "...It was because of a negative revelation I had in the Sinai, where Moses received the Ten Commandments...suddenly I experienced a complete rejection of all monotheisms... I told myself that to believe in one God, you had to be a cretin..really, I can't think of another word for it. And the most stupid religion of all would have to be Islam. When you read the Koran, it is a devastating experience! The Bible, at least, is very beautiful, because Jews have a real literary talent..which can excuse many things... I have a residual sympathy for Catholicism, because of its polytheistic aspect... and all its works of art, churches, paintings, sculptures, stained glass..Islam is a dangerous religion, since its very first appearance. Fortunately, it is doomed. First of all, because God doesn't exist, and even if one is a bloody idiot, one finishes up understanding that..In the long term, truth triumphs..On another part, Islam is undermined, under attack by capitalism. All one can

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wish for is that it(capitalism)will rapidly triumph. Materialism is a lesser evil. Its values are despicable, but less destructive, less cruel than those of Islam."

It was these remarks, rather than the novel itself (which no-one had as yet read) which prompted the suit against him. Five plaintiffs banded together to present the case against him in the French courts, for religious and racial incitement: three French-based Muslim organizations, including the Lyon and Paris mosques; an international Muslim organization, based in Saudi Arabia; and a very *soixante-huitard* organization, the League for the Rights of Man. Damages in excess of 190, 000 euros were sought, as well as a condemnation of the writer. Houellebecq

"Houellebecq was acquitted of all charges, the magistrate finding that his words had been 'directed against the religion of Islam, not its adherents.'"

received no support from the French literary establishment, and even his publisher, Flammarion, deserted him. But individual French writers, of very different philosophical orientations – an atheist, an agnostic, and a Catholic among them – defended him. Typically opportunistic support came from Bruno Megret's *Mouvement National Republicain*, an offshoot from Le Pen's National Front. More honorably, Le Pen himself kept quiet – after all, Houellebecq, symbol of modern French decadence, is hardly a suitable pin-up boy for 'traditional France.'

The case galvanized France. The media ran hot with opinions on the issues, a mix of today's unrest, unease, problems and dangers. All sorts of ungovernable forces suddenly expressed themselves. Traditional anti-clerical atheists saw it as a battle against the dark forces of religion; democracy's defenders as a battle for individual freedom and free speech; anti-Muslim activists as a vindication of their beliefs; people who distrust social engineering spoke-up publicly; mischief makers of all sorts banded together. But the establishment was more or less paralyzed; for the case was a clear example of what happens when pieties and realities clash. What was a poor *soixante-huitard* to do? Champion Houellebecq's free speech against wicked religion? Defend the poor Muslims, victims of "racism"? The verdict was eagerly awaited. Who would triumph? Would it be "secular, enlightened' France", or the France that's "Haven of the oppressed, leader of the Rights of Man"? Wait! Aren't they supposed to be one and the same?

The hearing of the case, on the 17th of September 2002, was tumultuous, with demonstrators for both sides shouting outside, and wild accusations flying inside. Dalil Boubakeur, of the Paris mosque, accused the writer of "seeking a fatwa[2], for publicity," and pointed out that "Words have a price. One can kill with a word." Houellebecq was more subdued at the hearing, but still defended himself vigorously, declaring that it was impossible to be "racist against Muslims," for they are not a race but a religious group, denying that he had intentionally caused harm to anyone, or that he despised Muslims, as people: it was "only" their religion that was stupid and hateful. In theory, the writer risked heavy penalties: a year's imprisonment, and a fine of 45,000 euros. In practice, however, the circus atmosphere hid a not-so-secret reality: this particular law had never been successfully prosecuted. It's all very well to have a silencing weapon but another thing to be able to wield it, as the plaintiffs found out. The courts and the government were well aware of the dangers inherent in a successful prosecution: with such a precedent, blasphemy laws would regain currency. Surely, the floodgates would open for that Old Enemy, the Catholic Church, to also bring suit.

The outcome was almost a foregone conclusion. Houellebecq was acquitted of all charges, the magistrate finding that his words had been "directed against the religion of Islam, not its adherents." Free speech against religion was one of the post-1789 freedoms granted, and though a writer could not act "with impunity" altogether, there was no racism in Houellebecq's words, more abstractly directed against Islam.

The plaintiffs could scarcely believe it, and appealed. A second finding, on October 22, upheld the

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original one. Secularist France had triumphed. The Muslim groups had learnt a difficult lesson: if you are petted and patronized by the "elite," you're not thereby guaranteed power. Alliance with the League of the Rights of Man and accusations of racism may seem to be smart moves, but it's not really, not when you're facing an array of entrenched interests, traditions, populist feelings, democratic anger, and general fed-up-ness. One feels sympathy for the anonymous writer in a Muslim publication whose "Open Letter to Michel Houellebecq," pleads with the novelist to understand that saying "I don't hate Muslims, but I hate their religion," is bewildering to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. How can you hate the essence of a culture, and not hate the people who carry that culture in their hearts? A very valid point, difficult to answer honestly.

The court hearing made Houellebecq even more famous than before, of course. Though it highlighted his inconsistency of thought and belief -- an inconsistency he cheerfully admits – the plaintiffs' unanswerable questions fell on deaf ears. They had to, really. The finding had managed to clumsily paper over the gulf between piety and reality in today's France, and any questioning of it could tear that delicate euphemism once and for all, and expose the dreadful, yawning abyss underneath. ■

NOTES

1. A member of the generation that launched the "revolution" of 1968, spearheaded by university students, that brought about major social and political reforms in France. Literally, a "sixty-eighter."

2. A punitive sentence pronounced by an Islamic religious authority.

Counting France's Numbers – Deflating the Numbers Inflation

In France, fear of stigmatizing some ethnic groups has hindered the ability to analyze the country's foreign-origin population by disallowing some key questions from being asked on the Census form. Consequently, the size of the Muslim population in France has long been a subject of wild speculation. The figure of five to six million Muslims has been used by government officials, but one often hears much higher estimates.

Now, for the first time, a large-scale research project known as the "Family History Study" (involving 380,000 persons over age 18) has collected information on the birthplace of *parents* and on childhood language practices. This makes it possible to estimate the foreign-origin population over three generations, and to derive the component *likely* to be Muslim.

There are some 14 million persons of foreign-origin in France: 4.3 million immigrants, 5.5 million children of immigrants, and 4 million grandchildren. Together, they constitute 24% of the population in metropolitan France.

It is Southern Europe -- Italy, Spain, and Portugal – that contributes the largest segment to the foreign-origin population, 5.2 million people.

In the last few years, political debate in France has reduced the foreign-origin population to its North African component. Actually, that segment represents only 22% of the total foreign-origin population – 3 million people. A far cry from the six million reported in *Le Monde* (5 April 2003)!

The total population *presumed* to be Muslim is 3.7 million. Of these, 1.7 million are immigrants, 1.7 million are children of immigrants, and fewer than 300,000 are grandchildren. 82% of all foreign-origin Muslims are from North Africa – Algeria (43%), Morocco (28%), and Tunisia (11%). The others are mostly from Black Africa (340,000) and Turkey (300,000).

Actually, that number is somewhat high. In a country in which people are free to choose their religion, many forego religious practice. This is confirmed in a 1992 study on "Geographic Mobility and Social Integration" in which 30% of young people of Algerian parentage (aged 20 -29) *declared themselves religiously unaffiliated*.

Among adults, half of those *presumed* to be Muslims still hold foreign nationality. As for voters, a subject that worries politicians on all sides, those who are both French citizens and of voting age numbered just 1.2 million in 1999. In view of its youthful profile, this potential electorate is bound to grow rapidly in coming years.

The Muslim issue is largely a North African one – now and for a long time to come. Islam is still an imported phenomenon.

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Under the Islamic Veil

In France, a painful struggle to maintain a secular republic

by Michele Tribalat

It's difficult for a foreigner to understand the passions aroused in France by the "Affair of the Veil," when other European countries and the United States admit students wearing religious headgear in their schools without any incident. My foreign colleagues are often alarmed by what they call our "intolerance." This French "exceptionalism" can't be grasped without a look at the unique history of this country, a history that itself has frightened Europe.

Yes, we have had religious wars, in the course of which our neighbors offered refuge to Protestants fleeing institutional intolerance. But, more generally, French history is marked by a quasi-permanent wrestling match between political power and the papacy – and this even before the French Revolution, when the clergy lost its privileges and recalcitrant priests were deported and threatened with hanging if they dared to return! When it comes to religion, France has never been subtle. Napoleon's Concordat humiliated the Church, but it regained influence during the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. This alliance, however, revived the struggle with the Church and at the end of the nineteenth century, the Third Republic (1870 - 1946) gave it a *coup de grace* in a series of laws that secularized the hospitals, the cemeteries and the schools. Religious orders not authorized by the state lost their teaching privileges and were dissolved – starting out with the Jesuits.

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Early in the twentieth century, in 1901 and 1905, other laws of a clearly anti-clerical character were enacted. The laws of 1901, governing organizations of public utility, were aimed at the religious orders, which henceforth had to get permission to continue their existence. Let us recall the ignoble conditions under which the Chartreux, a religious order operating in France for 800 years, was expelled when the State refused such permission – 43 members of the order

"The objective of the1905 laws was nothing more nor less than the collapse of the Church's hierarchical structure..."

were forced out, escorted by an infantry battalion, two squadrons of dragoons, 50 mounted police and elite military guards.

The objective of the1905 laws was nothing more nor less than the collapse of the Church's hierarchical structure, something the pope understood very well and refused to accept. It wasn't until 1923 that an agreement was reached whereby the State consented to recognize the Catholic dioceses as associations conforming to the laws of 1905.

The Church's retreat from civil affairs came at the price of much pain. The schools, which had been its domain but from which it had been excluded, turned against the Church once they were secularized. Peace finally emerged from this painful process, and positions softened some, but only because the Church had been beaten by a knock-out. In this ancient country steeped in Catholic traditions, the French people ended up complying with the rules of

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secularism. They were conditioned to be discrete in matters of religion, especially in the schools which were practically emptied of all religious expression. This is a noteworthy difference from our neighbors. When Islam intruded into the schools, it had no "competition."

In 1989, when the first head scarf challenges started, the French people showed no hesitation about what should be done, nor did they have any doubt about the meaning of secularism: 83 percent were hostile to the wearing of the Islamic veil, and 70 percent agreed that secularism forbids any open display of one's religious convictions in class.[1] Only the political establishment vacillated. The parties, associations, fraternal orders, unions, etc. disagreed on the issue; the same divisions are with us today as a law forbidding all visible religious symbols in the schools is once again under consideration. Both on the left and on the right, we find defenders of and opponents to this idea, much the same alignment we observed during prior crisis in 1989 and 1994. The defenders of the *status quo* are motivated by fears of stigmatization and of racist overtones, they have faith in the near-miraculous virtues of the public schools, they invoke individual rights and the notion that judicial powers (poorly understood, even by politicians) are enough. On the other hand, legislative action is perceived as justified in view of the ongoing and growing religious demands on the schools (Ramadan, prayers, etc.), the need to protect students who don't want to don the scarf, or who want to practice a more moderate Islam or not practice it at all, as well as the deteriorating relations between the sexes which push some girls to wear the scarf for the sake of peace, and the obvious confusion of teachers and administrators in the schools.

The passion aroused in French society by the head scarf can also be explained by the calamitous mismanagement of the issue by the socialist government in 1989, when the subject first surfaced. To avoid being in the line of fire, Lionel Jospin, then Minister of Education,[2] passed it on to the *Conseil d'État*,[3] requesting its opinion on the wearing of religious symbols in school. The question itself was not neutral, as it treated the Islamic scarf as a religious symbol like any other. The opinion of the *Conseil d'État*, which elaborated a novel conception of secularism contrary to French tradition, and the shameful support lent to it by the political class, ignited a powder keg. The French people felt it had been betrayed. The meaning of secularism had been twisted in order to permit religious expressions that had formerly been prohibited and which would benefit only Islam, as all other religious impulses had been eradicated. The French nation fails to understand why it was necessary to sacrifice so much when it came to the Church – and why so little is asked of Islam today.

"The passion aroused in French society by the head scarf can also be explained by the mismanagement of the issue by the socialist government in 1989..."

The sense of betrayal is sharpened by the politicians' flight from responsibility by referring the issue to the courts. Here are the words of the government solicitor on the "Kherouaa" case in 1992:

> *With regard to secularism in the schools, it seems to us that the opinion comes down to a reversal of the* too rigorous *approach advocated by some of its* most ardent supporters. *Secularism* no longer *appears to be a principle that justifies the prohibition of all religious manifestations. Schooling is secular not because it prohibits the expression of different faiths but, on the contrary, because it tolerates them all. This* reversed perspective, *which affirms the principle of liberty and makes prohibition the exception, seems to us particularly important.* [Emphasis added]

It is precisely this reversal of perspective, decided by judges, on a principle of constitutional relevance, that is indigestible. ■

NOTES

1. *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 23 November 1989.
2. Later Prime Minister, 1996 - 2002; Presidential Candidate, 2002.
3. High administrative tribunal, advisory to the State.

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Upward Mobility for Hispanic Immigrants?

The statistics say 'no'

by Linda Thom

Increasingly, demographic studies of immigrants show that many live in poverty. But what of their children and grandchildren? Many folks hold the hope that the descendants of hard-working immigrants will rise from the underclass of American society. Sadly, the numbers do not support this view.

Data Sources

In an effort to simplify the numbers, only two major data sources are used in this article. One is the October 2001 Current Population Survey (CPS) produced by the Bureau of the Census and the other is "Births: Final Data for 2001" which is produced by the National Center for Health Statistics, a division of the Center for Disease Control (Martin).

The CPS is a small sample taken in the years between the decennial censuses. Because of the small sample size, errors can occur. The table is: "Enrollment Status of the Population 3 years old and over by Age, Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin and Nativity."

Only a small sample of the CPS numbers is included. To see if the numbers might be skewed by small sample size, the author compared the 2000 data and the 2001 data. The numbers were consistent between the years and among various age, racial, and ethnic groupings.

The data on births have no reliability issues. Local public health departments collect data for birth certificates. This is transmitted to the state and then to the Federal Government. The numbers used are total, actual numbers and not samples. In addition, the trends are the same dating back over many years so that the data for 2001 is consistent with that of 1992, for example.

Education

One of the primary causes of poverty is poor educational attainment. In "School Enrollment: 2000," the Bureau of the Census reports that between 1990 and 2000, "the total number of 16- to 19-year-old dropouts decreased by 2 percent, [but] **the number of dropouts in the Hispanic population increased by 52 percent"** – emphasis by the author (Day). Jennifer Cheeseman Day, the author of the Census report, attributes this to "rapid population growth." With the exception of Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders, the number of high school dropouts

Table 1
High School Dropouts Aged 20 and 21, by Nativity, Oct 2001

(Numbers in thousands)	All	Not HS Grads	Rate
* Natives & their children	5,046	304	6%
* Immigrants	1,002	317	31.6%
* Children of Immigrants	1,806	412	22.8%
* Both immigrants & children	2,808	729	26%

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decreased in all racial and ethnic groups, including Asians. Obviously, the "rapid population growth" is immigration-driven and the Current Population Survey statistics confirm this.

The CPS enrollment data for October 2001, show that among the 7,854,000 U.S. residents aged 20 and 21, over a million did not complete high school. Of the 1,033,000 dropouts, 71 percent were immigrants and their U.S.-born children but they only make up 36 percent of the people in this age group. Table 1 gives the "raw" data.

The dropout rate, number of dropouts per 100,000 of population group, is especially troubling because the dropout rate for the U.S.-born children of immigrants is 22.8%. This rate is almost quadruple that of native-born residents and their children and is driven by the high dropout rate of Hispanics. The dropout rates in this age group for major racial and ethnic groups are: Non-Hispanic Whites- 8.3%; Blacks who may be Hispanic-15.6%; Asian-Pacific Islanders-3.9% and Hispanics-30.7%. Note, however, that the non-Hispanic black dropout rate for 16- to 19-year olds was 11.7 percent in the 2000 census. Therefore, the Hispanic dropout rate is almost triple the rate of non-Hispanic African-Americans.

Births to Immigrants

Natural increase of immigrants is a growing portion of U.S. population increase. Because of this, the second- and third-generation descendants of immigrants have become a growing portion of the U.S. population.

According to the Bureau of the Census, in 1983, native-born women accounted for 93 percent and immigrant women accounted for 7 percent of the total annual births of 3,896,000. In 1992, U.S. births were 4,065,015. Of these, 84.2 percent were to native-born mothers and 15.8 percent to foreign-born mothers – 3,422,743 and 642,272 respectively.

In 2001, annual births were 4,025,933 and native-born women made up 77.5 percent of new mothers while immigrants made up 22.5 percent, almost a forth of all annual births. In the decade between 1992 and 2001, births to native-born women decreased both numerically and as a percentage of total annual births. Table 2 summarizes data for 2001 from the National Center of Health Statistics. (Martin).

Because the immigrant share of births rose from 7 percent to 22.5 percent of annual births in less than twenty years, it is clear that in the next twenty years, many births to U.S. mothers will be to U.S.-born mothers whose parents or grandparents were immigrants.

Note that Hispanic births, both to native- and foreign-born women comprised over a fifth of all births. Of the U.S.-born Hispanic women – 313,481 – many are likely children or grandchildren of immigrants. Asian/Pacific Islander (API) women comprise a rapidly growing portion of total births, mostly to immigrant women.

How will these children fare? If they follow the patterns of their parents, in general, Hispanic children will make up a growing portion of America's underclass. Asian children, overall, will fare better but some groups such as Southeast Asians, display social patterns that result in poverty.

Poverty and Demographic Characteristics

In 1998, the National Center for Children in Poverty (NCCP) at Columbia School of Public Health released a statistical report on the percentage and number of children under age six in poverty. The study covered almost 20 years of data. The NCCP found that in 1996, 56 percent of all poor children under six lived

Table 2
Births in 2001 by Race, Ethnicity, and Nativity

	Total Births	US-Born women	Immigrants
All	4,025,933	3,120,098	905,835
Hispanics	851,851	313,481	538,370
Non-Hisp Whites	2,326,578	2,107,182	219,396
Non-Hisp Blacks	589,917	523,256	66,661
Asian/Pac Island	200,279	33,647	166,632

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in mother-headed households. In 62 percent of poor households, the most educated parent had less than a high school education while only 10 percent had a parent with more than a high school education. Sixteen percent of the children were born to teen mothers.

The NCCP study states, "Individuals with higher levels of education generally have more job opportunities, higher wages, and greater job full-time security than those with lower levels of education. In 1996, among children under six whose more educated parent had more than a high school education, 84 percent lived in families in which at least one parent held a job. The poverty rate for this group was less that 4 percent" (Li and Bennet, 1998). Besides lack of education and families headed by teens or single parents, many people are poor because there are many children in the family.

Table 3
2001 Births to Unmarried and Teen Mothers by Nativity, Race, and Ethnicity

US-Born Mothers	Unmarried	Teenagers	Not HS grads
Hispanic	47.9%	22.3%	32.2%
NH White	23.2%	8.5%	10.1%
NH Black	72.1%	20.6%	25.9%
Asian/Pac Is.	32.9%	14.2%	11.4%
Immigrant Mothers			
Hispanic	39.2%	11.6%	58.5%
NH White	10.6%	3.1%	9.3%
NH Black	40.6%	9.7%	15.8%
Asian/Pac Is.	11.2%	2.3%	10.6%

Using actual birth data from 2001, some trends emerge. Immigrant women are less likely to be teen- or unmarried-mothers than are their U.S.-born racial and ethnic counterparts but they have higher fertility rates and so have larger families. Except for Hispanics, immigrant women tend to be better educated than their American-born peers.

"In 2001, 16.1 percent of the foreign born were living below the poverty level, compared with 11.1 percent of natives" (Schmidley). Education makes a difference. But as the data will demonstrate, unmarried mothers, teen pregnancies, and large families lead to dismal lives for generations.

Level of Education of Immigrant Mothers

As a whole, Asian/Pacific Island (API) women are the best educated of all the racial and ethnic groups whether foreign- or native-born. Hispanic women are the least educated of all the groups. For example, among Asian women immigrants 89.4 percent completed 12 or more years of school. Among Hispanic, immigrant mothers only 41.5 percent attained this level of education. Of the 851,851 births to Hispanic mothers in 2001, almost 400,000 were to Mexican immigrant women, only a third of whom had completed high school. Of the total 177,652 mothers giving birth in 2001 who had 0 to 8 years of school, 121,078 or 89 percent were Hispanic (Martin).

According to Census data, as of March 2002, **among all immigrants 25 years and older, 21.9 percent had less than 9 years of school as compared to 4.4% of Americans** (emphasis by the author). "The percentage of the foreign born with a bachelor's degree or more was not statistically different from that of the native population – 26.8 percent" (Schmidley).

In the second and third generations, Hispanics continue to lag in educational attainment. Again, referring to data from birth certificates, a third of American-born Hispanic new mothers did not complete high school as compared to 15 percent of non-Hispanic American-born mothers, (Martin). The Columbia University study found that among 62 percent of poor children, the most educated parent had less than 12 years of school.

Education matters.

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Unmarried- and Teen-Mothers

In every racial and ethnic group, U.S.-born, new mothers are more likely to be unmarried or teens or both (under 20 years). Think about the significance of this as it relates to poverty. In the Columbia University study cited above, 16 percent of poor children had teen mothers and 56 percent lived in single-parent households. (See Table 3.)

No matter the nativity of Hispanic women, the numbers of births are appallingly high. Of the 851,851 births to Hispanic women in 2001, 611,000 births were to Mexican-origin women of whom 221,182 were U.S.-born and 389,818 foreign-born. Mexican women accounted for 327,233 of the total 532,249 births to Hispanic women in 1989. Total annual Hispanic births, therefore, rose by 319,602 between 1989 and 2001 and Mexican-origin women accounted for 89 percent of the increase in that period (Martin). Central and South American women contributed the next greatest increase in births – 72,443 births in 1989 and 121,365 births in 2001.

Note also, that among U.S.-born Asian/Pacific Islander mothers, the percent of unmarried women is triple, and the percent of teen mothers are 6 times higher than the percentage for their immigrant peers. No single Asian immigrant group accounts for this.

Among U.S.-born non-Hispanic Blacks, teen births to unmarried and poorly educated mothers make up a huge portion of the total population of new mothers, but the teen birth rate among them decreased by 36 percent between 1991 and 2001 (Martin). In 2001, Hispanic teenagers had the highest birth rate, 92.5 per 1,000, followed by non-Hispanic Black (75.6), non-Hispanic White (30.0) and API teenagers (20.4). Hispanics also had the highest birthrate among unmarried women – 98 per 1,000 births. Black women, including some Hispanics, had an unmarried birth rate of 70.1 as compared to non-Hispanic White women, 27.7, and API women, 23.2 per 1,000 births (Martin).

"For many immigrants and their descendants the American dream is a nightmare."

Overall, educational attainment among Hispanic women increased for U.S.-born women. In all other cases, the bad news for U.S.-born mothers overwhelmed the good news.

Family Size

Obviously, low income causes poverty but another contributing factor is household size. As every parent knows, children make one financially poorer, albeit richer in other ways. Children are consumers of income and adults are both consumers and producers of income. The more consumers per household, the more likely are the members to live in poverty. Fertility, therefore, matters.

As a group, immigrants have higher fertility than do American women. High fertility is closely correlated with low educational attainment. Hispanics are poorly educated; they have higher fertility than do non-Hispanics.

The total fertility rate (TFR) estimates the number of births that a group of 1,000 women would have if they experienced throughout their childbearing years the same age-specific rates observed in a given year (Martin). TFR declined for most race/ethnic groups for 2001, but increased among Hispanics. Table 4 shows the TFR's for the years 1990 and 2001. If for, example, a cohort has a TFR of 1,853 births per 1,000, that means that an individual woman's total fertility rate would be 1,853 or below

Table 4
Total Fertility Rates for 1990 and 2001
by Race and Ethnicity
(Births per thousand women)

Race/Ethnicity	2001	1990
Non-Hispanic White	1,853	1,850.5
Non-Hispanic Black	2,190.5	2,547.5
Hispanic	3,165	2,959.5
Asian/Pacific Islander	2,035.5	2002.5

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replacement level of 2.1 children per woman.

Non-Hispanic white and API women have below replacement fertility but both have risen slightly since 1990. The total fertility of Non-Hispanic Blacks may be above replacement level but note the significant decline in TFR since 1990. Hispanic fertility at 3,165 per 1,000 births, on the other hand, increased markedly between 1990 and 2001 and is one child above replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. Obviously, immigrant fertility rates are driving this.

Conclusion

While scholars may debate the cause of American poverty, the numbers show clearly that for many immigrants and their descendants the American dream is a nightmare. The negative numbers for American Blacks are instructive because Americans understand that poverty among Blacks continues generation after generation. Although African-Americans continue to steadily climb out of poverty, the improvement proceeds slowly. Moreover, millions of uneducated Black immigrants are not replenishing the legions of the poor as are millions of immigrants of other races and ethnicities. For African-Americans, hope for a better future is justified.

Even if Congress reverses the direction of current immigration policy by declaring a moratorium, America will have an ever-expanding underclass because of high fertility rates among Hispanics and some Asian populations. Many of the children and grandchildren of immigrants are failing to thrive and will continue to do so for generations. ■

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GLOBALIZATION THEORY: THE BLUE COLLAR JOBS ARE EXPORTED, THEN THE WHITE COLLAR JOBS.
GLOBALIZATION YES!
GOODS BECOME CHEAPER AND ARE EAGERLY SNATCHED UP...
...BY A LONG LINE OF HAPPY CONSUMERS!
GLOBALIZATION YES!
UNEMPLOYMENT OFFICE
WELL... THE "LONG LINE" PART IS DEAD ON
OK, SO WE'RE STILL WORKING OUT A FEW BUGS...
YES!
MIKE THOMPSON

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In the Hispanic News

An encounter with NotiHispano

by Denos P. Marvin

A short while ago my wife and I lunched at a Mexican restaurant in Galax, Virginia. Since we are both fluent in Spanish we each were motivated to pick up a free copy of a Spanish-language newspaper from a stack that was handily located at the cashier's station. The newspaper, *NotiHispano*, seems overall to have a very acceptable Hispanic bias, chiefly the preservation of the Hispanic heritage and language by migrants and their American-born children.

For the most part I found the reports and editorials to be the kinds of things that one would expect to find in a periodical of this nature. Hence the emphasis on immigration problem-solving, i.e., the legal right of all migrants to a professional interpreter; how to obtain, while in the U.S.A., an official Mexican ID (the *Metricula Consular*); and all about the favorable recognition the Matricula ID card is receiving from important institutions such as banks, Blue Cross, and the U.S. Department of Treasury. Another article advises readers that no public agency in the City of New York may inquire as to your immigration status.

The examples of public agencies given in the report were "police, schools, hospitals, etc." Listed among the "etc.," I am sure, would be all manner of governmental social service agencies that do and should bestow tax payer-paid services to the needy, regardless of their legal status in this country. I also found of interest a short blurb about the school district of Galax, Virginia, now offering a Spanish-language version of the GED, a high school equivalency exam. On another page was an info-report that told how to get a CD-ROM that tells how to obtain higher education scholarships. Information about the cost-free CD is available on a website sponsored jointly by the National Education Association (NEA) and the "National Hispanic Press Foundation" (NHPF). Certainly *Noti* puts a commendable emphasis on achieving an education.

Personally, if I were one of the ten million Spanish-speaking immigrants in the United States, I would find *NotiHispano* and similar Spanish language publications to be very helpful, especially if I were an illegal immigrant, living in fear of *la Migra* and of being returned to a life of high unemployment and abject poverty in Mexico. However, not being one of the ten million, but rather a native of this country, I did find a few aspects of this otherwise innocuous publication with its Spanish *gemutlich* to be somewhat disquieting.

For example, there was the somewhat peevish front-page lament that many California Hispanics had voted for Arnold Schwarzenegger instead of voting as a bloc for Lieutenant-Governor Cruz Bustamente, one of their very own – *"el candidato que representa a nuestras raices."* – an indication, it seems to me, of the apartheid aims of the reporters and publishers.

Further, in the report about the GED there was no concern about the apparent linguistic "dumbing down" of the GED and the effect this would have on related educational issues. Is not literacy in English and proficiency in thinking and writing in English the cornerstone of the GED examination and certificate? If so, minus the critical factor of English proficiency, the matter raises the question: to what extent has a Spanish-speaking student, with this kind of certification, really demonstrated that he has achieved the equivalent of a an American high school education? In other words, when not conducted in English and thereby removed from the American cultural context, the exam can hardly reflect educational equivalence.

Above all, what I found to be particularly lacking throughout the twelve pages of this letter-perfect publication (these are no amateur writers here) was that nowhere in the newspaper were there any positive statements about the value of learning and assimilating the language, culture, and heritage of the United States. Hopefully these are topics that will be written about in future editions of *NotiHispano*. ■

Denos P. Marvin *earned his B.A. at Mexico's University of the Americas and his M.A. at Columbia University.*

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U.S. 'Free Trade' with Mexico

Is it progress or self-destruction?

by John Culbertson

Depending on the world-view and vocabulary used to depict it, U.S. free trade with Mexico can seem anything from an obviously progressive step to an action ruinous to the United States and damaging to human prospects. The favorable interpretation now prevailing in both the political right and left in the United States proves, on consideration, to reflect a misleading conceptualization of the subject arising from a fashionable utopian ideology.

Seeking the truth on this subject thus requires first its depropagandization. The valid name for what is called "free trade" is "foreign trade not subject to regulation by the nation's government," that is, mandatory deregulation of the nation's foreign trade – like deregulation of its savings associations, banks, airlines. The valid name for what is called "barriers to trade" is "regulation of trade." The misleading labels present an image of regulation of foreign trade as unnatural and inherently destructive, a crime against the ways of the world. In truth, foreign trade has always been regulated by governments.

The human world always has been made up of many independent, or "free," tribes, kingdoms, empires, or nations. Preserving this structure of human life requires the regulation of foreign trade. Unregulated foreign trade undercuts the independence of nations, prevents their developing along different paths. In the absence of effective supranational government, the deregulation of foreign trade leaves mankind adrift, its diverse and discordant societies merged into impotence, dropped together into a single pot, with no government at any level that is capable of preserving a civilized level of life or preventing the destruction of the earthly habitat. Far from being obviously correct, unregulated foreign trade is revolutionary; fashionably but irresponsibly revolutionary.

Deceptive Stereotypes

The free-trade fable exercises its mind-ruling power by exploiting the human weakness for making issues a struggle between Good and Evil. It provides a stereotype of regulation of foreign trade as "protectionism," depicted as "import restrictions that damage the nation and the world but are imposed through the power of evil 'special interests'." The evil "protectionists" are portrayed as acting out of anti-social selfishness or of racism, an urge to bash some nation, or a show of indifference to foreign poverty. In the Good-versus-Evil conceptualization of foreign trade, protectionism/the Evil, commonly is depicted as the only option other than free trade/the Good. President Reagan's consistent characterization of his trade policy for the United States as one of "fighting protectionism" illustrates the pattern.

Is it true that the only options on foreign-trade policy are free trade *or* protectionism? The trade policy, through which Japan took over valuable U.S. markets, industries, and jobs through one-sided foreign trade, ran huge trade surpluses with the U.S. and become large owners of U.S. properties – is this free trade or is it protectionism? Of course, the answer is neither – neither the answer for Japan nor for most other nations. In reality, there are many kinds of trade policy available.

Posing the choice as "free trade *or* protectionism" illustrates a basic technique in the manipulative use of language, the misstated either/or, as in Hitler's proffered choice: Nazism *or* Jewish communism; Stalinism's idealized socialism *or* Satanic capitalism. The stereotype of protectionism functions as a contrived Evil to be paired with free trade as the Good. Given the effectiveness with which such propagandistic use of

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This prescient essay appeared over twelve years ago in the Fall 1991 issue of The Social Contract, *Vol. II, No. 1.*

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language has been analyzed by Hayakawa and others, it is surprising that self-respecting Americans across the political spectrum, both Ronald Reagan and the editorial writers of *The New York Times*, rely on it to support the deregulation of foreign trade – with no consideration of the actual effects of alternative trade policies. Economists commonly use the same conceptualization, contrasting the negatively stereotyped protectionism with misleading examples in which unregulated foreign trade automatically brings the best of all possible worlds – examples that do not correspond to evidence and experience.

Thus, to consider alternative trade policies in terms of their *effects* requires escaping from the whole system of deceptive stereotypes that dominates U.S. discussion of the subject. A realistic consideration of the effects of alternative systems of foreign trade can well begin with the observation of the great liberal economist, J. M. Keynes ("National Self-Sufficiency," *Yale Review*, 1933) that the system of foreign trade must be chosen to fit the political, economic, social, and international-relations realities of the times. Keynes, deploring his own zealous earlier support of the free-trade doctrine, pointed out that it made no sense to attempt to bring about *laissez-faire* foreign trade in the political and economic world of the 20th century – whether or not it would have been reasonable in an earlier era.

Keynes recognized the all-important point that unregulated foreign trade implied economic entanglement among nations. Unregulated foreign trade subordinates the goals, standards, powers of the nation to the interests of private parties in all nations. Deregulating its foreign trade costs a nation its freedom of action, its effective independence, its ability to chart its own course and to learn its own lessons from its successes and its failures.

The nineteenth-century vision of world-wide deregulation of foreign trade in the context of universal economic *laissez-faire* thus had no applicability to the political and economic world that arose from the First World War, in which nations explicitly adopted different theories, ideologies, and policy goals. The political and economic situation of the 20th century required policies that could bring about constructive, mutually beneficial patterns of foreign trade among independent nations operating under different political and economic agendas and goals. Wrote Keynes:

> *We do not wish, therefore, to be at the mercy of world forces working out ... some uniform equilibrium according to the ideal principles, if they can be called such, of laissez-faire capitalism. We wish ... to be our own masters and to be as free as we can make ourselves from the interferences of the outside world.*
>
> *I sympathize, therefore, with those who would minimize, rather than with those who would maximize, economic entanglement among nations. Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel – these are the things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national. For these strong reasons, therefore, I am inclined to the belief that ... a greater measure of national self-sufficiency and economic isolation among countries than existed in 1914 may serve the cause of peace rather than otherwise.*

Keynes noted that any loss of production efficiency from maintaining a nation's economic independence was in many cases small or trivial – and that the existence and amount of any such "inefficiency" depends on circumstances and cannot be inferred from ideologically-biased principles. Experience accumulates to prove that most modern processes of mass production can be performed in most countries and climates with almost equal efficiency.

In Keynes' valid conception of "efficiency," for example, shifting the production of telephones for the U.S. market from a factory in Louisiana to an identical factory in Thailand does not increase efficiency; it reduces efficiency but is profitable because it replaces high-income labor with low-income labor. Shifting world manufacturing production from high-wage to low-wage nations does not increase efficiency and world output. An increase in the volume of world trade of this type is not progress; it may be ruinous.

Foreign trade of genuine efficiency would provide the means of permanently benefitting both nations rather than temporarily benefitting one nation at the expense of the other. In real-world conditions, such efficiency-based and mutually beneficial patterns of foreign trade are ordinarily attainable only on the basis of a set of constructive trade policies. That the basic distinction

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between efficiency-based, beneficial trade and level-the-nations-downward trade has been lost in recent discussion, even by most economists, perhaps must be explained by the dominance of propaganda in the discussion of foreign trade, which has hidden even the most basic causal relations.

Keynes thus favored a system of regulated foreign trade that would work constructively in a world of free and independent – non-globalized – nations. That is, he favored a system of constructively regulated foreign trade, which is not so-called "free trade" and is not so-called "protectionism." But historical accidents put the path of opinion and events since the 1930s under the domination of a massive U.S. attempt to implement a peculiar version of world-wide "free trade."

"Patterns of trade that benefit both of the nations involved do not arise naturally from the profit-seeking dealings of private parties of all nations. Mutually beneficial foreign trade requires a constructive framework of national trade policy..."

The intellectual and political father of this movement was Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State from 1933 to 1944. The rationale of Hull's pursuit of deregulation of foreign trade differed from the now-dominant one. Having conceived as early as 1916 that "unhampered trade dove-tailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition with war," Hull and his U.S. State Department developed the concepts and the program that still underlie the U.S. campaign for the deregulation of foreign trade to attack not an alleged economic inefficiency of "protectionism" but asserted war-causing effects of international economic rivalries and "trade wars."

Hull was able to gain acquiescence in his version of foreign-trade deregulation during the temporary U.S. dominance of the world at the end of the Second World War. Keynes never supported Hull's approach, referring to "the lunatic proposals of Mr. Hull." Had Keynes' view governed the postwar arrangements for foreign trade, international economic and political developments would have taken a quite different course. It was not the inexorable march of progress but a curious set of circumstances that brought the world-trade situation to its present crisis.

Patterns of trade that benefit both of the nations involved do not arise naturally from the profit-seeking dealings of private parties of all nations. Mutually beneficial foreign trade requires a constructive framework of national trade policy that (1) prevents out-of-balance or one-way trade that shifts industries, jobs, and economic ownership from a trade-deficit to a trade-surplus nation, (2) prevents the shifting of the industries with bright futures to one nation thus leaving to the other nation only the declining and low-pay industries, (3) prevents nations from being damaged by instability imposed by the trade, such as the "dumping" of goods in a foreign market below production cost to weaken its industry and take over its market, (4) prevents the pattern of trade from unduly undermining the independence and defense capabilities of the nation, and (5) avoids the one-sidedness of trade benefit that arises when the trade on one side is arranged on behalf of the nation by its government and on the other side is handled by firms that are competing against one another in pursuit of private profit.

The foreign-trade arrangements arising from the Hull approach were not aimed at these goals. They proved to thwart their achievement. Hull's effort to reduce average tariff levels and trade "discrimination" (in a peculiar sense) through the "most-favored-nation" policy prevented the development of managed, mutually beneficial patterns of trade between nations in different circumstances. In this approach, if the United States, say, made a certain trade concession to Mexico in order to work out a balanced and mutually beneficial pattern of trade with Mexico, the United States (to avoid "discrimination") would have to offer the same concession to Japan and other countries that already had large trade surpluses with the U.S.

One epoch-making "side effect" of the Hull-structured trade policy was to cause the United States to

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acquiesce year after year after year in a ruinous pattern of one-sided, one-way-benefit foreign trade that permitted its all-important home market for the rewarding-to-the-nation industries of the times to be taken over by other nations, largely on the basis of their low-wages, minimal regulations and social standards, and government management of their foreign trade. The economic decline of the United States would not have occurred as it did under a foreign-trade system that paid attention to the effects of the *patterns of trade* and provided means for nations to arrange mutually beneficial patterns of trade.

The Free-Trade/Good vs Protectionism/Evil view of foreign trade thus has caused enormous mischief. It has the world headed for worsening problems. Low-wage and low-labor-standards nations around the world expect to advance themselves by taking over rising shares of the U.S. market, which is shrinking as a result of the trade-caused economic decline of the United States and its standard of living. The foreign-trade system is headed for crisis – a crisis that should have been easy to predict, but will be far from easy to cure.

A factor curiously neglected in recent trade-policy discussion is the radical effect on the process of rise and decline of human societies that would be caused by the entanglement, amalgamation, or merger of nations resulting from the deregulation of foreign trade. It now is widely understood that the basis of constructive organic, organizational, and societal evolution is diversity, variety, copious experimentation, multiple trials in the trial and error of the evolutionary process. Advancement – perhaps even survival – requires enough variety of experiments to generate some successes. Of the human societies of the present era, many have recently conceded failure and others seem to be headed for it. But human civilization has a future *so long as there are some successes – some societies that meet the short-run and long-run requirements of their environments, providing patterns that can be copied or adapted by the failing societies.*

Biologists argue that the survival of even an obscure species of owl may be important for mankind because it affects the earth's biological diversity. How much more important it must be that there exist a large and diverse set of human societies, exploring different developmental paths, demonstrating "what happens if...," providing patterns of success that can be used to repair failures and potential extinguishments of other societies. But because trade policy is discussed within misleading verbal stereotypes, these profound implications are not recognized to exist.

It is clear – as, again, Keynes took for granted – that nations that give up their power to regulate their foreign trade, in general or with particular nations, give up their independence of action and control of their future course of development. The actual implementation of "free trade" would replace many, diverse, nation-guided societal experiments with a single global experiment that presumably would be guided by no effective government.

One critically important consideration is that under a "global economy," "one world," or the rule of "free trade," the effects of overpopulation-caused poverty and joblessness would fall not on the society that causes the problem but on all nations, as competition shifts capital

"The Free-Trade/Good vs Protectionism/Evil view of foreign trade thus has caused enormous mischief. It has the world headed for worsening problems."

and production to the nation with the lowest labor-cost. In a world of independent societies, the failure of any one does not drag down the others. The failures can turn themselves around by copying the successes. In a world of one "global economy," failures anywhere drag all downward. The expected result is universal failure and degradation. On a planet critically threatened by human overpopulation, habitat destruction, and governments too weak or delusion-based to preserve the habitat and standard of living, the prospects of mankind as one single, globalized experiment are dismal.

Most recent discussion depicts the "global economy" or "one world" not as bringing all-eggs-in-one-basket human failure, but as fighting "nationalism" which is stereotyped as based on bigotry, racism, hatred, selfishness, or anti-progressiveness. Once again, the purported choice – "aggressive, bigotry-based nationalism," (the Evil) or "global economy,"(the Good)

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— misstates the options that are available. Neither "aggressive nationalism" nor "the global economy" is a course that merits serious consideration. Success can be gained only by escaping from such misleading stereotypes (which seem rooted in their own bigotries) and realistically defining the available policy options and their expected outcomes.

The economic merger of, or free trade between, two nations makes these nations subject to the downward-leveling effect of unregulated foreign trade, diminishes national independence and diversity, and undercuts the capabilities of both national governments while providing no new forms of government to take their place. In such cases, the first-stage outcome depends on the compatibility of the two societies that enter into the economic-political merger or partnership. The more alike they are the less there is to be lost in world societal diversity and in detrimental effect on one or both nations. Thus, economic merger of the U.S. and Canada is much less threatening than that of the U.S. and Mexico, or the U.S. and China, or India.

The Problem of Diverse Constituencies

The U.S. and Mexico differ widely in political tradition, ideology, government structure and performance, severity of overpopulation and excessive population-growth, unemployment, low-wage production, worker-protection standards, child labor laws, environmental protection attitudes and policies, cultures, values, viewpoints and language. Free trade and economic, political, cultural, social merger between two countries as different and disharmonious as these cannot be justified on the basis of an experience-based, cause-and-effect analysis of the likely effects. The conceivable gain is, at best, trivial in relation to the conceivable loss, which is almost beyond imagining. Any real potential gain from trade between the nations could be tapped through managed and mutually beneficial trade that preserved the independence of the two nations and threatened no ruinous outcome.

The damage done by a trade-deregulation merger of two nations need not fall on them equally. Nations with bright prospects have more to lose than those with dismal prospects. Mexican workers might seem certain, at least temporarily, to gain (at the expense of American workers, and of a rising role of American capital in Mexico) from the shift of production, jobs, industries, capital from the U.S. to Mexico because of cost-savings from lower wages and less stringent regulation of child labor, worker protection, and working conditions. But when the discordant nations sat down to, as it is put, 'harmonize' their laws and policies in a way that is satisfactory to their diverse constituencies and found how little agreement and how much conflict exists, it would become clear that while each nation alone had a chance of finding a path to success, in their joint harness they could not agree on any path that would meet the requirements of the times and achieve success.

As the United States, despite its recent lack of realism and its self-destructive policies, still must be counted among the nations that might generate patterns of success that merit copying by other nations, it would diminish the hopes of mankind for the U.S. to enter blindly into nation-mergers that would remove it from the potential contributors of patterns of societal economic success. From the viewpoint of Americans (except perhaps of some capitalists) U.S. merger with Mexico – or with almost any other nation – would be insane.

Thus, the pursuit of "free trade," "a global economy," and U.S. "free trade" with Mexico seem (1) a grand and inspiring program for progress when viewed within the stereotypes now dominating U.S. discussion but as (2) a uniquely destructive human folly when viewed within the framework of cause-and-effect analysis.

Where are the voices of those who understand the second view? Is the Congress to commit the nation's future without even an awareness that this view exists?

Extricating nations from the collapse of an ideology-based, deeply-embedded economic structure that proves a failure is being shown by the cases of collapsing Marxist communism to be very difficult and of uncertain outcome – even when models of success are available to be copied.

If the United States, beguiled by its misleading stereotypes of utopian individualism and anti-nationalism, blind to the effects that actually will follow (and have followed) from its actions, commits itself, and pushes other nations, to an ungovernable, all-the-human-eggs-in-one-basket structuring of mankind in a rapidly deteriorating and increasingly overpopulated earthly habitat, the prospects of recovering from the collapse of this structure will not be favorable. ■

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Embedded Visas

Free trade agreements mean a flow of workers across national borders

by Rob Sanchez

Free trade agreements (called FTAs) such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) receive a lot of public discussion because of the immense effect they have on our economy, but very few people understand that these agreements are about much more than trade and the exporting of jobs. Global trade agreements come with the extra baggage sometimes referred to as "embedded visas."

FTAs contain embedded visas because immigration is often used as a bargaining chip during trade negotiations. Pressure for visas comes from multi-national corporations seeking to import cheap labor, from special interests that want access to foreign markets, and from pro-immigration groups who have a variety of agendas.

To further the interests of the movement of labor across national boundaries, the General Agreement on Trade and Services (or GATS) was created. GATS contains two major components: the first is trade, which is defined as the movement of commodities and products across national boundaries without tariffs, and the second is the movement of people across borders to provide services. GATS negotiators consider human capital as a commodity that should be able to be moved across national boundaries wherever employers need it – and therefore subject to trade laws.

In 1995, the GATS agreement borrowed a World Trade Organization (WTO) term that describes the process of moving human capital across international borders. This process is called the "Movement of Natural Persons,"[1] which refers to the entry and temporary stay of human laborers for the purpose of providing "services" for employers. The term "natural persons" is an Orwellian euphemism used by the WTO to describe working class people who are considered to be nothing more than mere commodities. Immigration policies restricting the flow of "natural persons" would be considered a violation of the WTO rules because borders must be kept open for the movement of these international laborers.

As part of the NAFTA agreement, an embedded visa called the "Trade-NAFTA (TN) visa" was written to further the movement of "natural persons" across the Canadian and Mexican borders. TN visas allow unlimited numbers of Canadians to obtain guest-worker visas while Mexico is restricted to 5,500 visas per year. Those visa limits just changed because the United States, Canada and Mexico are committed to phasing out trade barriers completely by January 1, 2009. The phasing-out process contains a ten-year time bomb that was inserted into NAFTA. The fuse has been lit and it's too late to put it out. Detonation occurred on January 1, 2004 when all restrictions on the TN visa were lifted. Mexico now has the right to send unlimited numbers of TN visa holders to the U.S.[2]

Potentially a flood of aliens will be able to come into the U.S. by claiming they are Mexican citizens who have jobs in the USA. The TN visa program allows family members into the U.S. so the number of immigrants could be staggering. TN visas aren't very temporary either since they can be renewed in one-year increments forever, or until the alien worker gets a green card. NAFTA is a guest-worker/amnesty bill that allows visa holders to take jobs from 67 different job categories.

Examples of jobs that TN visa holders can take include the following: Accountant, Architect, Economist, Engineer, Scientist, Hotel Manager,

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***Rob Sanchez** keeps track of HI-B visa developments at his website, www.ZaZona.com. He also publishes the* Job Destruction Newsletter. *To get on the free mailing list send an e-mail to H1Bnews@ZaZona.com.*

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Computer programmer, Lawyer, Social Worker, Dentist, Nurse, Pharmacist, and Teacher.[3]

In fiscal year 2001, 92,951 Canadians and 2,571 Mexicans entered the U.S. under the NAFTA visa. Temporary visa issuance hasn't been reciprocal – only 8,326 Americans and 101 Mexicans entered Canada using TN visas, while 46,335 Americans and 3,890 Canadians entered Mexico under the visa.[4]

More U.S. citizens use TN visas to enter Mexico than the other way around – 46,335 Americans versus 2,571 Mexicans. Only half of the Mexican allotment of TN visas are being used because there isn't much incentive to hassle with a visa as long as it's so easy to enter the U.S. illegally to work.

TN visas probably won't be a favored method for low-paid Mexicans to cross our borders unless the U.S. gets serious enough about border enforcement to cut off the flow of foreigners that illegally cross the border in search of work. It may however be used in larger numbers for skilled workers to cross our border to work – and not just from Mexico! Professionals from other Spanish speaking countries will find it quite easy to pose as Mexican nationals in order to qualify for a TN visa.

The potential for fraudulent visa issuance is worse than for just about any other type of visa because aliens can obtain TNs right on the border and they only have to submit the necessary documentation to support their visa.[5] Mexican document mills routinely counterfeit the visa documents so it will be very easy for non-Mexicans to use the TN visa to enter the United States. Fraudulent documents could open the door for non-Mexicans to come across our border and it could be a red-carpet for aspiring terrorists.

Documents Required for TN Visa

* Proof of Citizenship (Birth Certificate or Passport)
* A temporary Offer of Employment from a prospective U.S. employer
* Copies of relevant educational degrees, diplomas and certificates
* Letters of reference from previous or current employers confirming your experience in your occupation (if applicable)

TN visas are a potential back-door into the U.S. for aliens with expired visas when they go out-of-status due to loss of jobs or from term expiration. H-1B visa holders have entered Canada in order to come back into the U.S. on TN visas, and there is no reason it would be more difficult for them to do the same thing from Mexico – providing of course if they can pose as a Mexican national. It is only a matter of time before Spanish speaking people throughout the Americas discover how easy it is to enter the United States with the TN visa.

Guest-worker to amnesty proposals are being bandied about in Congress that could reduce the incentives to use TN visas, but if they fail to be approved by Congress, the TN visa will be waiting for those who wish to enter the U.S. to take our jobs.

Proposed Guest-Worker Bills That Could Undermine the Need for TN visas

* President Bush's Guest-Worker Proposal of 2004
* Be-Real Act of 2003 –Introduced by Colorado Rep. Tom Tancredo.
* Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act of 2003 – Sponsored by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), Rep. Jeff Flake (R-AZ), and Rep.Jim Kolbe (R-AZ).
* The Border Security and Immigration Reform Act of 2003 – Introduced by Sen. John Cornyn, (R-Texas).
* Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security Act of 2003 – Introduced by Sen. Larry Craig, (R-Idaho) and sponsored by Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass. Co-sponsors include Chris Cannon (R-UT) and Howard Berman (D-CA).

Science fiction writers often use a theoretical phenomenon called the "wormhole effect" that warps space and time in order for space travelers to traverse the universe. The TN-NAFTA visa is an immigration wormhole that allows aliens to traverse the Mexican border, but these aliens will come to the U.S. – not to meet our leader but to take our jobs!

GATS mandates other types of visas also.[6] The minimum number of H-1Bs issued per year is to be 65,000 no matter how bad unemployment is, and worse yet, L-1s are unlimited. These visas affect over 150 job categories – and most of them are for white-collar professionals.

On July 31, 2003, the Senate approved the latest exercise in trade related immigration policy called the Singapore and Chile Free Trade agreement, Acronyms for this agreement aren't available but it's easy to form

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one by using the "S" from Singapore, and the "Ch" from Chile to form the acronym "SCHAFTA," but for the purposes of this paper – and to refer disparagingly to the consequences – "SHAFTA" will be used. This trade agreement sets up an embedded visa called the H-1B1 that has a limit of 6,800 visas per year that are counted against the H-1B visa cap. L-1s from Singapore are unlimited.

SHAFTA is a huge gift given by President Bush to corporatists who seek to offshore more jobs to overseas sweatshops and import cheap labor into the U.S. Even more ominous, it's also another wormhole. NumbersUSA research[7] confirmed that employees of Singaporean companies would not have to be Singapore citizens to have unlimited access to L-1 visas to the U.S. That leaves plenty of room for sham companies to be set up in Singapore that would be "staffed" by tens of thousands of Asian posing as workers. Once they are working in Singapore they could easily enter the U.S. by using fraudulent L-1 "intra-company" transfers.

Singapore and Chile won't be the last countries to glue onto SHAFTAs either. There are new agreements in the pipeline such as the Central American FTA, or CAFTA. The Bush administration says that there are 32 countries next in line for agreements including Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Australia, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco and India. Expansions of these SHAFTAs were agreed to during the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) meeting last November 19-21, 2003 in Miami, Florida. Fortunately the meeting hit a few snags, but despite the problems agreements were made with at least six countries – the Dominican Republic, Panama, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Expansion of CAFTA is just a matter of time as further meetings are held.

Embedded visas are very difficult to reverse once they are signed because they are adjudicated by the WTO – not the United States government.[8] Our rights to self-determination are sacrificed in the name of globalization because policy-making authority is granted to the WTO – a foreign entity. Article 15 of GATS states that in the event of a disagreement, the WTO will set up a world tribunal to adjudicate the dispute. The tribunal, *not the U.S. Congress*, will arbitrate the dispute. Citizens of the US will have no say in these proceedings.

Recently the Commerce Ministry of India announced that they will go to the WTO services negotiations, currently underway in Geneva, to argue that the U.S. must raise the yearly quota on H-1Bs in order to allow "natural persons" to cross our borders for work.[9] We may get to see the World Tribunal in action if the United States fails to capitulate to India's demands.

NAFTA set a precedent that will be followed in future trade agreements. Countries will ask for immigration treaties that are at least as good as the TN. The Bush Administration confirmed this carry-over when the President said he would use NAFTA and CAFTA as blueprints for future agreements with other countries.[10]

Congress granted the President the power to make these dangerous FTAs on July 24, 2003 when they gave him Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to make NAFTA-like trade agreements with other countries. One of the pernicious aspects of TPA is that Congress only has the authority to approve or reject the free trade agreements. Once Congress gives its approval for the trade agreement, it may not pass laws that restrict or alter its provisions – and that of course means they have no say in what kind of embedded visas are included in the final package.

The AFL-CIO made an effort to convince Congress that embedded visas should never be inserted into FTAs.[11] Press releases from the AFL-CIO and the Communications Workers of American claim that, "Sensenbrenner now believes he has a commitment from the U.S. Trade Representative to never again include immigration provisions in trade agreements. Many House and Senate members, particularly GOP conservatives, voiced their commitment to oppose any future trade agreements should they do so."

The unions are fooling themselves, because there is nothing Sensenbrenner or any other member of Congress can do to force embedded visas out of these agreements except to vote against the entire bill. Very few Congress-members will oppose these packaged agreements since wealthy and influential corporate lobbyists descend on Capitol Hill whenever these agreements are being voted on. When it comes down to a choice between money and serving the public

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good, money usually triumphs in Washington.

The first step in preventing these FTAs from containing embedded visas is to insist that Congress revoke Trade Promotion Authority. Until Congress gets their Constitutional power back from the Administration, it's unlikely that they will ever have control over embedded visas or any other aspects of international trade agreements. Revoking TPA will force Congress to bear the responsibility for this subversion of our immigration policies and the resultant reduction of our national sovereignty. TPA is an American-job killer that must be revoked. ■

NOTES

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IMMIGRANTS WILL BE HIRED ONLY FOR THOSE JOBS NO AMERICANS WANT TO FILL!
EVERYTHING ELSE GETS OUTSOURCED OVERSEAS!
FOREIGN WORKER POLICY
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Remember 9/11?

Another reason to oppose amnesties

by Juan Mann

The United States was attacked on September 11, 2001 by nineteen illegal aliens. The foreign nationals who murdered 2,775 people in one day flouted existing immigration laws by obtaining entry documents under false pretenses and overstaying legally-issued non-immigrant visas.

By overstaying the time limits of their visas, and not disclosing either their whereabouts or the true purpose of their visits to the United States, they became removable illegal aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

But now only two years after 9/11, this very same motley type of visa over-stayers, truant foreign students and lingering foreign "tourists" could be rewarded as amnesty candidates under the Bush Administration's recent illegal alien amnesty proposal – the coming Robert L. Bartley Memorial Open Borders Bill.

The Bush Administration would give these illegal aliens entry documents to come and go as they please across the border, and also line them up with any "willing employer" ready to put them to work regardless of their immigration status.

So given what happened on 9/11, why is the Bush Administration going in the direction of less, not more immigration law enforcement?

A group called "9/11 Families for a Secure America" (9-11 FSA) advocates the opposite route. Their path to a secure America is crystal clear.

"Families who lost loved ones on September 11th know that the federal government failed to live up to its most basic obligation to its citizens - to protect them from foreign attack.

"And we know our government failed to maintain control of our borders. *The failure to keep our unauthorized aliens led directly to the 9/11 attacks and the deaths of our loved ones.*"

The 9-11 FSA families and supporters suggest some very specific ideas for essential immigration reform.

It won't be a shock to readers to learn that 9-11 FSA says nothing about granting more entry documents to more illegal aliens, or hiring more illegal aliens to fill more American jobs more often.

Simply put, the 9-11 FSA families understand why their loved ones never made it home.

But while 9-11 FSA patiently waits for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission) to finish its hearings and make a final report, the Bush Administration apparently wants to jump the gun and give legal status to potentially millions of illegal aliens.

"Why is the Bush Administration going in the direction of less enforcement?

Do President Bush and "Secretario" Ridge really care to read the 9-11 Commission's report before opening our borders more than ever before – or was the 9/11 Commission just some sort of charade in the first place?

Will anyone in government heed the voices of the 9/11 Families before opening the legal and illegal immigration floodgates even wider, or are the narrow interests of the Hispanic Alliance for Progress, the Association for the Advancement of Mexican Americans, the Latino Coalition and LULAC just too important to the Bush Administration?

I fear that America – and its 9/11 families – already know the answer. ■

Juan Mann is a lawyer and the proprietor of www.DeportAliens.com. This op-ed is reprinted from www.V-Dare.com.

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Amnesty and Culture

Problems arise when immigrants refuse to assimilate

by Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX)

The dictionary defines amnesty as a general pardon for offenders by a government, and the Bush administration's new proposal to grant legal status to millions of illegal aliens surely meets that definition. Millions of people who broke the law by entering, staying, and working in our country will not be punished, but rather rewarded with a visa. This is amnesty, plain and simple. Lawbreakers are given legal status, while those seeking to immigrate legally face years of paperwork and long waits for a visa.

The president claims that America lacks the political will to deport the eight to twelve million illegal aliens already here, so we have no choice but to grant them visas. But what message does this send to the rest of the world? If we reward millions who came here illegally, surely millions more will follow suit. Ten years from now we will be in the same position, with a whole new generation of lawbreakers seeking amnesty. The Bush administration proposal does not provide a coherent immigration policy, nor does it address the urgent need for stricter control of our borders. The overwhelming majority of Americans – including legal immigrants – want immigration reduced, not expanded.

The immigration problem fundamentally is a welfare state problem. Some illegal immigrants – certainly not all – receive housing subsidies, food stamps, free medical care, and other forms of welfare. This alienates taxpayers and breeds suspicion of immigrants, even though the majority of them work very hard. Without a welfare state, we would know that everyone coming to America wanted to work hard and support himself. Since we have accepted a permanent welfare state, however, we cannot be surprised when some freeloaders and criminals are attracted to our shores. Welfare muddies the question of why immigrants want to come here.

Illegal immigrants also threaten to place a tremendous strain on federal social entitlement programs. Under the Bush proposal, millions of illegal immigrants will qualify for Social Security and other programs – programs that already threaten financial ruin for America in the coming decades. Adding millions of foreign citizens to the Social Security, Medicare, and disability rolls will only hasten the inevitable day of reckoning. Social Security is in serious trouble already, and sending benefits abroad to millions of illegal aliens who once worked here will cost hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. Every American who hopes to collect Social Security someday should stridently oppose the President's proposal.

> ***"Financial considerations aside, we cannot continue to ignore the cultural aspects of immigration."***

Financial considerations aside, we cannot continue to ignore the cultural aspects of immigration. The vast majority of Americans welcome immigrants who want to come here, work hard, and build a better life. This is a basic human

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desire that Americans understand, especially when so many immigrants are born into hopeless poverty in their own nations. But we rightfully expect immigrants to show a sincere desire to become American citizens, speak English, and assimilate themselves culturally. More importantly, we expect immigrants to respect our political and legal traditions, which are rooted in liberty and constitutionally limited government. After all, a lack of respect for the rule of law causes much of the poverty around the world that immigrants seek to escape.

Problems arise when immigrants refuse to assimilate and show little interest in becoming American citizens. 100 years ago, immigrants arrived in America after dangerous journeys fully prepared to embrace their new country. In most cases, returning home was not an option. Most led very hard lives, took pride in American citizenship, and asked for nothing but the opportunity to work. Today, however, some immigrants travel between countries frequently, enjoying the benefits of America but showing no desire to become Americans. Some even display hostility toward America and our ideals, joining the chorus of voices demanding that the United States become a multicultural society that rejects our own history. It is this cultural conflict that soon must be addressed, and the president's amnesty proposal simply turns a blind eye to the problem. ■

It's Still Jobs, Stupid

by Robert B. Reich, former Secretary of Labor
from *The American Prospect Online*, January 14, 2004

Buried in last weeks disappointing employment report showing only 1,000 jobs added to the economy in December was the news that American incomes grew only two percent last year the smallest rise in more than a decade.

Consumers are still buying, but the buying binge can't go on much longer. Household debt continues to rise and personal savings are plummeting. Meanwhile, companies are keeping their costs down by outsourcing jobs to India, China, and Latin America. And they're also installing new technologies that replace workers such as automated checkout systems in supermarkets and e-ticket kiosks at airports.

The reality is that unless this economy starts generating a lot of jobs soon, and at decent wages, the so-called recovery is going nowhere. Consumers just won't be able to keep on buying what's on the shelves and in showrooms.

So what is the White House doing? The administration's jobs strategy consists of two new initiatives that are bound to make a bad situation worse. The first is gutting the nation's overtime laws. Even if this were a good idea under normal circumstances (it isn't), it's the last thing we need right now. Employers who have to pay extra for overtime have an incentive to hire more workers rather than pay more. Take away overtime, and you take away that incentive to hire.

The second is the new guest-worker initiative. Regardless of how you come out on legalizing undocumented workers, this plan will surely mean fewer jobs for some Americans. The White House says the program will be limited only to jobs for which no American is available, but that's nonsense. At least 8 million Americans are unemployed right now. The only reason any job remains unfilled is because the wage is too low. Require it to be filled with an American and employers have to raise the wage. But if they can get legal guest workers, they won't.

At least until the jobs recovery is in full swing, we should keep overtime and maintain the limits on immigration. Oh, and one other thing: Reduce business tax deductions for outsourcing jobs abroad and for buying new technologies that replace workers. In other words, give employers more incentives to hire.

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On the Fruit Front Line

Legal workers suing employers for lost wages under the RICO statute

by Howard Foster

Yakima, Washington, deep in an irrigated, hundred-mile long valley, produces most of America's apples. Consumers will recognize them at virtually every supermarket from coast to coast by the small stickers emblazoned with the trade name "Washington State Apples."

VDare.com readers already know that the agricultural sector of the American economy is rife with illegal "immigrants." But my experience in litigation against two of the local Yakima fruit companies provides a rare glimpse into just how rotten this industry is – and how its illegal hiring is perpetuated. What I have learned is far worse than what we've been led to believe.

This small city might seem to some as heartland territory. In the small downtown you find a mall, a courthouse, plenty of cheap restaurants and motels, and not a trace of the sophistication of Seattle, two hours to the west.

But look just a bit closer and you suddenly sense that border-feel that is instantly noticeable in El Paso. For Yakima, a good 1500 miles from the border, is overrun with Mexicans. The vast majority are working in the area's agricultural enterprises, picking and packing fruit. Any quaint American small-town or western flair has long been smothered by the endless taco joints and money transmittal outfits that line the streets just beyond the core of the city.

I go to Yakima to do something nobody has ever done: to sue the Zirkle and Matson Fruit Companies, two of the local fruit operations, for knowingly hiring illegal aliens. (I am the pioneering lawyer that brought the first cases under an untested legal theory based upon the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act — RICO.) I have brought suit on behalf of legal workers for two fruit companies because their wages were depressed by the companies' illegal immigrant hiring scheme. If these two fruit companies complied with the law, and had not hired illegal workers, my clients would have received wages that were at least 20 percent higher than what they were actually paid to sort and pack apples into boxes — about $6.00/hour.

The local federal judge dismissed the case. I appealed the dismissal to the San Francisco-based Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (reviled by conservatives for, among other rulings, holding that the Pledge of Allegiance is an unconstitutional breach of the separation of church and state). Last year the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and ordered the case to proceed. This established a precedent that can be used in similar cases throughout the country. [Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 9th Cir. 2002.]

Two weeks after the Ninth Circuit's decision, Zirkle placed a full page ad in the *Yakima Herald Tribune* comparing me to the September 11th hijackers. The ad was signed by many Zirkle employees, vouching for the good faith of their employer's hiring policies, all with Hispanic surnames.

The case was returned to the same judge who dismissed it (normal procedure), with instructions on how to correctly handle it. I have begun taking depositions of the apple companies' owners and human resources managers.

By far the most interesting person is an attractive naturalized American citizen named Juana Castenada, who holds a key

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position at Zirkle: deciding whether job applicants are eligible for employment based upon their documents.

Ms. Castenada has an interesting background for such a position. She entered the U.S. illegally and obtained her job at the company with fake social security and green cards, which she purchased in a Yakima parking lot for $50. She is now married to the company's human resources director. Needless to say the manner in which she obtained her first job at Zirkle has not adversely affected her employment, even though it was a federal crime for her to use fake documents to obtain employment, and another one for Zirkle to accept them knowing they were fakes.

Let's be realistic about this. It takes well over a decade to lawfully obtain a green card, and this woman was just days away from her swim across the Rio Grande when she presented her "lawful permanent residency" and social security cards to Zirkle — without having so much as a word of English.

This, as you may expect, is the usual profile of Zirkle's hourly paid workers: illiterate, Spanish-speaking, and possessing shiny new green cards, sometimes issued to someone else with the original falsifier's picture on the card (they can be borrowed, like a library book, for a fee cheaper than outright purchase). No problem – Zirkle hires them all. And when there is a close case, the aforementioned Ms. Castenada decides whether the applicant is legally authorized to be employed.

By 1997 Zirkle's hiring practices had become so flagrantly offensive that even the usually inert INS took action. They conducted a raid and ordered the company to fire over 100 workers. (Previously the INS would announce its "inspections" to area agricultural companies in advance. Supervisors would warn known illegals, and on inspection day, up to half the workforce would be "absent." This happened so often at co-defendant Matson Fruit Co. that it decided to skip the pretense and maintain two sets of employment records, one for INS use, and another one for its own.) The raid changed nothing at Zirkle. It kept Ms. Castenada in her job and continued its hiring policies in place.

Now I've filed a motion to amend the lawsuit to add Bill Zirkle and Rod Matson, the owners of the respective companies, as defendants, exposing them to tens of millions of dollars in liability (which is tripled under RICO, if the case is successfully proven to a jury). Their lawyers contend naming them personally in this class action, rather than their corporations, is an act of "bad faith."

But I just can't forget the image of Ms. Castenada giving her deposition — through an interpreter, as her English is still rudimentary despite her position in the company — stating with confidence that her actions were perfectly legal because she was simply following the orders of her superiors (her husband, who is the HR director, and Mr. Zirkle himself).

To be continued... ■

The Candidates for President:
What Are Their Positions on Immigration?

Log onto the website of Americans for Better Immigration at:

www.betterimmigration.com/candidates/

for a "Presidential Candidates Grid Page"

on immigration issues.

What is the difference among the candidates? Unfortunately, not much. Still, citizens need to know the facts in order to at least make candidates pay a little price for their various immigration stands.

Americans for Better Immigration devoted a lot of time and expense to putting this together ABI hired Dr. Louisa Mattozzi, Ph.D., history, University of Virginia, to do the research. She will be constantly updating it as the campaign progresses.

Candidate have separate fact pages with information on ways to phone and email them about their positions. Such contacts do have an effect.

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The Unmanaged Commons

A major challenge for sustainability ethics

by John Cairns, Jr.

Why another article on the commons when Garrett Hardin has covered all the major issues so superbly? There are new developments that did not exist in the many decades during which Hardin's writings became so famous: worldwide concern has heightened about the global environment since 1961 when Hardin wrote the classic "The Tragedy of the Commons" and sustainable development has attracted international interest, and even some implementation.

Economic globalization has turned the entire planet into common ground. Access to the commons need not be physical as originally envisioned by mathematician William Foster Lloyd in 1833. Economic access enables individuals and organizations to exploit far distant resources and avoid responsibility for the consequences even better than when the commons are exploited by local inhabitants. The global commons is unmanaged in an ecological sense and even in an economic sense if economic development ignores humankind's responsibility to its descendants and other species. The basic theorem of ecology is that it is impossible to do just one thing.

Exponential growth has some intended consequences (largely touted) and multitudinous unintended consequences (studiously ignored).

Sustainable use of the planet requires that humankind do nothing that seriously depletes and/or damages both natural capital and ecosystem services.

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In a less populated world, the need for a sustainability ethic was not as great as now. However, humankind now lives in a crowded world, so that leaving a habitable planet for future generations of humans and those of other species is problematic.

A tribe said to the universe,
"Sir, we exist!"
"So I see," said the universe,
"But your multitude creates in me
No feeling of obligation."
– Garrett Hardin

[Author note: Substitute "humankind" for "tribe" for a superb description of the present situation facing an unsustainable society.]

A Wider View of the Commons

Environmental health is essential to human health since humans are embedded in the interdependent web of life. Two current developments justify additional attention to humankind's relationship to the global commons: The interest in sustainable development requires, at its core, informed and compassionate use of the global commons; and many more examples are available of the consequences of unsustainable practices.

On the negative side is the strong probability that the attractive word in the term *sustainable development* is *development*. Most people associate development with growth and the continuation of present lifestyles, with only a few minor adjustments and new technologies. It is clearly not accidental that the word *development* was chosen to describe ecological aspirations because the word goes quite well with *smart growth* and similar reassuring "buzzwords." It would be a pity to miss an opportunity to protect the global commons because of problems with semantics.

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Hardin's (1968) "The Tragedy of the Commons" is, arguably, the key paper on ethical issues in the use of the commons. As of 1997, this seminal paper had been reprinted over 100 times in anthologies in the fields of biology, ecology, environmental sciences, law, economics, sociology, political sciences, philosophy, ethics, and English composition and is one of the most frequently cited articles in *Science*. A special issue of *The Social Contract* (Vol. XII, No. 1, Fall 2001) honoring Hardin provides a superb overview of his key topics and issues from 1968 to the present. Basically, tragedy is the inevitable price paid for unmanaged, unlimited freedom in use of the commons. The quest for sustainable use of the planet mandates responsibility for the commons. As Hands (1973) remarked, traditional ethics has almost entirely ignored the rights or claims of posterity; sustainability ethics focuses on leaving a habitable planet for posterity.

"The reason for the emphasis on Hardin's publications is that he has addressed many of the important issues affecting sustainable use of the planet, yet they have not been given the attention they deserve in publications on sustainability."

The reason for the emphasis on Hardin's publications is that he has addressed many of the important issues affecting sustainable use of the planet, yet they have not been given the attention they deserve in publications on sustainability. I have avoided discussion of population issues for many years because it seemed abundantly clear that all of the pivotal issues regarding human population size had been discussed, not only by Hardin but also by Paul R. Ehrlich, Lester Brown, and others. However, my avoidance of this issue was a serious error!

Not only human population issues but also those involving the 30+ million species with which humankind shares the planet must be continually discussed until action is taken about the addictive, unsustainable practices humankind perpetuates. As a student and early in my professional career, I was told that science and ethics should not be commingled. However, all environmental problems, arguably without exception, involve value judgments (i.e., ethics or ethos) that are best implemented with scientific evidence. Naturally, clear indications must be made of whioh category each component of the proposed solution belongs.

Sustainability Ethics

Catastrophes cannot be entirely eliminated because many are the result of natural forces, such as earthquakes. However, catastrophes resulting from human practices can be reduced both in frequency and magnitude. The question is how to reduce the misuse of the global commons. The impasse presently occurring over greenhouse gases illustrates the difficulty of nation-states being effective outside of their own borders, or, in some cases, even within their borders. In addition, the United Nations has neither the staff nor the power to become the global environmental police force. From a sustainability perspective, damaging the global commons damages natural capital, ecosystem services, and the interdependent web of life that constitutes the planet's ecological life support system. No individual, organization, or nation-state has the "right" to damage these entities.

The illusion of an infinitely generous "Mother" Earth has masked the harsh reality that organisms without a suitable habitat die. The present use of the global commons is ruinous and unsustainable, and, in the long term, humankind does not benefit from damaging the global commons. In the short term, some individuals, organizations, and nation-states do benefit. The basic question becomes: how can human society best serve future generations of its own and other species while filling the basic needs of those now living? A truly socialized individual is ashamed to violate the social contract that aspires to sustainable use of the planet. However, the word *shame* is rarely used in this permissive era.

Cairns (2003) has produced a list of ten

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declarations that are focused on a mutualistic relationship between humankind and natural systems whose goal is leaving a habitable planet for human descendants and those of other species. Sustainability ethics differs from eco-ethics (e.g. Cairns, 2002, in press; Kinne, 2002) – sustainability ethics is both homocentric and ecocentric, while eco-ethics is entirely ecocentric. One might easily conclude that there is no substantive difference because humankind cannot survive without natural capital and ecosystem services. One should also recognize that nature is not designed to protect a single species, even if that species is capable of thinking it is the most important species on the planet. However, the implementation of sustainability ethics would, at worst, prolong humankind's stay on the planet.

"One should also recognize that nature is not designed to protect a single species, even if that species is capable of thinking it is the most important species on the planet."

Both sustainability ethics and eco-ethics deplore unsustainable practices that impair ecological integrity and increase biotic impoverishment. Both are expressions of deep concern about the exponential growth of the human population and consumption of material goods. Sustainability ethics is a consilience (literally, leaping together) of econ-ethics and eco-ethics (as revisited by Kinne, 2002).

Cairns (2003) also provides an illustrative list of ten sustainability ethics for nation states; they are even less likely to be accepted than either sustainability ethics or eco-ethics. All of the statements pledge that ensuring environmental integrity is the primary goal. The wide gap between these statements and the approach in the U.S. is illustrated by Walsh's (2003) recent analysis of President Bush's current policy on greenhouse gases. The basic problem is that the policy is based on how much reduction, if any, the industries that produce the gases can endure, rather than how much anthropogenic greenhouse gases the planet can tolerate. Such a policy does not include an ethical responsibility for the planet's biosphere.

Such attempts to "solve" environmental problems will not be successful in developing a harmonious relationship with the interdependent web of life. The U.S. greenhouse gas policy is based on voluntary agreements with industry to reduce global warming emissions. A number of industrial trade associations have announced that emissions goals were based on emissions per unit of output (i.e., intensity based). Voluntary commitments have not proven effective in the past, and, even if they were, nothing indicates that the biospheric life support system would be healthy, or even in good condition, as a consequence. As Walsh (2003) notes, even government projections show that U.S. greenhouse gases will continue to grow over the next 10 years. The result may be crossing a major ecological threshold that could place global climate at risk and seriously threaten the global commons.

The well-known Kyoto Protocol placed mandatory caps on emissions, which are vastly different than intensity goals that use the ratio of emissions to economic output. Environmental groups support a goal of reducing total emissions into the atmosphere, regardless of the size of the economic output. In a growing economy, the actual emissions into the atmosphere might well increase. On a finite plane, the size of the atmosphere cannot be expanded to match the growth of the economy. Ethical use of the global commons requires recognition that it is both finite and vulnerable.

James Carville, aide to former President Bill Clinton, was fond of saying, "It's the economy, stupid!" To paraphrase Mr. Carville, "It's the planet, stupid!" In short, the global commons deserves tender, loving care. What is the benefit of energy production that also generates unacceptable levels of greenhouse gases if humankind lacks a habitable planet on which to use this energy? Sustainability ethics are essential to a perpetually habitable planet.

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The Ocean Commons

This common ground covers over half Earth's surface. If this commons is seriously damaged, it probably will be impossible to restore it to the pre-industrial era condition. Unsustainable practices (e.g., over-harvesting fisheries stocks, toxic and sewage pollution, coral reef damage, littering with plastic and other solid wastes, and nuclear waste, etc.) have already caused serious ecological damage, and the situation is rapidly worsening. Using the oceans as an unmanaged commons has failed (e.g., Miles, 1999). Management on this scale is daunting, but essential to sustainable use of the planet.

"Time is running out for humankind to implement either ecological ethics or sustainability ethics. If not implemented, nature's laws will become evident, whose consequences are not humane..."

Lindholm and Barr (2001) note that, in the U.S., a wide disparity exists between the total land and ocean under federal management. Of the total U.S. landmass, approximately 18 percent is included in some form of protected area. In contrast, of the total area of U.S. waters within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, only 0.4 percent is presently under Federal protection, with a much smaller percentage, 0.0004 percent, actually contained in non-extractive reserves.

Both land and oceans were once considered vast and limitless. However, even in the U.S., Australia, and Canada where "frontier" views persist to the present day, there is now a perception of a finite planet – Carl Sagan's "small blue dot" in a vast universe. Nevertheless, recognition of the need to cease unsustainable practices and to live sustainably is far from universal. Decades ago, Aldo Leopold perceived the need for a "land ethic." Now Safina (2002-2003) and Barr and Lindholm (2002-2003) propose a "sea ethic" using Leopold's land ethic as a model.

Although Aldo Leopold's land ethic has been widely acclaimed by those concerned with the environment, it has not been practiced widely, probably because most politicians and the average citizen have not even heard of the concept. The land ethic needs to be updated, especially with regard to sustainable use of the planet. Time is running out for humankind to implement either ecological ethics or sustainability ethics. If not implemented, nature's laws will become evident, whose consequences are not humane, as most people define this word.

Nation-State Environmental Terrorism

Hunt (2003) estimates the cost of Iraq's torching its oil fields at US$10 billion for only oil field repairs. Collateral effects, such as damage to human health and the environment, appear to be forgotten extras. Some useful information on environmental terrorism of this type comes from the Gulf War, which began when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and, in one day, gained control of 22 percent of the world's exportable oil. Had Iraq also successfully invaded Saudi Arabia, Iraq would have controlled 44 percent of the exportable oil (Youngquist, 1997). This situation was clearly intolerable for the industrialized world, which responded promptly with massive, modern, military force. Even with this action, the Gulf Coalition aircraft did not strike Baghdad the beginning of 1991.

Saddam Hussein had threatened to set fire to all of Kuwait's oil wells in retaliation for any invasion by coalition forces. Because of the rapidity of the invasion, not all the wells could be blown up and then set afire, but a large number were torched by the retreating Iraqi forces. At one time, about 4 million barrels of oil were burning each day (Hobbs and Radke, 1992). Some wells were blown up but not set afire, which resulted in large oil pools in the desert. Approximately 11 million barrels entered the Persian Gulf, with devastating environmental impact (e.g., Hawley, 1992). El-Baz (1992) predicted the effect would last for years; no robust evidence refutes this view.

This was nation-state environmental terrorism on a grand scale, and one that may be repeated in twenty-

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first century post-war Iraq. Despite the fact that the Gulf War spill was one of the largest oil spills in history, it did not attract media attention as did, for example, the Exxon *Valdez* spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska. This lack of attention is disturbing since, to protect the global commons, there must be worldwide indignation when the integrity of the commons is impaired.

Public Opinion: The New Superpower?

Tyler (2003) asserts that two superpowers may exist on the planet: the U.S. and world public opinion. His theory is based on the sentiment of people around the world who felt that the evidence on which President Bush depended was not adequate for going to war against Iraq in 2003. The pivotal issue, in this case, for the United Nations Security Council was: what is the rationale for military operations? Tyler (2003) feels that, although the fresh outpouring of antiwar sentiment may not be enough to dissuade President Bush or his advisors from the preparations for war with other countries that appear to support terrorism, it is a persuasive reminder that any rush to war may have unfortunate political and environmental consequences for nations, organizations, and individuals who support a new war now. No war benefits the global commons.

What does public opinion have to do with protecting the global commons? Politics are affected by the psychology and momentum of public opinion. Even for a complex, multivariate issue such as the ecological integrity of the global commons, the majority of people now feel a sense of unease about how deteriorating ecological integrity could have adverse effects upon their lives (e.g., environmental refugees) and the lives of their descendants (e.g., depleted natural resources and ecosystem services).

Environmentally literate people, who are aware of adverse effects presented in well-documented studies in the publications of organizations such as Worldwatch and the United Nations, have a sense of barely controlled panic. However, these organizations also present persuasive evidence that sustainable alternatives are available to present unsustainable practices. For example, sustainable alternatives are biological controls for pests and wind power or solar power to replace the use of fossil fuels. Evidence also is available that ecological restoration can repair some of the damage to natural systems. Arguably, the cost of unsustainable practices mounting, often at an appalling rate, is evident everywhere on the planet.

Powerful economic forces defend the status quo. However, natural capitalism (e.g., Hawken et al, 1999) offers a competitive, economic alternative. Exceptional phenomena now occurring on the global commons, e.g., endocrine disruptors, biotic impoverishment, and melting glaciers, encourage the move toward sustainable use of the commons. Moreover, ethics is becoming an increasingly important piece of the decision making process. The term *carrying capacity* (a term well established in ecological literature) has been rejected a pronouncement by "prophets of doom." Hardin (1976) has an excellent discussion of the ethical issues involved.

Economics and the Global Commons

Economic growth is a high priority goal for elected politicians, especially those with short terms of office. Not surprisingly, economic growth is the goal of all third world nations whose per capita wealth is shockingly low. Concomitantly, many mainstream scientists now consider the planet to be in the midst of the sixth great wave of animal extinctions. The fifth wave, 65 million years ago, was notable as the time of extinction of the seemingly invincible dinosaurs (e.g., Wilson, 1992).

The sixth wave of great extinctions is unique, being caused by humankind rather than natural causes. The twentieth century was a notable period of astonishing global-wide habitat change. The human population exploded from 1.6 billion to over 6 billion. In three decades (1960-1990), 20 percent of the world's tropical forests were cut and burned; estimates of total deforestation rates vary from 50,000 to 170, 000 square kilometers per year. Quality habitat (e.g., old growth forests) and other habitat losses (e.g,. tall grass prairie) are responsible for many species extinctions.

From a sustainability standpoint, extinctions are only the final stage in the decline of a species. Species cease functioning as critical components of the ecological life support system long before they disappear entirely. Species can be saved if damaged

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ecosystems are restored in time. Restoring damaged ecosystems is a much more complex process than conserving them (e.g., National Research Council, 1992). In strong contrast to these views, Lomborg (2001) espouses the view that claims of environmental damage are exaggerated. Many powerful financial interests and media want to believe this "happy times" conclusion.

Those wishing unrestricted access to the global commons have enormous financial resources, some of which were acquired from resources obtained from the global commons. Those favoring limited access to the global commons are not without financial resources, but their finances are orders of magnitude less than those of organizations profiting from resources obtained from the global commons, discharging wastes into the global commons (e.g., air pollution), and producing hazardous products that are used on private property but end up, in part, in the global commons (e.g., pesticides, radioactive wastes).

The willingness to place short-term financial gains ahead of public safety in the attempts to circumvent the travel restrictions designed to restrict the spread of SARS is an example. Fears of loss of tourism and other revenues dependent on travel prevailed. Although China had belatedly taken significant steps to prevent spread of this disease, world financial interests pointed to the subsequent low numbers of deaths from SARS as justification for avoiding travel and following other restrictions designed to prevent a worldwide epidemic. In view of this disregard for human health, it seems wise not to count on major efforts by financial institutions to protect the global commons. Recreational or business travel during an outbreak of a transmissible disease does not represent a basic human need. The fact that many people are reluctant to travel until SARS is under control attests to the accuracy of this statement.

Other elements of economic theory are also a cause for concern. Arguably, the most contentious is the concept of resource substitutability. Simon (1981) and Simon and Kahn (1984) are the most outspoken advocates of the belief that resources are not limiting – when one resource becomes scarce, human creativity (the ultimate resource) will develop a substitute (e.g., alternative energy sources for fossil fuels). One problem of the concept of infinite substitutability is concentration on raw materials such as coal, metals, petroleum, marble, and the like. However, human ingenuity, creativity, and technology are unlikely to find substitutes for ecosystem services at a realistic cost. At present, almost all ecosystem services are free: maintenance of the atmospheric gas balance, decomposition and recycling of organic wastes, maintenance of water quality, biological pest and disease control, pollination of agricultural and other plants, conversion of solar energy (photosynthesis) into food and raw materials that are readily recycled by natural systems, maintenance of the hydrologic cycle, production of fertile organic soils, moderation and regulation of global climate, models for pharmaceuticals, and nutrient recycling. The question of infinite substitutability has not been adequately phrased. Substitutes for copper fuel, fossil fuels, and the like divert the general public, economists, and ecologists from addressing the primary resource depletion.

The planet is running out of natural systems. The primary lesson of Biosphere 2 is that no amount of money can produce a self-regulating natural system that provides services favorable to humankind. In 1991, the US$200 million Biosphere 2 – a sealed, glass-enclosed, 3.15 acre structure – was designed to support eight scientists, the "bionauts," for two years in an environment suitable for them. It contained "miniature ecosystems," which, because of problems of scale, did not function like natural systems. Consequently, air quality declined (Recer, 1996); cockroaches flourished, and insect pollinators died. The estimated cost of supplying inadequate ecosystem services to the few inhabitants in Biosphere 2 was US$9 million per person per year. Clearly, human-made substitutes cannot reliably supply the diverse array of services natural systems supply at little or no cost. Is it reasonable to assume that these natural services should or can be replaced with human-designed ecosystems? The concept of infinite substitutability deserves more rigorous examination. Even if the science were robust and the technology sound and affordable, an ethical problem would still remain – should humankind replace natural systems with human-constructed systems?

Another interesting problem concerns intergenerational equity and fairness. Parfit (1982)

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wonders how obligations to posterity can be effectively met when present decisions may determine which people are born and even how many will survive. Since those now living do not know the preferences of posterity (Solow, 1993), humankind's primary obligation is to avoid impoverishing future generations through present overconsumption and undersaving.

"Globalization has made it virtually impossible to ensure the future of one's own children unless some provision is made for the children of others."

The basic disagreement between ecologists and economists is with what effect damaging natural systems will have on posterity. In view of the rapid disappearance of natural systems, the probable outcome of endorsing either viewpoint becomes an ethical/moral decision. Globalization has made it virtually impossible to ensure the future of one's own children unless some provision is made for the children of others.

Ecological deficits should be of great concern to economists, ecologists, and everyone on the planet. Illustrative examples of ecological deficits are loss of old growth forests, loss of topsoil, disruption of the hydrologic cycle, depletion of brood stocks of oceanic fisheries, species impoverishment, depletion of fossil water, depletion of gene pools for models for pharmaceuticals, desertification, and fragmentation of ecosystems.

Basically, ecological deficits occur because natural capital is being used at a greater than replacement rate, which results in diminished ecosystem services (the "interest" on natural capital). Humankind has inherited natural capital that has been accumulating for billions of years. Only recently, in evolutionary time, has humankind had the technology to acquire natural capital at a rate greater than replacement. The assumption that it is a sound business practice to use more and more natural capital, processed by fewer and fewer people should be re-examined. Exponential growth of the human population and exponential depletion of natural capital are not sustainable strategies. The loss of natural capital (e.g., arable lands) is even now imposing severe costs (e.g., Postel, 1999; Brown, 2002a,b).

In Japan in the early 1950s, organic mercury produced a neurological disease (the Minimata disease) that resembled cerebral palsy. This disease was particularly affecting infants and children via fetal development (e.g., Schettler et al., 1999). Schettler et al. (1999) cover damage to both the structure and the function of the human reproductive system by exposure to environmental chemicals. At present, the risks are mostly unknown and unstudied, but exposures continue. Unquestionably, economic and political forces influence both the nature of scientific research and level of public concern about risks. Clearly, these substances will have some, perhaps major, effects upon human health that, in turn, will affect the global economy. Although some exposures are highly site specific, most are sufficiently ubiquitous to be considered as having occurred in the global commons. Enlightened management should reduce these risks markedly, but zero risk is a utopian dream.

Ethics for the Global Commons

Problems resulting from an unmanaged global commons point out the need for developing a preliminary statement of ethics upon which management plans might be made. As Sophocles states: "One must learn by doing the thing; though you think you know it, you have no certainty until you try it." One thing is certain – an unmanaged global commons is a major threat to sustainable use of the planet. A statement of ethical responsibility is, arguably, a good way to develop an equitable, fair management program.

1. I pledge to oppose any activities that impair the integrity of the global commons, including actions of nation-states, corporations, and organizations.

2. I pledge to improve my environmental literacy so that I am aware of threats to the global commons.

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3. I pledge to oppose any further increase of the human population on this finite planet.

4. I pledge to oppose a laissez faire market system ruled by conscience alone, since it rewards for lack of conscience.

5. I pledge to oppose all activities that diminish posterity's use of the commons.

6. I pledge to oppose any country that attempts to solve its population problems by exporting people to other countries.

7. I pledge to support social arrangements that enhance responsibility for the global commons, even if they involve arrangements that include coercion of some sort.

8. I pledge to acknowledge that the global commons is effectively limited in its capacity to accommodate use.

9. I recognize that the "right" to use the global commons must be matched by an operational responsibility to nurture and care for it.

10. I affirm that global tragedy is the price that will be paid for misuse of the commons. If humankind's laws do not protect the commons effectively, nature's laws will be activated, not only affecting the transgressors but all of humankind. Any disjunction between rights and responsibilities with regard to the global commons will result in tragic ruin for all of humankind.

11. I will not be misled by accusations of uncertainty and "unsound science" by those who benefit from the status quo. Precision of numbers is not as important as the relative size of the numbers (e.g., human population growth) or the direction of change (e.g., global warming).

12. I affirm that, on a planet with diminishing natural capital, humankind cannot be governed by ethics that ignore natural systems (ecosystems) and posterity.

13. I pledge to be guided by the basic theorem of ecology that one can never do merely one thing. This pledge is particularly important when exercising "rights" in the global commons.

14. I affirm that access to the resources of the global commons must be controlled (i.e., managed) so that the unscrupulous do not destroy them.

15. I affirm that food and other resources should never be sent to any population that has exceeded the carrying capacity, unless there is persuasive evidence that effective measures have been taken to stabilize the population and a firm time limit has been placed on the period of aid. Charity may often assume an austere and superficially unsympathetic aspect toward the population at risk. As Hardin (1972) remarks: "The morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time the act is performed – this is the foundation of situationist, ecological ethics."

16. I affirm T. H. Huxley's statement that every new truth begins as heresy. Management of the global commons now appears heretical, but, as the ecological collapse continues, it may increasingly appeal to common sense.

Conclusions

The health and integrity of the global commons is essential to the quest for sustainable use of the planet. An unmanaged global commons will permit unsustainable practices that may generate impressive short-term profits, but will generate even more impressive long-term losses. Literature on the use and misuse of the commons has existed for decades. However, the increasing evidence of the need to switch from unsustainable to sustainable practices has generated momentum for re-examination of this issue. Moreover, ethics is now becoming an increasingly important component of the decision-making process. Finally, the internet and international television has enabled average citizens to view environmental degradation, often while it is occurring.

Protests are not an ideal way to express opposition to unattractive decisions, but they may be all that is available for expressing dissent. Informed citizens can express both approval and dissent by their purchases in the global marketplace. Even a small shift to "green" purchases may make the difference between profit and loss for many companies.

Sustainable practices will benefit the global commons' unsustainable practices will damage it. The choice is basically based on different value systems and ethical motivation. A paradigm shift to sustainable practices might well occur at a breathtaking rate under these circumstances. An additional effort to protect the global commons is well worthwhile. ■

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New Text by Australian Demographer

A stimulating way to learn about the numbers

Book Review by Katharine Betts

Are you longing for a demography text that is amusing, literate, and comprehensive? Do you want a CD with wonderfully constructed graphics that run the demographic transition through before your very eyes for the country of your choice, that let you build population pyramids, that project populations with different mortality, fertility, and migration assumptions, that illustrate the stages of the epidemilogic transition and much more? If yes, your wishes can now be fulfilled.

Australian demographers who have watched Don Rowland present conference papers on teaching demography know that we have a skilled communicator in the profession. Now some of the fruits of his work in the lecture theater and computer lab have been distilled and presented to a wider audience. This book has been a massive undertaking. It covers population dynamics, period and cohort perspectives, techniques for comparing rates (especially standardization), models (including life tables), spatial patterns and processes, and applied demography. It even has a section on how to write demographic papers.

Demographic Methods and Concepts
by Donald T. Rowland
Oxford: Oxford University Press
546 pages, $85 (Australian)

The text is designed to work for people who are complete beginners but it never patronizes and a student who conscientiously worked through the thirteen chapters would have acquired a sound understanding of demography.

Examples and data from all over the world are provided, together with a host of useful web links. The CD contains files written in Excel and the text provides plenty of help for those unfamiliar with the package.

The book could serve as a self-education package for students unable to enroll in a formal course. But it will be invaluable for teachers in all branches of the social sciences, especially those who would like to teach more demography but who have been looking for an appropriate textbook. ■

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French Public Schools Try to Remain Secular

Century-old tradition under pressure

Book Review by Gerda Bikales

The lament for the lost territories in the title of this chilling book is not for the erstwhile colonies of the French Empire, but for the school system charged with educating French children today. The "Republic" implies more than France's post-monarchial form of government – it includes the celebration of its eighteenth century Enlightenment tradition and its hard-won secularism, most especially in its public schools.

This is a very anguished book that chronicles in detail the rapid transformation of the schools, from academies of learning and fellowship to places of chaos ruled by bullies in the throes of Islamic radicalism. In the prevailing atmosphere of intimidation, teachers and administrators look the other way as Jewish students and faculty members are attacked and humiliated, and female students and staff are routinely harassed and insulted.

***Les Territoires Perdus de la République: Antisemitisme, Racisme et Sexisme en Milieu Scolaire* (The Lost Territories of the Republic: Antisemitism, Racism and Sexism in the Schools)**
by Emmanuel Brenner, editor
Mille et un Nuit, 2002
238 pages (paperback), 11.40 Euros

At the heart of the book is a series of reports on incidents in particular schools, mostly those known as ZEP, an acronym denoting troubled establishments in "priority educational zones." The reports are pulled together by several essays on current social trends in France and how these are playing out in the school environment. It took considerable courage for the editor and the contributing teachers to go public, putting their careers and possibly their personal safety are on the line. Wisely, no doubt, many (including the editor, "Emmanuel Brenner") have chosen to write under a pseudonym and to avoid naming their schools, identifying them only in general terms such as "a high school in a suburb north of Paris."

Violent antisemitic acts have been escalating in France, reaching 405[1] in 2001, while anti-Muslim incidents, never numerous, have been going down steadily, to 12 in 2001. The response from government and the media has been to make light of the situation, characterizing the antisemitic violence as merely the outbursts of young Arab hooligans angered by hostilities in the Middle East. Politicians of the opposition left as well as the ruling center-right try to squeeze further advantage from the attacks on Jewish institutions by blaming it all on the National Front and its extreme-right confederates.

The permissiveness of the authorities in the face of rampant lawlessness and terror has been felt most keenly in the schools. Several suburbs in the larger cities (Paris, Lyon) are home to subsidized apartment projects inhabited by disadvantaged families from North Africa, both Muslim and Jewish, where schools have experienced an educational meltdown. Jewish students, a small minority, are insulted, mocked, spat upon, kicked and robbed, without any interference from those in charge. Even among themselves, teachers dare not discuss what they observe every day, for fear of being accused of such crimes as racism, populism, or giving credence to Samuel Huntington's thesis on the "clash of civilizations." Better to go with the flow than fight risky uphill battles. As one teacher puts it, "the spirit of Munich" is alive in the teachers'

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lounge.

To the extent that the problems are noted, the *a priori* politically correct stance is to grant the troublemakers their claimed status as victims. Offered the privilege of a paid-for French education, these students reject it wholesale because they feel themselves victimized by 130 years of French colonial exploitation, by job discrimination, poverty, a disordered family life, and Ariel Sharon's politics. Of course, victims too can be dangerous bullies in need of disciplining, but French society and its teachers seem willing enough to tolerate a *modus vivendi* whereby the Jewish students alone are called upon to take the punishment for all these sins. As reported by one of the writers, irrational anti-Jewish bias in her school

"Woe to the teacher trying to get the lesson [of the Drefus case] across – it will be greeted with shouts, whistles, foot-stomping and covered ears."

emerged in the controversies surrounding the serving of pork in the school's cafeteria. Though "respect for differences" is now dogma, when Jews refuse to eat pork, it's a vile mannerism. When Muslims refuse it, it becomes a valuable cultural lesson. The same holds for religious holidays, disparaged when they cause Jewish students to miss school but applauded as a family-strengthening custom when their Muslim classmates do the same!

It has become impossible in many schools to teach certain topics of French history. The Dreyfus case, which engaged the passions of French men and women in the late nineteenth century and led to the definitive separation of church-and-state in 1905, can't be discussed because it deals with the antisemitically inspired false accusation and conviction for treason of a Jewish military officer, imprisoned for years but eventually exonerated. Woe to the teacher trying to get the lesson across – it will be greeted with shouts, whistles, foot-stomping and covered ears.

Even noisier disturbances await a history unit on the Holocaust. Incorporated quite recently into the curriculum, after nearly fifty years of denial that France had any role in the deportation and murder of some eighty thousand French Jews, its teaching was made a mandatory part of World War II history. Carrying out that requirement is proving impossible in schools with sizeable Arab student bodies, among whom Holocaust denial is an article of faith.

The changes that have overtaken the schools are traced in some detail in an essay by "Elyse Jacquard." In the seventies, her establishment was a respected technical high school known for its quality teaching of the social sciences, economics and accounting, in addition to the standard academic curriculum of French, mathematics and history-geography. Twenty-five years later it has become dangerous and unmanageable territory, where "the irrational and the arbitrary have become the rule."

The trouble started in the eighties, when students started to enter the school with large language deficits and little capacity for abstract thinking or work organization. Blame for their poor performance was laid on the teachers, whose pedagogy was faulted. As the formerly selective school was opened to masses of students, the ensuing teachers' shortage was plugged by hiring candidates without credentials or university diplomas. The timing corresponded with the introduction of computers into the school curriculum, followed by the rapid promotion of computer savvy personnel over those from traditional academic disciplines. Budget priorities shifted away from cultural subjects to practical ones. "Progressive" educational innovations failed to produce progress, yet there was little questioning because the student body had turned increasingly Arab and Black, and everyone felt uncomfortable raising the issue. Failure is now handled by denying its relevance, through a policy of automatic promotion of all students to the next level. Students can be late or absent at will, but teachers too find ways to avoid school by being sick, stressed out, or on extended leave of absence. Flunking grades are no longer reported, having been replaced by the euphemism "not marked," meaning zero. The students who bother to attend keep themselves busy talking on the telephone, decorating the walls with antisemitic graffiti, chanting Koranic verses, hanging out in halls where they deliberately trip teachers and students trying to use the passageway. There is no limit to the fun that can be had when the unwritten rule is that

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there are no rules.

One of the consequences of the unchecked bedlam and fevered judeophobia in the schools has been a growth spurt for Jewish schools. Once reserved for the most devout, these schools (which require costly investments in security equipment and personnel) have become shelters for children subjected to daily abuse in the public schools, under the indifferent gaze of the responsible adults. Meanwhile, the organized Muslim community has been agitating for government subsidized private schools of its own, in which the wearing of head scarves will not be an issue. The first such high school, *Lycée Avrroès*,[2] named for the Spanish-born twelfth century Arab philosopher, opened its doors last September in the northern city of Lille. It is located within the *Al-Imane* Mosque, known for its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.

Thus, a hundred years after the Catholic Church was forced out of the nation's schools, France is experiencing a gradual religious segregation of what had been an effective and assimilative educational system. The vision articulated by Jules Ferry, Minister of Public Education in the 1880s, that "the public schools must be mandatory, free, and secular." still resonates with an older generation of educators – even as their younger colleagues are languishing in schools that are poorly attended, free but an expensive drain on taxpayers, and increasingly sectarian – dreaming of retirement. ■

NOTES

1. These are major incidents that came to the attention of the police. A much larger number, usually attacks on individuals rather than institutions, went unreported.

2. *The New York Times*, 9 September 2003, A3.

Australian Police Officer Alludes to Difficulties in France

Denis McCormack, our frequent contributor from Australia, sent an article from The Australian *of January 12, 2004 by Tim Priest who was a Sydney detective until 2002. This brief excerpt further illuminates the problems created by an influx of Muslims to Western societies.*

Many have heard of the horrific problems in France with an unprecedented outbreak of crimes among an estimated 5 million Muslim immigrants. Middle Eastern males now make up 45,000 of the 90,000 inmates in French prisons. There are no-go areas in Paris for police and citizens alike. The rule of law has broken down so badly that when police went to one of these areas recently to round up three Islamic terrorists, they went in armored vehicles, with heavy weaponry and more than 1,000 armed officers – just to arrest a few suspects.

Why did they need such numbers? Because the threat of terrorist reprisal was minimal compared to the anticipated revolt by thousands of Middle Eastern and North African residents, who have no respect for the rule of law in France and consider intrusions by police and other authorities a declaration of war.

The problems in Paris's Muslim communities are being replicated in Sydney at an alarming rate. Paris has seen an explosion of rapes committed by Middle Eastern males against French women in the past 15 years. The rapes are almost identical to those in Sydney. They are committed not only for sexual gratification, but there are also deep racial undertones, along with threats of violence and retribution.

What is more alarming is the identical reaction among some sections of the media and criminologists in France: they downplay the race factor and even gang up on those who try to draw attention to the widening gulf between Middle Eastern youths and the rest of French society.

That is what we are seeing in Australia. The usual suspects come out of their institutions and libraries to downplay and even cover up the growing problem of Middle Eastern crime.

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The Making of a Cornucopian

Book Review by John Attarian

Julian Simon (1932-1998) was one of America's most fervent immigration advocates, and an optimist who argued incessantly that mankind's situation was getting ever better. Published posthumously from a manuscript written in 1994-1996, *A Life Against the Grain* contains numerous clues about the psychological roots of Simon's optimism and immigration advocacy, and bleakly illuminates the flawed nature of his thought.

While his professional success may be questionable, he writes, enumerating the professional distinctions he didn't acquire, there is no question that he was right: "That the world will continue to become better-off in all material ways for the foreseeable future has so far been confirmed completely."

A Life Against the Grain: The Autobiography of an Unconventional Economist
by Julian L. Simon
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers
360 pages, $29.95 paperback

Ideas aren't very important in the long run, he adds. While bad ideas such as Marxism can be damaging temporarily, people's desires to make good livings, bear and rear children, and enjoy the fruits of their labor will ultimately bring about government policies enabling them to do these things. All we really need intellectuals for is to secure some degree of liberty and rule of law; the people will do the rest. The more we progress, the less economic and political ideas will matter, because the variety of political regimes and the ease of international movement "will provide the necessary opportunities for entrepreneurs and other talented persons." Therefore, there is a declining need for philosophers of freedom to wrest freedom from politicians. "People will achieve it anyway." Greater progress will create greater opportunities for irrational, counterproductive conduct, but Simon hoped that this will be checked by "the pressure of basic needs."

All this reveals Simon as a minstrel of economism. He not only assumes perpetual progress, he construes it entirely in material terms. To Simon, material concerns and economic incentives far outweigh the life of the mind.

Another theme which Simon establishes early is his miserably low self-esteem. He considered himself a failure and an outcast. Indeed, he flaunts his self-disparagement so relentlessly that one is uncharitably reminded of Tartuffe. When Simon reveals that he was depressed for thirteen years, it becomes horribly clear not only that he really was a sad sack, but that he wants his readers to feel sorry for him. There is a smell of manipulativeness here. Recall that Simon also called attention to his unhappiness and sense of being in a beleaguered intellectual minority at the beginning of *The Ultimate Resource*. I cannot shake the impression that Simon had a strategy of soliciting sympathy from readers so as to get them to suspend critical judgment about his positions.

To be fair, Simon's account of his childhood is unpleasant. As soon as he could stand, his mother would put him inside a screened-in box hung outside a second-story window, to save herself the trouble of taking him outdoors for some fresh air. Naturally, he cried when he wanted her or wanted to come in. She ignored him "until I learned to stop. Maybe here was the template for my life: Yearning to be held close, but not expecting that my yearning would be fulfilled." When he was five, he went crying to his mother that someone had hit him, only to be told to fight his own

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battles. It was the last time he asked her for help in dealing with others. For the rest of his life, he had trouble getting help from people. An only child, he had, he tells us, little contact with his mother, and for reasons which are obscure he apparently despised his father. While one cannot help pitying Simon, one wonders why he did not have the decency to keep some of this to himself.

One wonders too if Simon realized how much he was revealing. "I greatly respected Mother, and felt affectionate and protective toward her. But the distance at which she kept me (and others) worked to diminish any passion I might have felt toward her." (p. 33) "Passion" is a curious word for a son to use to describe his feelings for his mother. This is either sloppy language or a disquieting slip. Readers may speculate as they like.

Very few things in life gave Simon pleasure. He did not feel he had "any claim on others to do anything for me," and seldom asked anybody for anything, because he "did not feel I had any rights to have my desires fulfilled by others." Clearly, Simon had a depression-prone personality.

Perhaps due to his childhood starvation for affection, he also had an obsessive sexual lust, sex apparently being one claim on others which he did think he had. One of his bachelor affairs resulted in a pregnancy for which he and his partner obtained an illegal abortion. Odd that someone so hard on himself had so few sexual scruples. He has always opposed making abortion a crime, he tells us, and has no objection to contraception. Catholics who laud Simon because he told them what they want to hear about population should be more fastidious in their choice of intellectual bedfellows.

By his own account, Simon's education in economics was virtually nonexistent. A Harvard psychology major, he took no economics as an undergraduate. His graduate studies in business at the University of Chicago included one course in microeconomics, one in economic forecasting, and one in managerial economics. That was all. He had no education in demography whatsoever. This did not stop him from trying to publish articles on these fields in refereed scholarly journals – an audacity hard to square with his purported low self-esteem.

Repeatedly, Simon complains that he had a hard time getting published. One article, critical of the central work in population economics, a book by Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover, "was rejected by journal after journal, and only appeared at last in my 1977 book." That his qualifications as a marketing professor to pontificate on population economics were underwhelming, and that perhaps the referees sensed that he had not mastered his subject, seems not to have occurred to him.

When he began studying the economics of population in 1966-1968, he believed that population growth was one of humanity's biggest threats, and the single worst obstacle to economic progress. He claims that studying the data changed his mind. There was no empirical correlation between the growth rate of a country's population and its rate of economic development.

"By his own account, Simon's education in economics was virtually nonexistent."

Simon's account of his population work inadvertently reveals his glaring intellectual deficiencies. He adopted Ester Boserup's theory that rising population density leads countries to adopt more labor-intensive agriculture. To test her theory, he made a cross-country study of irrigation, a measurable indicator of labor-intensive agriculture. "I found that population density has a strong positive relationship to the proportion of a country's cultivated land that is irrigated." Given that for poor countries agriculture was at least half the value of their output and that irrigation systems are a major part of agricultural capital, "this finding suggests that additional people lead to an increase in agricultural saving." Obviously, Simon deemed this a good thing.

That increased irrigation gradually salinizes the soil, ultimately poisoning it and rendering it useless for agriculture, which occurred in Sumeria and which is ruining cropland worldwide, goes unmentioned. Simon did not realize that what his finding really suggests is that greater population density pushes societies into greater dependence on unsustainable, even dysfunctional agricultural methods. His ecological ignorance, and his blithe unawareness of his ignorance, are appalling. He faults the mainstream population economics literature for focusing only on

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the immediate short run, and ignoring the crucial long run. But as the foregoing shows, this criticism applies to him too.

All too clearly, Simon was a dilletante, not a scholar: facile rather than thoroughly learned and profoundly reflective. Obviously, he had never really thought things through. He certainly never grasped two of Garrett Hardin's great maxims: "We can never do merely one thing" and "And then what?"

"But perhaps Simon's most startling revelation in* A Life Against the Grain *is his apparent belief that the mind can make its own reality."

Although Simon whines about his treatment by immigration critics such as Peter Brimelow and the Federation for American Immigration Reform, he does not answer them. The closest he comes is a nasty *ad hominem* swipe at motives tucked into childhood reminiscences. From childhood on Simon was an egalitarian with an intense dislike of elitism, or a belief in the superiority of oneself or one's group to others. Elitism "explains the willingness of people to believe arguments about the low IQs of various groups..., and combined with the innate dislike of foreigners, it explains the arguments used against immigrants." (So if you're worried about immigration driving population over carrying capacity, you must be a foreigner-baiting snob. Oh.)

Amid all this, Simon recounts his depression, triggered in 1962 by guilt over something unethical he did in one of his mail-order businesses. Finally, around 1971 Simon consciously decided that he wanted to be happy. In 1973 he began observing the Jewish Sabbath, which, giving him one day's relief a week, helped him greatly. He decided not to be a perfectionist, which helped, too. His realization that he had an obligation to his children to be happy, so as to set an example for them, was the final event in his escape from depression.

As a human being one rejoices that Simon found happiness. But note that his optimistic pronouncements about resources, population, and immigration began appearing after he shook off his depression in 1975. Was his optimism really grounded in the facts, as he claimed, or was it constructed to meet a deep personal need? How badly were debates over resources, immigration, and population warped because Simon needed to be happy? This need may explain his strange persistence in making counterfactual and bizarre claims (e.g., that oil and ore come out of our minds) in the face of devastating criticisms by Garrett Hardin, Herman Daly and others – which he never mentions, let alone answers, here.

Suspicion that Simon's psychological needs drove his intellectual positions deepens when one recalls his writing in *The Ultimate Resource* that he began his population studies while depressed, and that as he came to a positive view of population growth, "my outlook for my myself, for my family, and for the future of humanity became more optimistic. Eventually, I was able to pull myself out of my depression. This is only part of the story, but there is at least some connection between the two sets of mental events – my population studies and my increasing optimism." Tellingly, after *The Ultimate Resource* appeared and was immediately seized upon by the cornucopian camp, Simon wrote in a note to himself, "I have hit the jackpot. The world has now made it easy for me to remain undepressed. I no longer must deflect my mind from my professional difficulties in order to stay happy, but instead I can now dwell on my worldly 'success' and take pleasure in it."

But perhaps Simon's most startling revelation in *A Life Against the Grain* is his apparent belief that the mind can make its own reality. A "key element" in his thinking was a belief that scientific propositions are not laws existing in nature which we discover, but rather they "follow from our own interests and perceptions as well as from the 'out there' features of the world. That is, we invent and develop the relationships we find, rather than merely discovering them." The earth, for example, is round and smooth for manufacturers of cheap globes, but flat for surveyors and farmers. "The earth does not have one shape but rather many, and the relevant 'model' – flat, round, bumpy, or whatever – depends upon your needs and interests." (Note that Simon uses "the earth" and "the relevant 'model'" of the earth interchangeably, indicative of the sleight of hand, sloppiness, or both

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which pervade his work.) Reality, then, is whatever you want and need it to be. This is the sort of "thinking" which allowed Simon to dismiss population and environmental concerns and the law of diminishing marginal returns as mere pessimistic oldthink.

But if your model of reality flows from your agenda, it merely reflects your own state of mind. So by Simon's own logic, his optimistic model of the universe depended on his "needs and interests" in remaining undepressed. Which means that his optimism does not reflect the reality "out there."

Julian Simon was one of the most important minds of the past twenty years – not because he was right, but because he was disastrously wrong, and worked powerfully to wrench the resource, immigration, and population debates away from reality and into fantasy. Although indifferently written, *A Life Against the Grain* is useful for what it reveals of the mind and motives of a deeply pernicious figure. ■

Filters Against Folly

Renewed interest in a Hardin classic

Book Review by Carl Bajema

The American economist Kenneth Boulding has contended that it is "almost criminal to teach people things they do not really need to know if this prevents them from learning things they do need to know." The shortcomings of the formal education provided by our schools, colleges, and universities have been discussed in numerous reports but little attention has been devoted to how educators can better help students learn how to become more critical thinkers. One important exception is the book *Filters Against Folly: How To Survive Despite Economists, Ecologists and the Merely Eloquent.* The political scientist Lynton Caldwell, who reviewed the manuscript of this book, concluded that it "offers an antidote to some of the more perverse and dangerous irrationalities of our time: wishful self-delusion, educated incapacity, and foolhardy optimism."

Filters Against Folly: How to Survive Despite Economists, Ecologists and the Merely Eloquent
by Garrett Hardin
New York: Viking Press
123 pages, $15.95

Our increasingly complex and interdependent society requires the development of more effective problem solving strategies. Garret Hardin asks, "How are we laymen to survive in a world increasingly dominated by experts?" We need lay defenses to protect ourselves against the assumptions (conscious and unconscious), the biases, the prejudices and ignorance of experts so that we can evaluate the claims of experts as we citizens try to identify the most appropriate course of action. Hardin contends that the greatest folly citizens can commit when confronted with expert testimony is to accept expert statements uncritically. The statement that "The authority of a scholar is measured by how long he/she can delay progress in his/her field" applies equally to experts in engineering and government as well as in science and theology.

Experts, be they economists, ecologists or linguists, have been aptly described as individuals who know more and more about less and less. Since the world is too complex for our minds to remember every detail and to easily encompass the whole, experts employ filters to set aside certain dimensions of reality as trivial or as something to be dealt with by another expert. Since different filters alter the total picture of reality in different ways, we need to know the characteristics of the intellectual filters used by experts as well as by ourselves in solving problems. Professor Hardin identifies three major filters against folly that

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we citizens can use against the blindness, short-sightedness, and sheer idiocy that so often comes disguised as eloquence or expertise.

The first filter is **literacy** – "the ability to understand what words really mean." The second is **numeracy** – "the ability not only to quantify information, but also to interpret it intelligently." Hardin calls the last filter **ecolacy** – the ability to take into account the effects of complex interactions of systems over time.

Hardin contends that most of the major controversies of our time can be better understood as the result of the participants relying too much on any single one of these three filters. Since no one filter by itself is adequate for understanding reality and predicting the consequences of our actions, Hardin devotes the rest of the book to a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three filters.

Literacy – skill in the written and spoken language – enables us to draw on the wisdom (and foolishness) of human beings distant from us in space and time. In his discussion of the sins of the literate, Hardin contends that language has two functions beyond communication – "to promote thought and to prevent it." He spends most of the chapter identifying ways in which we use language to prevent thought. While his discussion of the "verbal diarrhea" or the merely eloquent and the misuse of poetic license is fascinating, it is Hardin's discussion of the use of such discussion-stoppers as "infinite," "inexhaustible," "non-negotiable," "self-evident," "must" and "imperative" to prevent the use of the other two intellectual filters against folly that is most revealing. Hardin also asks why we always talk about shortages rather than about "longages" of demand or of people. He concludes that it is in large part due to the fact that virtually no one profits from supplying less. Hardin's penetrating analyses of how language has been used to distort our perception of the world echos the concerns of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who wrote, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."

The World of Numbers

In a moment of frustration Mark Twain is reported to have shouted, "There are lies, damned lies and statistics!" In a world where people are very numerous and where many people use numbers in an effort to convince others to behave in certain ways, a responsible citizen has no choice but to become numerate as well as literate. **Numeracy** involves the ability to measure and to interpret quantities, proportions and rates. Hardin points out that human beings have all too often learned how to use the resources of literacy to hide numbers and the need for numerate analysis. Hardin draws attention to the problems created by always thinking solely in terms of dichotomies (safe vs unsafe, pure vs impure) rather than in terms of relative risks and benefits, etc. The widespread apathy to quantitative analysis which is so important in science, technology, business, and government, while understandable as an emotional reaction to the remarks of the more arrogant of the practitioners of numeracy, bodes ill for a complex and fast moving society where quantities, ratios, rates and duration of time all matter. Hardin also discusses the limitations of numeracy – that the conclusions of an accurate mathematical analysis is only as good as its premises. Hardin concludes that "Given effective education – a rare commodity, of course – a numerate orientation is probably within the reach of most normal people."

And Then There Is the Environment

It is when Hardin discusses the intellectual filter **ecolacy** that he is at his best because he has spent the last 40 years studying ecology, evolution and their bioethical dimensions. A more comprehensive development of ecolacy – the ability to ask and answer the question: *and then what*? so that the effects of the interactions of systems over time can be taken into account – is necessary if we are not to fall victim to the forces we unleash and are unwilling or unable to control.

Science has been defined as the knowledge of consequences by the philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Scientists have been extremely successful employing reductionistic methodology – breaking problems down into their components and studying the properties of these components and their interactions. This has led to the ascendancy of what has been called the engineering mentality – thinking that we can do just one thing. The way we think about cause-effects of our actions/ inactions. Our world is not made up of simple systems where an event is produced by a single

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isolated cause and has a single isolated effect. When we expand the very short time frame most scientists, technicians, businessmen, and government planners employ in studying processes, it becomes obvious that effects become causes of still further effects in the future – that causal chains of events rather than single effects are reality. It also becomes obvious that events are embedded in causal networks – that events are produced by multiple causes and have multiple effects, each of which triggers a causal chain of future events.

Some ecologists have tried to draw attention to the interrelatedness of our world by stating that *everything is related to everything else* (sometimes called Barry Commoner's first law of ecology). This statement has been criticized by many scholars because while it is valuable as a warning it is useless as a guide to action. While all things in the environment interact they interact in different ways. The ecologist Garrett Hardin restated this important ecological understanding in the following language so that it can serve as a guide to action: WE CAN NEVER DO MERELY ONE THING which is now known as Hardin's Law. The language that we have used to describe the effects of our actions demonstrates the reality that Hardin's Law draws our attention to. We talk about effects and side-effects, products and wastes.

Hardin contends that since we cannot do just one thing we must always ask and answer the question *and then what?* when we try to ascertain the benefits and costs of proposed courses of action on both the individual as well as social levels. The ecological systems way of thinking employs modern scientific theories and knowledge to study a world of interlocking processes characterized by many reciprocal cause-effect pathways. The ecological systems way of thinking has to become an integral part of the thinking of the well-educated person if we are to adequately control technology rather than fall victim to the forces we generate and are unable or unwilling to control. Ecological systems thinking provides well-educated persons with the opportunity to act more rationally, because they have learned a more comprehensive and more accurate way of estimating the probable costs and benefits of their actions.

After the explosion of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Albert Einstein is reported to have said: "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking."

The recent construction and computer simulation of ecological scenarios of the medical, ecological and politico-economic consequences of nuclear war is one example of the success of ecolacy – asking and attempting to answer the question *and then what?* The nuclear war casualty estimates made by military experts were shown to be gross underestimates when scientists used both the ecolate and numerate filters to examine the human casualties predicted by the military experts. The smoke and dust from nuclear weapons explosions and the resulting firestorms – effects which were thought to be so trivial by military experts that they were not carefully quantified and studied – have been mathematically modeled, and the resulting computer scenarios have produced what is now widely known as the Nuclear Winter Scenario, in which more people are expected to die of starvation generated by the long range climatic effects (the cold and dark) than by the immediate consequences of radiation sickness and burns.

"One element more than anything else divides economists and ecologists: the different conceptions the two groups give to time as an element binding human decisions."

Numerous problem-solving strategies separate ecologists from economists. One approach in economics that ecologists reject is the classifying of certain costs as "external" to the decision making process whose adverse effects can then be conveniently ignored. One element more than anything else divides economists and ecologists: the different conceptions the two groups give to time as an element binding human decisions. Hardin points out that "at high rates of interest the present value of the future effectively vanishes" and contends that "A

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culture of poverty is one in which the future is discounted – both implicitly and explicitly – at a very high rate." Professor Hardin contends that while the economic theory of discounting the future makes a certain amount of sense, the permanent features of an enduring civilization are built on actions that do not discount the future.

Hardin devotes considerable space to a discussion of the commons – a tragic political/economic system for distributing the costs and benefits of human actions/inactions. He warns his readers against the tragic consequences of the Double C-Double P game, the wedding of commonized costs with privatized profits. Hardin contends that Marxists have concentrated too much "on the relatively trivial fact of 'ownership,' while ignoring the critical act of 'distribution.'" Hardin contends time spent in getting our verbs correct – ascertaining whether the distribution of costs and benefits is privatized, commonized, or socialized is far more important than "splitting hairs over the meaning of nouns."

Humans pursue scientific understanding for two reasons – understanding and control. Hardin contends that effective educational reform will go beyond a return to the basics – the "Three R's of READING, WRITING and ARITHMETIC" – and provide learning experiences that enable students to develop the skills necessary to use the "Three Intellectual Filters of LITERACY, NUMERACY, and ECOLACY" against human folly.

The modern world-view has been based on an almost exclusively individualistic basis. Hardin contends we are headed for disaster unless we take account of the ecological consequences of our actions/inactions. What should an ecologically oriented education include? Ecological education in the social/biological sciences should include the study of such topics as the flows of energy, matter and information, exponential growth rates, the limits to growth (second law of thermodynamics, the carrying capacity of the environment, etc.) and adaptive genetic and cultural evolution by selection theories. Cybernetics, game theory, and the computer simulation of ecological scenarios should be part of the curriculum as well as systems analyses that demonstrate how various political systems distribute the costs and benefits of using environmental resources and thus affect the wastage of resources, the production of pollutants, and the quality of life of all citizens.

The compartmentalized reductionistic approach to education should not be allowed to continue to dominate education. The continued production of narrow-minded, trained specialists in the humanities, social sciences and the natural sciences is inconsistent with the educational goal of helping students become well-educated persons. Educators who wish to help their students become well-educated must provide learning experiences that integrate rather than fractionate our knowledge of the world. Reading *Filters Against Folly* is a good way for educators as well as citizens to begin the necessary intellectual retooling for gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the world around us and how we can make more humane choices in interacting with other human beings and the rest of the world. ■

A Disquieting View of the Southern Border

It's too bad we have come to the point where an agency like the Cochise County (Arizona) Solid Waste Department needs to put out a call for volunteers to clean up immigrant trash sites:

Information for the Second Illegal Immigrant Cleanup Event

Date: Saturday, December 6, 2003 Time: 9:00 a.m.

Location: Brown Canyon Trailhead on Ramsey Canyon Road 3 miles west from Highway 92.

Information: Parking limited, please carpool if possible. Shuttle available.

Bring: Wear long sleeve shirts, pants, and comfortable walking/hiking shoes. Cleanup site about 3/4 mile from trailhead.

Equipment: County will provide insect repellant, gloves, trash bags, water, and face masks. Volunteers will not be picking up hazardous waste and materials.

If you or your group would like to help, please contact...

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The Bulletin Board

Immigration on the Internet

Here are some additional sites that readers may find of interest. Listing them here does not imply endorsement of the material on any specific site.

- The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR): www.fairus.org.
- Diversity Alliance for a Sustainable America at www.diversityalliance.org.
- Immigration by the Numbers: www.numbersusa.com.
- ProEnglish: www.proenglish.org.
- Californians for Population Stabilization (CAPS): www.capsweb.org
- A new voice for population/environment issues: www.sprawlcity.org.
- Center for Immigration Studies: www.cis.org.
- *Limits to Growth* edited by Brenda Walker: www.LimitsToGrowth.org.
- Dedicated to preserving the literature of Garrett Hardin, Ph.D.: www.GarrettHardinSociety.org.
- Friends of Immigration Law Enforcement: www.fileus.com.
- www.ImmigrationsHumanCost.org.
- Rob Sanchez keeps track of H1-B visa developments at www.ZaZona.com.
- Alternatives to Growth Oregon at: www.agoregon.org.
- National parks at our southern border are being overrun by an overwhelming number of illegal aliens: www.desertinvasion.us.
- Comments from Peter Brimelow, Joseph Fallon, and others: www.vdare.com.
- Colorado Alliance for Immigration Reform (CAIR) and links to other state-based organizations: www.cairco.org.
- Carrying Capacity Network: www.carryingcapacity.org.
- Negative Population Growth: www.npg.org.
- California Coalition for Immigration Reform: www.ccir.net.
- Philip Martin's *Migration News:* www.migration.ucdavis.edu.
- Professor Norman Matloff: www.heather.cs.ucdavis.edu /pub/Immigration/Index.html.
- Midwest Coalition for Responsible Immigration: www.enteract.com/~mcri97.
- Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization: www.susps.org.
- *People and Place* is published in Australia by the Centre for Population and Urban Research: www.elecpress.monash.edu.au/pnp.
- Canadian Immigration Reform Committee: www.canadafirst.net.
- Terminology is important: www.illegalaliens.us.
- Voices of Citizens Together: www.americanpatrol.com.
- Council of Conservative Citizens: www.cofcc.org.
- Juan Mann hosts a website at www.DeportAliens.com.
- The Biocentric Institute: www.iapm.org/biocenter.html.
- Stalking the Wild Taboo: www.lrainc.com/swtaboo/.
- ProjectUSA: www.projectusa.org.
- The European Forum for Migration Studies: www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/home.html.
- Floridians for a Sustainable Population: www.flsuspop.org.
- Population and Sustainability: www.ecofuture.org/populat.html.
- American Renaissance: www.amren.com.
- *Mankind Quarterly:* www.mankind.org.
- Federal Publications (developments in immigration law): http://www.fedpub.com/fedpub/immigrat.htm.
- www.TheOccidentalQuarterly.org.
- Middle America News with features on immigration, multiculturalism etc: www.manews.org.

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"A much-needed, solid and systematic guide to an unknown history: America's constant effort to control immigration in the national interest."
—**PETER BRIMELOW**, author of *Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster*



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